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TIME

Friday, Oct. 05, 1962

Cuba: The Double-Secret Plot

Out of Cuba last week came news of a daring plot to overthrow Fidel Castro's Communist regime. Though Castro himself said nothing and his captive press kept it quiet, Cuban censors let pass an Associated Press report from Havana giving some details of the plot and the fate of the plotters. Miami's Cuban exiles confirmed the story; so did refugees newly arrived from Castro's fortress island and the chief of an inside-Cuba underground organization who was briefly in the U.S. A major revolt was indeed planned for late last month—and was discovered by Castro's agents.

Sight.

WHAT?

MONEYCOURSE:

The rebels intended to kill Castro and other members of the Communist hierarchy, then follow up with sabotage and uprisings that would engulf Cuba in turmoil. Behind the plot was a reorganized Cuban underground, including a new group consisting largely of Cuban military men fed up with Castro. The plotters reportedly had backing in the Cuban army, the navy, even the militia. But they paid dearly for their plans.

One refugee arriving in Miami last week brought news that 70 navy officers and men had been arrested after Castro's G-2 uncovered the plot. All told, more than 300 suspects were rounded up. After secret trials, 75 of the plotters were executed by firing squads at La Cabana fortress overlooking the entrance to Havana Bay; 27 were sentenced to from two to 30 years in prison. Last week Havana radio, still silent about the major plot, announced five arrests—the grand master of Cuba's Masonic Lodge and four other Masons, who were charged with being "directly linked to the CIA."

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6, 20 years later: still lying, still half news, still ignorance of crucial facts, still totally unequal low crisis ended ("soon")

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Monday, Sep. 27, 1982

Reagan Frege p2-CM

TIME

Essay: The Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis

By Andrew Ross Nov. 7?

For 13 chilling days in October 1962, it seemed that John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev might be playing out the opening scenes of World War III. The Cuban missile crisis was a uniquely compact moment of history. For the first time in the nuclear age, the two superpowers found themselves in a sort of moral road test of their apocalyptic powers.

The crisis blew up suddenly. The U.S. discovered that the Soviet Union, despite repeated and solemn denials, was installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. An American U-2 spy plane came back with photographs of the bases and their support facilities under construction: clear, irrefutable evidence. Kennedy assembled a task force of advisers. Some of them wanted to invade Cuba. In the end, Kennedy chose a course of artful restraint; he laid down a naval quarantine. After six days, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet missiles would be dismantled.

The crisis served some purposes. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have had no comparable collision since then. On the other hand, the humiliation that Khrushchev suffered may have hastened his fall. The experience may be partly responsible for both the Soviet military buildup in the past two decades and whatever enthusiasm the Soviets have displayed for nuclear disarmament.

Now, on the 20th anniversary of the crisis, six of Kennedy's men have collaborated on a remarkable joint statement on the lessons of that October. It contains some new information, particularly in Point Eight, and at least one of their conclusions is startling and controversial: their thought that, contrary to the widespread assumption of the past two decades, the American nuclear superiority over the Soviets in 1962 had no crucial influence with Washington or Moscow at the time—and that in general, nuclear superiority is insignificant.

The authors are Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State; Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense; George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Theodore Sorensen, special counsel to the President; and McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the President for national security affairs. Their analysis:

In the years since the Cuban missile crisis, many commentators have examined the affair and offered a wide variety of conclusions. It seems fitting now that some of us who worked particularly closely with President Kennedy during that crisis should offer a few comments, with the advantages both of participation and of hindsight.

McK: "Commitment was the problem." See,

4-4-15

? NO { FIRST: The crisis could and should have been avoided. If we had done an earlier, stronger and clearer job of explaining our position on Soviet nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere, or if the Soviet government had more carefully assessed the evidence that did exist on this point, it is likely that the missiles would never have been sent to Cuba. The importance of accurate mutual assessment of interests between the two superpowers is evident and continuous.

Margaret

R, B

SECOND: Reliable intelligence permitting an effective choice of response was obtained only just in time. It was primarily a mistake by policymakers, not by professionals, that made such intelligence unavailable sooner. But it was also a timely recognition of the need for thorough overflight, not without its hazards, that produced the decisive photographs. The usefulness and scope of inspection from above, also employed in monitoring the Soviet missile withdrawal, should never be underestimated. When the importance of accurate information for a crucial policy decision is high enough, risks not otherwise acceptable in collecting intelligence can become profoundly prudent.

? But no action about that will be spontaneous

i.e. R & B wrong to delay

THIRD: The President wisely took his time in choosing a course of action. A quick decision would certainly have been less carefully designed and could well have produced a much higher risk of catastrophe. The fact that the crisis did not become public in its first week obviously made it easier for President Kennedy to consider his options with a maximum of care and a minimum of outside pressure. Not every future crisis will be so quiet in its first phase, but Americans should always respect the need for a period of confidential and careful deliberation in dealing with a major international crisis.

don't get nervous of too much news!

Without A (from JFK reluctance to attack), BIG danger - K win.

OK

prior decision

OK

OK

FOURTH: The decisive military element in the resolution of the crisis was our clearly available and applicable superiority in conventional weapons within the area of the crisis. U.S. naval forces, quickly deployable for the blockade of offensive weapons that was sensibly termed a quarantine, and the availability of U.S. ground and air forces sufficient to execute an invasion if necessary, made the difference. American nuclear superiority was not in our view a critical factor, for the fundamental and controlling reason that nuclear war, already in 1962, would have been an unexampled catastrophe for both sides; the balance of terror so eloquently described by Winston Churchill seven years earlier was in full operation. No one of us ever reviewed the nuclear balance for comfort in those hard weeks. The Cuban missile crisis illustrates not the significance but the insignificance of nuclear superiority in the face of survivable thermonuclear retaliatory forces. It also shows the crucial role of rapidly available conventional strength.

(A) And how news (and control!)

Good that Berlin looked bad for us...

if you're about to invade, anyone.

if posture had been reversed...?

FIFTH: The political and military pressure created by the quarantine was matched by a diplomatic effort that ignored no relevant means of communication with both our friends and our adversary. Communication to and from our allies in Europe was intense, and their support sturdy. The Organization of American States gave the moral and legal authority of its regional backing to the quarantine, making it plain that Soviet

but without Rep, we wouldn't have been in Berlin...

& make K think to Berlin, Sunday, less crucial: yet JFK still expected it? (Cochran) - later?

nuclear weapons were profoundly unwelcome in the Americas. In the U.N., Ambassador Adlai Stevenson drove home with angry eloquence and unanswerable photographic evidence the facts of the Soviet deployment and deception.

Still more important, communication was established and maintained, once our basic course was set, with the government of the Soviet Union. If the crisis itself showed the cost of mutual incomprehension, its resolution showed the value of serious and sustained communication, and in particular of direct exchanges between the two heads of government.

*Was this criticism? (See front page!)
What if no letter?*

No When great states come anywhere near the brink in the nuclear age, there is no room for games of blindman's buff. Nor can friends be led by silence. They must know what we are doing and why. Effective communication is never more important than when there is a military confrontation.

SIXTH: This diplomatic effort and indeed our whole course of action were greatly reinforced by the fact that our position was squarely based on irrefutable evidence that the Soviet government was doing exactly what it had repeatedly denied that it would do. The support of our allies and the readiness of the Soviet government to draw back were heavily affected by the public demonstration of a Soviet course of conduct that simply could not be defended. In this demonstration no evidence less explicit and authoritative than that of photography would have been sufficient, and it was one of President Kennedy's best decisions that the ordinary requirements of secrecy in such matters should be brushed aside in the interest of persuasive exposition. There are times when a display of hard evidence is more valuable than protection of intelligence techniques.

LIES
not quite FA

SEVENTH: In the successful resolution of the crisis, restraint was as important as strength. In particular, we avoided any early initiation of battle by American forces, and indeed we took no action of any kind that would have forced an instant and possibly ill-considered response. Moreover, we limited our demands to the restoration of the status quo ante, that is, the removal of any Soviet nuclear capability from Cuba. There was no demand for "total victory" or "unconditional surrender." These choices gave the Soviet government both time and opportunity to respond with equal restraint. It is wrong, in relations between the superpowers, for either side to leave the other with no way out but war or humiliation.

study? no
EIGHTH: On two points of particular interest to the Soviet government, we made sure that it had the benefit of knowing the independently reached positions of President Kennedy. One assurance was public and the other private.

Publicly we made it clear that the U.S. would not invade Cuba if the Soviet missiles were withdrawn. The President never shared the view that the missile crisis should be "used" to pick a fight to the finish with Castro; he correctly insisted that the real issue in the crisis was with the Soviet government, and that the one vital bone of contention was the secret and deceit-covered movement of Soviet missiles into Cuba. He recognized that an invasion by U.S. forces would be bitter and bloody, and that it would leave festering wounds in the body politic of the Western Hemisphere. The no-invasion assurance was not a concession,

yes. us. VCS
with implication?
W44
SECRET??
("We are #1")

See Oct-2
Cancel US have limited deployment, if other...?
Blockade? Regally? Politically?
Castro...

inoperative?

but a statement of our own clear preference—once the missiles were withdrawn.

The second and private assurance—communicated on the President's instructions by Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin on the evening of Oct. 27—was that the President had determined that once the crisis was resolved, the American missiles then in Turkey would be removed. (The essence of this secret assurance was revealed by Robert Kennedy in his 1969 book *Thirteen Days*, and a more detailed account, drawn from many sources but not from discussion with any of us, was published by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. in *Robert Kennedy and His Times* in 1978. In these circumstances, we think it is now proper for those of us privy to that decision to discuss the matter.) This could not be a "deal"—our missiles in Turkey for theirs in Cuba—as the Soviet government had just proposed. The matter involved the concerns of our allies, and we could not put ourselves in the position of appearing to trade their protection for our own. But in fact President Kennedy had long since reached the conclusion that the outmoded and vulnerable missiles in Turkey should be withdrawn. In the spring of 1961 Secretary Rusk had begun the necessary discussions with high Turkish officials. These officials asked for delay, at least until Polaris submarines could be deployed in the Mediterranean. While the matter was not pressed to a conclusion in the following year and a half, the missile crisis itself reinforced the President's convictions. It was entirely right that the Soviet government should understand this reality.

about?
OR, NEVER?

WHY NOT EARLIER? OR, RUSK 1957 LIE?

RUSK still concerned — for 5 more years — the Cuban missile crisis

Sovereign: it was a deal, "H.S.U. memo..."

This second assurance was kept secret because the few who knew about it at the time were in unanimous agreement that any other course would have had explosive and destructive effects on the security of the U.S. and its allies. If made public in the context of the Soviet proposal to make a "deal," the unilateral decision reached by the President would have been misread as an unwilling concession granted in fear at the expense of an ally. It seemed better to tell the Soviets the real position in private, and in a way that would prevent any such misunderstanding. Robert Kennedy made it plain to Ambassador Dobrynin that any attempt to treat the President's unilateral assurance as part of a deal would simply make that assurance inoperative.

all that, + REIC

to avoid GW?

Although for separate reasons neither the public nor the private assurance ever became a formal commitment of the U.S. Government, the validity of both was demonstrated by our later actions; there was no invasion of Cuba, and the vulnerable missiles in Turkey (and Italy) were withdrawn, with allied concurrence, to be replaced by invulnerable Polaris submarines. Both results were in our own clear interest, and both assurances were helpful in making it easier for the Soviet government to decide to withdraw its missiles.

? why not?

As it went "unilateral" —

depended on the behavior?

Turkey?

NO! Note the private "American reaction. Could be told President? Did he? China, NO!

In part this was secret diplomacy, including a secret assurance. Any failure to make good on that assurance would obviously have had damaging effects on Soviet-American relations. But it is of critical importance here that the President gave no assurance that went beyond his own presidential powers; in particular he made no commitment that required congressional approval or even support. The decision that the missiles in Turkey should be removed was one that the President had full and unquestioned authority to make and execute.

LIE TO IKE

Turkey?!

? He (and to spend the up?)

When it will help your own country for your adversary to know your settled intentions, you should find

"no invasion seen 'unilateral'" as possible option

ULT? BLUFF! in Rank '87

effective ways of making sure that he does, and a secret assurance is justified when a) you can keep your word, and b) no other course can avoid grave damage to your country's legitimate interests.

YES

NINTH: The gravest risk in this crisis was not that either head of government desired to initiate a major escalation but that events would produce actions, reactions or miscalculations carrying the conflict beyond the control of one or the other or both. In retrospect we are inclined to think that both men would have taken every possible step to prevent such a result, but at the time no one near the top of either government could have that certainty about the other side. In any crisis involving the superpowers, firm control by the heads of both governments is essential to the avoidance of an unpredictably escalating conflict.

on its own!

NO

TENTH: The successful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis was fundamentally the achievement of two men, John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev. We know that in this anniversary year John Kennedy would wish us to emphasize the contribution of Khrushchev; the fact that an earlier and less prudent decision by the Soviet leader made the crisis inevitable does not detract from the statesmanship of his change of course. We may be forgiven, however, if we give the last and highest word of honor to our own President, whose cautious determination, steady composure, deep-seated compassion and, above all, continuously attentive control of our options and actions brilliantly served his country and all mankind. -

Richard

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Account variables - or "Trading" (MRF agreement)
- as Oct 6 B wanted after Oct 22, + 8 tw - would have
(or, MRF before Sept 3?) want what?

(Why to secure the of "Long Arms":
or JFK, for allowing it later to have
been done.

(Would it have gone down, with different
US policy? 8 year question...)

What if: no Berlin envelope? "Free of": negotiation.
2M

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Who wrote?

If JFK ever wrote a note this long, or dictated it - I'd never see it.

TIME

Monday, Mar. 31, 2003

41 yrs later

Averting the Apocalypse

By Robert McNamara

Oct. 27, 1962

RRR: "ambrose"?

did it?

(A-3 A-01) early Monday

well, NO

At 4 p.m., the Joint Chiefs recommended to President John F. Kennedy that the U.S. attack Cuba within 36 hours and destroy the Soviet missiles we had detected, believing — as the CIA estimated — the nuclear warheads had not yet been delivered. It would be a huge attack: the first day's air strike would be 1,080 sorties. This would be followed by an invasion; we had 180,000 troops mobilized in southeastern U.S. ports. We didn't learn until 30 years later that the Soviets already had 162 warheads in Cuba, and Fidel Castro had already recommended to Nikita Khrushchev that nuclear weapons be used if the U.S. invaded. That's how close we came. Events were slipping out of control.

KS:

SAC, AA, sub, U-2

When Kennedy first learned of the missiles, on Oct. 16, he knew he had to get them out of Cuba. For a month before, Soviet officials had told us no missiles had been delivered to Cuba and none would be. Clearly the Soviets had introduced them under the cloak of deception, and if they got away with that, they might believe they could do it elsewhere. That day Kennedy brought together his top advisers and told us to meet until we came to an agreement on what course to take.

Swearing

in favor of US illegal action

THROUGH LEGAL

wild trade?

McN

By Oct. 21 one group of advisers thought we should try to force the missiles out without military action, that is by a quarantine — we called it a quarantine because a blockade is an act of war — and the other group recommended an attack. Kennedy asked General Walter Sweeney, chief of the Tactical Air Command, if he was certain he could take out all the missiles. Sweeney replied, "We have the finest fighter force in the world; we have trained for this kind of operation, and they would destroy the great majority. But there might be one or two or five left." What President would knowingly take the risk of exposing millions of Americans to attack by not destroying one, two or five nuclear weapons? At that moment I knew Kennedy would decide on a quarantine.

COULD NOT WORK WITHOUT CRED. THREAT

So, not unanimous

True

Pres: trade? results IC offer?

Even so, by Oct. 27 Khrushchev was not giving any sign of backing down. We met all day with the President, split between those who believed we should attack and those who thought we should negotiate. The Joint Chiefs pushed for an invasion. Khrushchev had sent a hard-line offer that morning. But Kennedy decided simply to take the Soviet leader up on his offer of the previous night, proposing to withdraw the missiles if

What if he had rejected RRR offer and removed ult? and JFK should reject it, removed ult? w/o plan in Cuba? He contacts. Which would cause crisis? IC would 5/24/2003 3:31 PM

NO
yes

the U.S. promised not to invade Cuba. Khrushchev accepted on Sunday. He was so worried that war would break out in the six hours it took to encode and transmit a message from the Kremlin to the White House, he broadcast his response on Moscow public radio.

(why?) Waited during Sunday in Moscow

He had to - not because of RFK threat -

(24-48 hours: 12-36 left Sunday morning.

UCS: Monday morning - (4AM?)

McNamara was J.F.K.'s Secretary of Defense

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TIME

Monday, Nov. 22, 1982

The Soviets: One Quota That Was Overfulfilled

By Strobe Talbott; Bruce W. Nelan

Brezhnev's arms buildup gave Moscow an edge in some key areas

When John Kennedy demanded that Nikita Khrushchev remove Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962, the American President was carrying a big stick: roughly a 10-to-1 superiority over the U.S.S.R. in nuclear weaponry. At the time, and for years afterward, it was commonly accepted in both Moscow and Washington that the overwhelming U.S. nuclear advantage had enabled Kennedy to go to the brink and force Khrushchev to back down. The episode humiliated the Soviet leadership and contributed to Khrushchev's downfall two years later. Leonid Brezhnev and his comrades were determined that the Soviet Union catch up to the U.S. in all forms of military power, but particularly in the nuclear forces that were believed to have been politically crucial in the Cuban missile crisis.*

K did not!

*crappy
SU reason!*

*4-3-15
SU: Wrong! Reason: he was of
debris the war!*

In sponsoring the arms buildup, Brezhnev turned out to be a true Stakhanovite: he overfulfilled his quota.

1982

When he died last week, he left to Yuri Andropov a military machine that is at least as powerful as the U.S.'s in some respects, and more powerful in others. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. now possess approximately the same number of ballistic missile warheads—more than 7,000. These warheads are the fastest, most accurate and destructive long-range weapons in the two sides' arsenals of last resort. In Soviet eyes, they symbolize the U.S.S.R.'s attainment of equality with the U.S. as a superpower.

To many Americans and other Westerners, however, the Soviet accumulation of nuclear arms represents something far more menacing. The weapons proliferated so rapidly and so massively during the 18 years of Brezhnev's reign that they conveyed the impression of a juggernaut. American deployments during the same period, while formidable in their own right, tended to occur more in fits and starts.

The Soviets have concentrated their nuclear firepower on giant land-based missiles that could, according to some worst-case scenarios, be used to launch a sneak attack and deprive the U.S. of a large portion of its ability to strike back. The smaller American nuclear weapons, by contrast, have traditionally been better suited for retaliatory, rather than preemptive, missions. Moreover, by unveiling a new generation of shorter-range missiles targeted against Europe, the Soviets have raised anxieties in NATO about the West

PR!

SS-20

(a threat - to both! - Poland's desert from!)

** see JFK/McN wrong about control of Jamb. missiles was strict!*

P. didn't contribute to July 12/12 4:34 PM

being bullied or blackmailed in some future crisis.

The Kremlin's nuclear buildup has been accompanied by an equally disturbing increase in conventional strength and the ability to project power around the world. It has added ground forces and modernized its armored units in Eastern Europe. The Soviet navy has evolved from little more than a coastal patrol force to a bluewater, 300-vessel fleet that could threaten the industrialized democracies' sea lines of communication.

Utilizing its new global reach, the U.S.S.R. under Brezhnev also embarked on adventures far from its traditional sphere of interest. During a period when the U.S. was shrinking from overseas commitments because of Viet Nam, the Soviet Union was busy making mischief, on its own and by proxy, in Africa, Indochina and Central America, although it did avoid situations that might bring direct conflict with the U.S.

The combination of Soviet military acquisitiveness and geopolitical assertiveness has led some in the West, notably Ronald Reagan, to an alarming conclusion: despite its declared aspiration merely to attain parity with the U.S., the U.S.S.R. has actually achieved cross-the-board superiority. But that judgment does not take sufficiently into account a number of problems that plague the Soviet Union and offset what otherwise might be decisive advantages. Precisely because it has been so unrestrained in beefing up its military might and throwing its weight around the world, the Soviet Union has provoked countermeasures by the West that will further complicate the U.S.S.R.'s defense planning as well as help deter it from possible aggression.

The Kremlin's much vaunted missile force, which Reagan cites as proof of Soviet superiority, is far less diversified and mobile than America's. In a few years the most threatening of the Soviet rockets will themselves be threatened by the latest U.S. warheads. Some of those are already deployed on Minuteman intercontinental missiles, and others are destined for the Trident II submarine-launched missile and the MX. Even if the MX is defeated by political opposition, the Minuteman and the Trident II programs could still expose the Soviet Union to a mirror image of the "window of vulnerability" that so worries Reagan.

oh well { That vulnerability will be even more acute for the Soviets, since their submarines and bombers are far inferior to those of the U.S. So are Soviet precision-guided munitions, miniaturized guidance systems and other high-tech hardware that proved so devastating in the Falklands and Lebanon.

The Warsaw Pact has a numerical edge over NATO in various categories of weaponry, but the very name of that alliance ought to serve as a reminder of one of its fundamental weaknesses: the Soviet Union is heavily reliant on Poland and other resentful, potentially mutinous satellites for supply lines and soldiers.

Moreover, 49 divisions totaling more than 500,000 troops, nearly a quarter of the Soviet army, are tied down on the Chinese border. When Brezhnev took over from Khrushchev, there were only 17 divisions in the Far East.

Thus the Soviet Union over which Andropov now presides is vastly more powerful, both in the absolute and by comparison with the U.S., than it was two decades ago. That is thanks largely to Leonid Brezhnev. But

while the Soviet ability to exert force on the world has grown, so have the external dangers and internal defects with which its new leaders must cope. That too is Brezhnev's legacy.

—By Strobe Talbott.

Reported by Bruce W. Nelan/Washington

*Reappraising the crisis 20 years after it occurred, six of J.F.K.'s top advisers challenged the conventional wisdom. Writing in TIME (Sept. 27), they concluded that Kennedy had prevailed not because of his nuclear ace in the hole but because Cuba was so near the U.S. and because he had Khrushchev outgunned with conventional forces in the region.

~~Sept. 27~~ ? NO

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[◀ Back to Article](#)[🖨️ Click to Print](#)**TIME**

Friday, Aug. 17, 1962

Berlin: A Year Later

When the Communists built their ugly Wall across Berlin last year, East Germany's Red Boss Walter Ulbricht freely predicted that the barrier would bring prosperity to his own puppet nation and strangulation to the hated capitalists of West Berlin. Last week, on the Wall's first anniversary, it was clear that just the opposite had happened.

Shiny cars clogged West Berlin's broad Kurfürstendamm, while pedestrians window-shopped at fancy stores or looked for an empty seat at one of the many sidewalk cafes. Tourists were flocking in as never before, and savings accounts were at the record level of \$366.5 million, \$20 million higher than in early August last year. Although West Berlin's industry was beginning to feel the effects of the tapering West German economic boom, there were still job vacancies for 29,000 workers. The panicky exodus of thousands from West Berlin in the days immediately after the Wall was built has been halted; nowadays about the same number of people come to West Berlin to live as leave it. The city's officials happily report that it is the young who arrive, the old who leave.

The Dismal East. Despite West Berlin's stability, there was just a touch of tension in the air last week. Part of it came from the spate of new rumors that Moscow will soon sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, a move that would bring new efforts to shut off West Berliners' few remaining access routes to the West. West Berliners were also nervous at the chance that hordes of restive East Germans might choose the Wall's anniversary as an occasion for a mass escape attempt through the 95 miles of concrete, barbed wire and death strips that surround the western half of the city.

This would surely bring bloodshed along the border.

The Communists were also clearly aware of the potential danger. Replacing the regular police and army units that usually patrol the Wall—more than 500 of whom have fled to the West—were two regiments of specially selected toughs from Saxony whom East Berliners bitterly call "the fifth occupying power." In contrast to Vopos, who have been known to look the other way during an escape, the Saxons shoot to kill

without a second thought. Even so, an average of ten East Germans a day leap, crawl, dig or swim their way to freedom. One couple even floated its infant across the Havel River in a bathtub. Since the Wall went up a year ago, 12,000 refugees have made it safely out of the Soviet zone; 49 who tried to reach West Berlin have died.

Escape is a risk worth taking, for life in East Germany has become sheer misery. The crippled economy can turn out precious little of the consumer goods that East Germans need so desperately. One reason: imported Soviet managerial experts control the output of such basic industries as mining and steel, give Moscow top priority for East German manufactures. East German food production has fallen sharply in the past twelve months. Potatoes, once a staple, have been imported from the uncollectivized farms of Communist Poland; last week meat and sausage went on the ration list, to join butter, which has been strictly allocated for 18 months. For complainers, there was the ever-present fear of a Communist jail cell or a Communist pistol.

All in all, though West Berlin was surrounded by Red territory, it seemed clear to people on both sides of the barrier on anniversary day that it was the East Germans who were on the inside and the West Berliners who were outside.

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[◀ Back to Article](#)[🖨 Click to Print](#)**TIME**

Friday, Aug. 31, 1962

Cuba: Russian Ships Arrive

For months Russia seemed undecided about how to handle Brother Castro, as if hesitant to get too identified with his irrational words and his flopping economics. Now, it seems, the decision has been made to stand by him and prop him up.

As though a trickling tap had suddenly been turned full on, Soviet bloc aid is pouring into Cuba. Since July 26, some 20 Soviet ships have embarked from Black Sea, Baltic and Siberian ports; by Aug. 8 at least eight vessels had docked at Cuban ports to unload military goods and 5,000 "technicians."

Rocket-Size Crates. Cuba's Communist government tried to keep a security lid on the shipments. Casual citizens were cleared from dockside areas; unloading was confined to after midnight. The result was to proliferate rumors that most of the 5,000 new arrivals were Russian combat troops in helmets and short-sleeved uniforms: 18,000 RUSSIAN TROOPS IN CUBA, headlined the New York Daily News, going a step further. The size of the concerted shipments indicate that they were in the works before the visit to Moscow last month by Fidel's 31-year-old brother Raul, though perhaps he was able to ask for a few more items and the Russians were in a position to extract a few more pledges.

U.S. intelligence identified the first cargoes as communications trucks, radar vans, general purpose trucks, mobile generator units—and, apparently, rockets. All the equipment pointed to large-scale coastal surveillance and air-defense systems. In other nations where similar Soviet help has been received, the contents of crates like the ones landed in Cuba turned out to be ground-to-air rockets, similar to the U.S. Nike-Ajax. Of the 5,000 technicians, according to the intelligence reports, one-half to two-thirds were military technical men sent to install and operate the electronic systems until Castro's men learn to handle the equipment. The rest of the specialists seemed to be economists, agronomists, industrial engineers—types desperately needed to shore up Cuba's collapsing economy.

Technicians, Yes. At last week's press conference, President Kennedy was asked about Communist-bloc troops or supplies entering Cuba, and replied: "New supplies, definitely, in large quantities. Troops? We do not have any information, but an increased number of technicians." Just the same, at week's end the

President sent his top military adviser, General Maxwell D. Taylor, on a hurry-up tour of U.S. military installations that would be involved if Cuban trouble flared up: the Panama Canal Zone, the new Strike Command headquarters at Tampa's MacDill Air Force Base, and the Atlantic Fleet Headquarters at Norfolk.

The coast and air defenses should help ease Castro's fear of a new invasion. He is forever beating his propaganda drums against U.S. planes and ships intruding on Cuban waters (which the U.S. denies). Last week he proclaimed that "enemy ships" standing a few hundred yards offshore had pumped 20-mm. cannon shells into a suburb of Havana. "We hold the U.S. Government responsible," he cried. Actually, the bombardment was an unopposed nighttime firing on a waterfront Havana hotel housing Iron Curtain technicians, and the nearby Chaplin Theater, from a surplus PT boat and a fast cruiser manned by 20 members of the under ground Revolutionary Student Directo rate. The raid seems to have come as a surprise to Washington too.

It was also the week when Fidel Castro finally disabused his people of an old promise. When he came to power three years ago, Castro bragged that his land-reform program would rest on two principles: "The land should belong to those who work it," and "Those who have no land must have some." As a starter, he divided 13% (more than 3,000,000 acres) of Cuba's total farmland into 630 cooperative farms. Fortnight ago, Castro conceded that the land distribution to peasants had been a flop, partly because it encouraged too much private initiative.

Now, like everything else in Cuba, the co-ops would be collectivized — and their peasants would become hired hands.

"Should we give each peasant a small piece of land?" asked Castro. "No! Be cause after one little piece of land the peasant would want a larger one, his live stock would multiply and soon he would not have just three, but 10, 20, 50 head of cattle. He would then be a large land-owner."

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Friday, Aug. 31, 1962

World: Wall of Shame

BERLIN (See Cover)

In flat, open country within the city's northern boundary, the land to the west is checkered with brown wheatfields and lush, green, potato gardens. Eastward stretches a no-man's land where once fertile fields lie desolate and deathly still. They could be in two different worlds—and, in a sense, they are. Even the countryside outside Berlin is divided into East and West by a vicious, impenetrable hedge of rusty barbed wire and concrete. As it snakes southward toward the partitioned city, it becomes the Wall.

Seldom in history have blocks and mortar been so malevolently employed or so richly hated in return. One year old this month, the Wall of Shame, as it is often called, cleaves Berlin's war-scarred face like an unhealed wound; its hideousness offends the eye as its inhumanity hurts the heart. For 27 miles it coils through the city, amputating proud squares and busy thoroughfares, marching insolently across graveyards and gardens, dividing families and friends, transforming whole street-fronts into bricked-up blankness. "The Wall," muses a Berlin policeman, "is not just sad. It is not just ridiculous. It is schizophrenic."

Curses for Friends. Last week a touch of mass schizophrenia rubbed off on West Berliners. Normally they are a cynical, cocksure breed who thumb their noses at trouble. "Mir kann keener," they brag in the local dialect. "No one can push me around." In 17 years as a cockpit of the cold war, West Berlin has usually reacted more coolly to its recurring alarms than Washington or Whitehall. Even the Wall seemed barely to have dented the city's composure.

Then, in an abrupt fit of rage at friend and foe alike, thousands of West Berliners went on a violent, four-day emotional bender that complicated the tense situation along the East-West barrier. What brought them to the boil was the death of 18-year-old Peter Fechter, shot while trying to cross the Wall. Many an East Berliner had died in similar efforts, but Fechter bled slowly to death in full view of a helpless, outraged crowd. Suddenly, all the pent-up frustrations exploded in an orgy of riots. After venting their anger on the detested East German border guards, rock-hurling, catcalling West Berliners battled their own police, stoned Russian soldiers, and shouted insults at harassed U.S. troops.

The mob's voice echoed in every major capital of the world, forcing Russia and the West into another of those nightmarish Berlin confrontations. It emphasized once again that so long as the Wall is allowed to stand, a perpetual threat to world peace exists in the heart of Europe.

Sounds of Death. West Berliners watch fretfully as the barricade grows more formidable and its servants' marksmanship improves. The Wall has become an all-pervasive part of life in Berlin. At their backs, West Berliners feel the cold-eyed scrutiny of the Communist cops, whose duty is to guard their frontier not from those outside, but against their own people. Hardly a night passes without the rattle of gunfire and the sounds of death from the other side. To West Berliners, the Wall is a calendar: they will recall a date by saying, "It happened the month before the Wall." It is a direction finder: strangers in search of a Gartenstrasse bordello are told to follow the Wall until they see the wooden screens that the Communist border guards put up to end East-West flirtation.

Bernauerstrasse, where the windows and doorways of a row of houses have been bricked up for several blocks to become part of the Wall, is now a standard West Berlin tourist attraction. So are the parts of the Wall that stretch through the working-class districts of Wedding and Neukölln, whose fiercely independent inhabitants can sometimes be seen lobbing rocks at the Reds for summer evening sport.

Marxist Maginot. At the Potsdamer Platz, which was Berlin's Times Square before the Wall truncated it, visiting sightseers mount wooden stands to gawk at the bare, dead city beyond. "In one quick look," they nod, "you can see what Communism is like." Berliners proudly point out each place where the Wall has been breached: eight celebrated holes in the ground where East-West tunnelers surfaced; the spot on the River Spree where 14 East Berliners turned pirate and steered an excursion boat to freedom. On the Wall's grey blocks of compressed rubble they scrawl elaborate imprecations against East Germany's Red Boss Walter Ulbricht and his commissars; one of the politest avers, "They think like Eichmann." And wherever Germans from the other side have died trying to escape Ulbricht's prison camp, West Berliners mark the spot with crosses that seldom lack for flowers.

Though the Wall itself ends in the U.S. sector, at East Germany's Schönefeld airport, watchtowers and barbed-wire barriers also seal the city's 65-mile western border with the Soviet zone. And that does not count the 830-mile Marxist Maginot line that seals East Germany's western frontier from the Baltic to Czechoslovakia. This is what Walter Ulbricht cynically calls the Democratic Anti-Fascist Protection Wall; already it boasts 500 watchtowers, 1,000 fortified bunkers, 93 miles of minefields, and throughout its length, the wide, plowed strips of earth where a footprint can be seen from a distance, alerting guards with savage dogs to another escape attempt.

Fatal Pause. In fact, Ulbricht's prison wall is a cynical denial of the human rights that are recognized by every civilized society, and even fraudulently guaranteed by the East German constitution, which pledges: "Every citizen has the right to emigrate." To Germans, the Wall's greatest mischief is its aim of permanently dismembering a divided nation whose people yearn to be reunified. West Berliners themselves must also

think of their city's welfare. Said West Berlin's Mayor Willy Brandt last week: "The Wall must go, but until it goes, the city must live."

Brandt's words were prompted by Peter Fechter's ignominious death and the events that followed it. Fechter was an East Berlin bricklayer who had waited a year for an opportunity to join his sister in West Berlin. Because of his trade, he was allowed to work near the crumbling wall, and, with another 18-year-old, discovered a deserted lumberyard that was separated from a low stretch of Wall by a vacant lot and the "death strip," a border of sand within easy range of a dozen Communist tommy guns.

When the pair made their dash early one afternoon last week, Fechter's friend managed to climb the six-foot-high barrier and leap over the barbed wire on top. But Fechter paused for a few fatal seconds, long enough for the Grenzpolizei (border police) to raise their weapons and fire. Shot in the back by crossfire, Fechter fell back onto the death strip only 300 yds. from Checkpoint Charlie, the U.S. command post at the busy Friedrichstrasse border crossing.

"Go Get Him." There he lay, moaning "Hilfe, Hilfe," while a growing throng of horrified West Berliners stood gaping on the other side of the barrier. As the minutes ticked past, photographers, cops, even a couple of U.S. military policemen, edged gingerly up to the Wall's western side to have a look at the hideous sight. One conscience-stricken U.S. second lieutenant could stand it no longer, picked up the "hot line" telephone to Major General Albert Watson II, the U.S. commandant in West Berlin. Back came the order: "Lieutenant, you have your orders. Stand fast. Do nothing." Not knowing the reason for the Americans' inaction, an agonized crowd swirled around the command post crying: "For God's sake, go get him." When a German reporter asked why the American troops did not rescue Fechter, one G.I. replied, "This is not our problem."

Fifty-five minutes after he had fallen to the ground, Peter Fechter's lifeless body was carted away by Communist cops. He was the 50th East German known to have been killed while attempting to breach the Wall.

Checking with Washington. It was not the first time that Western soldiers have been powerless to help a wounded victim of the Grepos. Last December another youth died within a few yards of the British sector line. At the time, freewheeling General Lucius D. Clay snorted: "If that ever happened at the American sector, we would have had that boy out of there in ten minutes."

General Clay enjoyed a unique freedom of action—and comment—for he was sent to Berlin as President Kennedy's special representative. General Watson, in a complex chain of command from the Pentagon and the State Department, can hardly make a move without clearing it in advance with Washington. Like the men under him, he lives with the somber instructions that a single rash decision could trigger World War III.

On purely humanitarian grounds, there was wide feeling that his U.S. detachment at Checkpoint Charlie had a moral duty to minister to Peter Fechter as he lay dying. Reasoned a Berlin cab driver: "Even in war,

both sides respect the right to collect the wounded." But in the explosive context of the cold war, there are few clear-cut rules. One solution would have been to call an army doctor, but in the excitement of the moment no one thought of calling a medic or even a priest. (The only bystander who made any effort to help Fechter was a West German policeman who dropped two first aid packages over the Wall.) But any attempt by U.S. troops to remove him would have invited political repercussions and, just possibly, shooting. If they had whisked Fechter through Checkpoint Charlie to a West Berlin hospital, the Russians would have had a readymade excuse for manhunting forays in the U.S. sector, the perfect pretext for kidnaping defectors.

Ambulance Call. General Watson, 53, a cool, meticulous professional, has only one standing order on which he can take major action: if the Russians move into West Berlin, start fighting. Thus, responsibility for caution lies with policymakers in Washington, London and Paris. After the Fechter incident, Watson suggested stationing an ambulance at Checkpoint Charlie, finally got permission after the proposal had gone all the way to the Pentagon and the White House. Even that token gesture was of limited value, surrounded as it was by Washington's careful insistence that any wounded fugitive it might pick up would have to be taken to a hospital in the Soviet zone. "It would be kinder," shrugged one officer, "to give the poor devil a loaded revolver."

But West Berliners were too upset to be concerned with such niceties. They saw only that the mighty U.S., while pledged to preserve the life of the city, had not lifted a finger to help one desperate lad. As news of the tragedy spread, thousands of solid Berlin citizens and hordes of the city's rowdy Halbstarke (Teddy boys) flocked to the Friedrichstrasse border point to gape and grumble. They jeered and elbowed their own West Berlin cops, booed shamefaced U.S. troops. For the first time in West Berlin's long love affair with the G.I., they chorused: "Ami [Americans], Go Home!" The West Berliners vented their rage on Ulbricht by raining curses and rocks on his Grepos and Vopos, and turned the barrage against their own police when the latter tried to reason with them.

Guarding the Guard. Berliners' most satisfying target for three straight evenings was the bus that shuttles the 25-man Soviet guard from Checkpoint Charlie to the Russian war memorial in the British sector near the Brandenburg Gate.

On the third and wildest night, the mob broke 18 windows in the Soviet bus while its occupants cowered with heads in hands; later they made a bonfire of two old cars in an attempt to block its return. After beating back the Bereitschaftspolizei, Berlin's crack riot squads, the mob surged out of control around a three-jeep U.S. patrol, and stood catcalling and shaking their fists until MPs came after them brandishing M-14 rifles with fixed (but sheathed) bayonets.

Chanting "The Wall must go," some 5,000 demonstrators swarmed across the square in front of Berlin's city hall and used police loudspeakers to ask Mayor Willy Brandt what he planned to do about it. Brandt, who later blamed the outbursts on "a small minority of rowdies" and known Communist agents, warned them that they were playing into the hands of the Communists, and said that he had ordered his police to halt the demonstrations. Ignoring his advice, several mobs of more than 1,000 youths each headed for the Wall,

where they cruised up and down hurling rocks at Vopos almost all night. Next evening another Soviet bus was twice waylaid by rock-hurling youths; later on, a wedge of car-borne demonstrators forced a Soviet staff car to seek temporary refuge in the U.S Army's McNair barracks.

The Escort Question. The rioting finally petered out after heavily reinforced police had put a moat of barbed wire around Checkpoint Charlie and arrested 128 troublemakers. The Soviet guard faced trouble of a different sort when its commander announced that it was going to drive to the war memorial in three armored personnel carriers, which by tacit agreement between U.S. and Soviet commandants enter each other's sector only if they do not display arms. When the Soviet guard showed up with submachine-gun-toting soldiers standing on the sides of the vehicles, General Watson insisted that they climb inside. After a 43-minute argument, the Russians agreed and were escorted to the memorial by MPs. After another three-hour sitdown in which they objected to the escort, the Russians retaliated by dispatching a "quasi-escort" to shepherd a U.S. convoy on the Helmstedt Autobahn.

At the top level, away from the streets, U.S. and Soviet commandants went through an Alphonse and Gaston exchange calculated to observe the diplomatic niceties without meeting face to face. U.S. commandant Watson, who had earlier sent the Russians a note protesting "acts of terror" (it was ignored), sent the deputy Soviet commandant, Colonel C.V. Tarasov, an invitation to attend a four-power meeting to discuss the disturbances (it was rejected). Tarasov then tried twice to see Watson to protest the stoning of Soviet troop buses. He was predictably rebuffed in both attempts. This merely widened the smile on his chubby face; Moscow was soon crowing that the Americans were not only unable to prevent hooliganism, but refused even to discuss their failures.

Concerned that the killings at the Wall might unleash uncontrollable violence in Berlin, Secretary of State Dean Rusk summoned Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to his office, urgently requested Russian authorities in Berlin to join four-power discussions aimed at reducing tensions in the troubled city.

Another Dictum. The Allies fired off stiffly worded protests to Moscow against the East German regime's "coldblooded killings." Before the Western notes could be delivered, East German policemen standing at the West Berlin border pumped 30 machine gun bullets into a fleeing 19-year-old East Berliner who was already inside the French sector. He died.

While the Soviet propaganda mill churned out charges that West Berlin had become a "NATO base," Moscow officials formally protested the stoning of its buses in the western sector, which it blamed on "fascistic elements with the obvious connivance" of the U.S.

Moscow did not stop at that. Abruptly, the Russians announced that they were abolishing the office of Soviet commandant in Berlin; from now on, they suggested, their affairs in East Berlin would be taken care of by General Ivan Yaku-bovsky, Russian commandant in East Ger many itself. This, declared the Soviet Defense Ministry, was part of its "policy of eliminating in Europe the vestiges of the Second World War."

Again, Berlin was in the banner headlines of the world press, for by this maneuver Russia was raising once again its thesis that four-power control of Berlin* is ended, and with it the rights of the U.S., Britain and France to station troops in West Berlin and maintain free access to the city.

Only as Agent. The West, of course, flatly rejects this idea, and the U.S. has made it clear that it would go to war rather than surrender the "three essentials" : right of free access to West Berlin, the presence of U.S. troops in the city, and survival of West Berlin's free economy and political system.

As a practical matter, four-power control in Berlin ended in June 1948, when Soviet General Alexander Kotikov walked out of the ruling Kommandatura early in the 13-month Berlin blockade. In a gleaming Berlin conference room, a seat is carefully saved for the Russians, but the U.S., British and French commandants have for years conducted their business on a tripartite basis. Fact is, the West can maintain its dealings with the Russians about as easily through General Yakubovsky, whose headquarters is in nearby Wiins-dorf, as it can with a Russian "Berlin commandant." The contacts have not been very intimate or frequent in any case.

In fact, the U.S. may not object to dealing with Major General Helmut Poppe, the East German who was "named" last week to replace the Russian Berlin commander, provided it is understood that he is acting only as "agent" for the Russians, and provided, above all, that the East German does not in any way attempt to undermine the West's position in West Berlin.

In a statement issued within a few hours of the Soviet change in commandants—a near-record feat for the State Department—the U.S. replied bluntly: "Regardless of how they organize themselves administratively, we continue to hold the Soviet Union responsible for carrying out its obligations in Berlin under existing agreements." It added: "This move appears to be an attempt by the Soviet Union to absolve itself from responsibility for the Communist actions in Berlin which have increased tensions so dangerously in that city."

Light Bulbs & Cigarettes. By contrast with the numbing depression that gripped their city when the Wall went up, Berliners were good and mad last week; there was no talk of an exodus. Said one: "We've pretty well separated the men from the boys by now." Pan American, British European Airways and Air France, the airlines serving West Berlin, were flying dozens of flights daily, with big loads coming as well as going.

West Berliners today seem confident that they can sit out any Soviet squeeze. The population (2,200,000) is stable. Bank deposits and industrial production are climbing. The people boast that, despite the Wall, they live in West Germany's "biggest industrial city," produce one of every three dresses and cigarettes used in West Germany—and, they add solemnly, "every other light bulb."

The city's remoteness from West Germany does not disturb them; Berliners have always called themselves "island dwellers." But it deeply worries Allied commanders.

Militarily, West Berlin's position deep inside Communist territory is hideously vulnerable. The western

sector is 140 miles from the nearest Allied bases in West Germany; hence the U.S. preoccupation with access rights, both on land and in the air. In a test of strength with East Germany alone, the three Western powers' 11,000 man Berlin garrison would be outnumbered by Ulbricht's 24,500 armed forces and paramilitary police. They would also have to reckon immediately with the three Soviet divisions that are in and around the city. But, as General Maxwell Taylor, soon to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has pointed out, the likelihood of direct Soviet attack on West Berlin is extremely remote. What the West does face, he predicted, is a continuous barrage of "ambiguous challenges about which we might be uncertain."

WS ?

Salami Slicing. Many statesmen also are less worried at the prospect of outright conflict than by the systematic program to freeze the Allies out of the city by peaceful means. West German officials, in particular, argue that the U.S. too readily accedes to Moscow's systematic slicing away at its rights—"salami tactics," as diplomats call it. In fact, when Washington determinedly resists Russian pressure to revise or eliminate its rights, as it did last February in riding out Soviet harassment in the Berlin air corridors, Moscow usually backs down.

Few Berliners think that the Wall will fall in their lifetime. Many realists feel that it is possible at least to allay the tensions it breeds. One way of easing misery would be to establish an international commission to repatriate divided families; as it becomes more and more hazardous to escape from East Germany, Ulbricht's regime might welcome the measure of respectability to be derived from reuniting hardship cases—even though the traffic would be overwhelmingly one way.

99
61
28

As an ever present reminder of their country's partition, the Wall does, after all, subtly keep alive Germans' hopes of reunification. That, admittedly, is a remote prospect—but, say optimists, "What goes up must come down." There are, of course, the fatalists who suggest that Ulbricht's Wall will probably last as long as Hadrian's (1,835 years and going strong)—if only because, as one old Bonn hand put it last week, "No democratic government could ever ask its people to try and tear that thing down."

October Rites. The testing time for Western nerves will probably come this fall. Nikita Khrushchev is half expected to make an appearance at the U.N. to plead Moscow's specious case for Allied withdrawal from Berlin. Iron Curtain capitals were buzzing last week with a more intriguing notion. In October, it was said, Khrushchev plans to convene a spectacular peace conference in Moscow, attended by other Communist nations and the usual array of neutrals and non-aligned nations, at which Russia will finally go through the ritual of signing a peace treaty with East Germany.

NO

Since the U.S., Britain and France are unlikely to be lured to the party, such a treaty would be without legal force, but not without peril. It will almost certainly be followed by East Germany's assumption of responsibility for Allied rights in Berlin, which East Berlin's Mayor Friedrich Ebert last week contemptuously called "a fig leaf punched full of holes." Other East German officials bayed in unison that the Berlin question will not be solved until the Allies pull out and allow the Communists to turn it into a "neutral, demilitarized, free city."

The threats have all been made before. But almost no one in the West thinks that the Communists will

really make any serious effort to grab the whole salami. For this, as President Kennedy bluntly warned Khrushchev during 1961's Berlin crisis, will bring a nuclear war.

The Communists' ace in the hole is that any real improvement in the situation is entirely up to them—the West can do nothing—and that therefore they also have the power to harass, provoke, tantalize and annoy. And mostly with impunity, or at least without any genuine Western retaliation.

Says a West German official who is a firm friend of the U.S.: "The threat of nuclear war has paralyzed the West. The question is whether we are not on the road to ruin this way. The Wall is wrong—everybody knows it's wrong. The East Germans want to be free—everybody knows they do. And yet Adenauer and Brandt have to tell their own people constantly to keep calm, don't start anything. The outside world says whatever happens don't start a war, and to move an ambulance to Checkpoint Charlie you have to have a meeting of the ambassadorial working group in Washington. We assure the East we won't do anything and as a result they play see-saw on our nerves. We hope for a change in Soviet policy—that's the formula we use to legitimize our inaction."

Wall?

Remember 1985-89

Will there ever be a change in Soviet policy? There are those who think that Khrushchev would be delighted to be rid of the whole East German mess; it is costing him dearly in prestige and occupation bills, and bringing him less and less in industrial production. But if Russian troops were removed and East Germany were really turned free, would Ulbricht survive? And would the other satellites stay quiescent?

Down to

So Khrushchev must hang on, and the Wall must stay—for the time being. But some time—within a year? within a decade? within a generation?—it must come down. For it is an unnatural, inhuman barrier that, if it is not brought down by reason, will some day provoke men to demolish it by force.

* The U.S., Russia and Britain agreed in 1944 that since Berlin in all likelihood would again be Germany's capital, it should be jointly administered as a "special area." A year later, France was granted occupation rights and a sector that came from U.S. and British territory. In early 1945 the Red army had sole control of Berlin, only admitted the other powers in exchange for a vast area (almost half) of present-day East Germany that was then occupied by Allied troops. Stalin, who earlier had promised that Russia did "not intend to dismember or destroy Germany," also promised in return to take "all necessary measures" to assure Allied access to Berlin.

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Friday, Sep. 07, 1962

Europe: Berlin Breathing Spell

After bringing Berlin to the boil, Russia last week let the city simmer a while. Soviet armored cars continued to shuttle through the Western sector; they drew only scowls from the crowds that had stoned them the week before. More than 300 East Berliners turned out for the funeral of Peter Fechter, the 18-year-old bricklayer who had been shot and left to die while trying to cross the Wall. Surest sign of relaxed tensions was the Western alliance's return to disarray. Despite President Kennedy's announcement that the Big Four had agreed "in principle" to a foreign ministers' conference on Berlin, they all seemed to have previous engagements. At week's end, the Big Four conference was off—like the pressure.

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Friday, Sep. 07, 1962

Cuba: Time of Deterioration

Manned by three U.S. Navy reservists getting in some summer flight time, an unarmed snub-nosed 52F submarine tracker droned along over international waters one day last week some 15 miles off the Cuban coast. Suddenly, machine-gun fire rose from two small gunboats, apparently Cuban, cruising the blue Straits of Florida below. No hits were scored, but the incident produced a sharp protest from the White House and an equally sharp denial from Fidel Castro. The exchange climaxed a week of rapidly deteriorating relations between the U.S. and Communist Cuba.

Earlier in the week, as if in fear of the large-scale invasion he constantly foresees, Castro staged a partial mobilization of his 400,000-man militia. Rumors spread of threatened insurrection in Las Villas province, of landings of anti-Castro guerrillas in the province's sheltered inlets. Castro's precautions may only have been set off by the recent daring attack on Havana's waterfront by two boatloads of youths from the underground Revolutionary Student Directorate. More likely, Castro reasoned that the U.S. would not stand by while Russia builds Cuba's military strength.

Mistake to Invade. After the plane incident, President Kennedy made clear that "U.S. armed forces will employ all means necessary for their own protection," but at his press conference he insisted, "I think it would be a mistake to invade Cuba," Are there Russian troops in Cuba? asked a newsman. From the hem and haw of his response, Kennedy seemed to be working from abysmally poor intelligence reports. "We don't have complete information about what's going on in Cuba," he said. * It was an explanation that satisfied no one. On Capitol Hill, New York's Republican Senator Kenneth Keating said that he had reports that at least 1,200 men "wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms" had arrived in Cuba in August. At the press conference, Kennedy reiterated that the 139-year-old Monroe Doctrine is still alive. "That's why we have cut off our trade," he said, "and that's why we work in the OAS and in other ways to isolate the Communist menace in Cuba." Gaining Their Chains. Cuba was obviously feeling the economic squeeze of inept Communist management. Castro last week froze wages, invoked stringent penalties for absenteeism. The \$293 million in the treasury when Castro took over has now shrunk to \$5,000,000 in foreign exchange. Looking for help, Economic Czar Ernesto (Che) Guevara was dispatched in a hurry to huddle with Soviet

Premier Khrushchev.

AND { Help was coming. Proudly the Soviet news agency Tass announced that their maritime cargoes to Cuba this year would double those in 1961. Some ten Soviet ships are now converging on Cuban ports, said Tass, carrying consumer goods from canned food to cars, heavy machinery from harvesters to floating cranes, raw materials from timber to grain. Five more ships for the Cuba run were chartered from owners in four NATO countries — West Germany, Norway, Greece and Italy. Khrushchev's evident decision to support Castro to the limit has already raised Cuba to the position of Russia's third largest trade partner in 1962, after East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

— Another explanation hopefully advanced by Cuban exiles: that the President did not want to queer the Cuba mission of former OSS Counsel James B. Donovan, the New York lawyer who negotiated the swap of Soviet Spy Rudolf Abel for U.S. Pilot Francis Gary Powers. Donovan flew to Cuba last week for another attempt at ransoming the 1,113 Bay of Pigs prisoners for whom Castro is asking \$62 million.

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TIME

the (on Sept. 3) article
Friday, Sep. 14, 1962

Foreign Relations: The Ugly Choice

No
no Since the day that the Bay of Pigs became a synonym for fiasco, U.S. policy toward Cuba has been based on hope—the hope that Castro's Communism would somehow curl up its toes and die. In its most positive form, that policy aimed at isolating Cuba, both economically and politically. It did not work — for the simple and foreseeable reason that Nikita Khrushchev did not want it to. *}*

The U.S.S.R. has long propped up Castro's chaotic economy and trickled in military aid. But in late July, the trickle became a torrent; since then, according to U.S. intelligence figures, 61 ships carrying Soviet arms and men have arrived in Cuba or are on the way. The Kennedy Administration said little about the Cuba buildup — until New York Republican Kenneth Keating rose on the Senate floor, outlined what he had heard about the Russian shipments, demanded that the Administration tell the U.S. what was going on. Others took up the cry, and under mounting pressure President Kennedy decided to issue an official statement.

"Whatever Necessary." That statement had a resolute ring. "The Castro regime," said the President, "will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere." Those words were echoed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Meeting in his office with 19 Latin American envoys, Rusk pledged that the U.S. would use "whatever means may be necessary" to prevent aggression by Cuba.

Yet both Kennedy and Rusk attempted to minimize the Cuba threat, harped on three points as proof that the U.S. should not and cannot intervene directly in Cuba. *defense?*

There is no evidence, Kennedy insisted, "of any significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance." His argument: the Russian arms, including 25-mile antiaircraft missiles and torpedo boats with 15-mile guided missiles, are defensive in nature. But the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons is a dangerous one; it all depends on how the weapons are used, whom they are pointed at, and how mobile they are. It is a bitter fact that many tyrants—including Hitler—have built aggressive war machines while claiming to arm only for defense.

not Cuba

3rd para - "retal."?

^{BUT}
 There is also no evidence, Kennedy said, of "any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet-bloc country." He stressed that the Russians landing in Cuba are not troops but technicians—and he seemed to take comfort from that fact. But Castro does not need troops; he has all the home-grown gun toters he can ^{use} ~~use~~. What he does need, and what he is getting, is the electronics, radar and missile experts so vital to modern warfare.

The U.S., Kennedy argued, can only deal with Cuba "as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to peace." As explained to congressional leaders at a White House briefing, this means the U.S. should not intervene directly against Cuba because it might inspire Khrushchev to heat up other cold war trouble spots—Berlin, Laos, South Viet Nam. As policy, this thinking amounts to absolute sterility. For, carried to its logical extreme, it would prohibit the U.S. from taking effective action against Communist aggression anywhere.

Open Invitation. The U.S. policy of merely trying to isolate—or contain—Cuba has had dismal results. Castro Communism has not withered away; and it will not so long as Khrushchev, at little cost or risk, can sustain it. The Red military buildup is big (see THE HEMISPHERE). Castro does pose a military threat, if not to the U.S. then to other Latin American nations. More than that, the U.S. failure to move against Castro stands as an open invitation to Latin American adventurers of all political stripes to take over without fear of effective U.S. reaction.

Just 17 months ago, Castro could have been erased by a relatively simple U.S. decision to back the Bay of Pigs invaders with the necessary arms and planes. That time is past; and the choices today are much more difficult. The U.S. could throw a naval blockade around Cuba—at the risk of setting U.S. and Soviet ships to shooting at one another. It could support military action against Cuba by anti-Communist nations in Latin America. Or —and it may come to this—it could get the job done itself, once and for all. For whatever else, the U.S. simply cannot afford to let Cuba survive indefinitely as a Soviet fortress just off its shores and a cancer throughout the hemisphere.

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Friday, Sep. 14, 1962

Nation: The Flights Go On*helps prevent U-2s?*

This time the U.S. was ready for the Russian screams before they came. The pilot of a U-2 reconnaissance plane, returning from a mission, reported that his plane had strayed over the fortified Russian island of Sakhalin, off the Siberian coast and reaching down to within 26 miles of Japan. Word was swiftly passed to Washington—and, with the warning in hand, it was barely 3½ hours after the inevitable Russian protest note arrived that the U.S. reply was written, approved by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President Kennedy, and delivered to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.

The Soviet note was accurate right down to the detail that the U-2 had been over Sakhalin for nine minutes. The U.S. reply acknowledged that "an unintentional violation may have taken place." It went on to reaffirm the U.S. ban—set by President Eisenhower after the Francis Gary Powers flight in May 1960 and continued by President Kennedy—against flights over Russian territory.

That ban is real. But it does not prevent high-altitude U.S. reconnaissance planes from flying within peeping distance—generally about 100 miles—of Russian borders. Nor does it include a pledge to refrain from flying over Communist nations other than Russia, including Red China.

The U-2 can reach altitudes over 90,000 ft. with electronic gear to spy out defenses from far away, plus equipment to collect airborne radioactivity from Soviet nuclear tests. But the crowded U-2 carries few sophisticated navigational aids, and, to complicate the pilot's task, the plane, because of its gliderlike design, is easily blown off course. These factors forced the Air Force pilot to veer over Sakhalin.

At the time, he was collecting air samples and trying to get an electronic reading on the heavy Soviet defenses on the island. As a result of the Sakhalin overflight, the U.S. is considering such precautionary steps as increasing the U2's navigational gear and limiting flights to good weather to avoid chances of error. But there are no plans to ground the U-2 altogether—its probing flights are considered vital to U.S. security.

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Friday, Sep. 14, 1962

Cuba: The Russian Presence

Despite initial Cuban attempts to hide it, and official U.S. denials that it was going on, there was no mistaking the Russian buildup when it began six weeks ago. Refugees fleeing Castro's miserable island brought the first reports; U.S. intelligence agents and members of the Western diplomatic corps filled out the story. Ships—some Russian, some chartered from such NATO nations as Britain, West Germany and Norway—were pouring into Cuba carrying heavy loads of Russian military equipment and Russian soldiers.

Mostly at night, and mostly with their own hands, the Russians unloaded sensitive electronic gear and crates shaped as though they might contain missiles. At

Mariel, a port near Havana, a cinder-block wall went up to screen the docks; local Cubans nicknamed the area "Little Berlin." But there was no way of concealing the Red army trucks and armored cars lined up five-deep for a quarter of a mile along Havana's waterfront San Pedro Street. Exiles with contacts in Cuba reported convoys of military vehicles, radar vans, mobile generators, field kitchens, and flatbed trucks bearing cylindrical objects under tarpaulins rumbling inland from the quays.

Twin Bivouacs. Castro bars most U.S. newsmen from his Communist police state, and it was not until Keith Morfett of the London Daily Mail hired a car and went looking southwest of Havana that the West last week got an eyewitness description of the Russian presence. Just past the village of El Cano, eight miles from the capital, Morfett came to a high hedge and a wire fence stretching for about two miles. Then, at a break in the hedge, "there were the Russians." They numbered in the hundreds, Morfett said, and wore coarse denim trousers and cheap checked shirts. "They looked in their early 20s, and were beefy men . . . strong. They were probably a construction unit."

Four miles down the red clay road, Morfett discovered a second bivouac, "swarming with thousands of Russians. Some were dressed in physical-training gear and were doing calisthenics. Others wore greenish fatigues. Two teams were playing volley ball." Between neat rows of dun-colored tents, Morfett caught glimpses of field kitchens and chow lines, and beyond sat "military vehicles—lorries, trucks with mobile radar units, armored cars. Some of the trucks still bore Russian-language lettering." Ringing the camp were

Cuban soldiers manning freshly dug anti-aircraft emplacements.

Gratuitous Slap. Thus, for the first time since he reached power, Castro had on hand flesh-and-blood soldiers of the

Red army, totaling about 4,000, along with a growing armory ranging from rifles to missiles (see box opposite).

Back in Moscow, Khrushchev obviously enjoyed what he had wrought. In a gratuitous slap in the face for the U.S. and President Kennedy, he announced that "during the stay in the U.S.S.R. of Ernesto Guevara Serna [better known as Che] . . . the government of the Cuban republic addressed the Soviet government with a request for help by delivering armaments and sending technical specialists for training Cuban servicemen. Agreement was reached. As long as aggressive imperialist quarters continue threatening Cuba, the Cuban republic has every justification for taking measures to ensure its security . . . while all Cuba's true friends have every right to respond."

Fragile Republics. Behind Khrushchev's arrogant new gesture lay more than the desire to add a new cold war pressure point only 90 miles off the U.S. coast. The Kremlin wants to hold Cuba as a base for the eventual subversion of all Latin America. Against a Castro-Khrushchev alliance defying the U.S. with impunity, wielding a war machine unlike any seen before in Latin America and spreading revolution through Spanish-speaking agents, the emotional, economically unbalanced, heavily illiterate republics below the Rio Grande would be hard pressed to preserve their present fragile structures.

Castro's divisive influence is already evident. Communist rebels and rioters have shaken the governments of Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. Early this year at Punta del Este, Uruguay, it took the Americas' foreign ministers ten round-the-clock days to find a devious, legalistic way to declare Communist Cuba "incompatible" with the democratic ideals of the Organization of American States—and to find 14 countries bold enough to vote for it. Meeting in Mexico City fortnight ago, the infant eight-nation Latin American Free Trade Association debated for eight days over whether to admit Red Cuba although nearly all of Cuba's trade is now with the Communist bloc. LAFTA finally rejected Cuba, but with Mexico and Brazil abstaining.

Time for Decision. Even when they could not say it publicly for fear of violent reaction by local pro-Castro minorities, most Latin American governments feared the new Cuban military buildup, and privately prayed that the U.S. would do something about it. In Nicaragua, the ruling Somoza dynasty called openly for "collective military action." Democratic little Costa Rica promised to "support any action to defend the inter-American system from the Communist threat that could come from Cuba." Students paraded through the Costa Rican capital of San José with placards calling for intervention—"OAS, the Time Is Now!"

In the fence-sitting, bigger countries of South America, influential voices were calling for action. Wrote Brazil's O Estado de São Paulo: "The hour of evasion, confusion and hesitation has passed." An Argentine

Foreign Ministry official announced support for "any initiative taken by the U.S."

Nothing Yet. If any justification was needed beyond the Monroe Doctrine, there was the 1947 Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the peace-keeping OAS Charter, and the 1954 OAS anti-Communist resolution. Action under the OAS Charter might range from a blockade (which a U.S. Navy expert estimated could easily be maintained by two aircraft carriers and 16 destroyers) to outright invasion.

However great the degree of support from its southern neighbors, the final decision will be the U.S.'s own. At week's end the U.S. decision was to do nothing —yet. Secretary of State Dean Rusk invited Latin American foreign ministers to an "informal" conference later this month during the U.N. General Assembly. But he lamely assured them that there would be "no intention to reach decisions or take any action whatever."

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Friday, Sep. 14, 1962

The Hemisphere: CASTRO'S COMMUNIST ARSENAL

CONVERSION of Fidel Castro's Cuba to a Communist island fortress in the Caribbean began with the arrival of Czech-made ZB R-2 .30-cal. rifles from Baltic ports in August of 1960. By mid-1961, the U.S. Defense Department was estimating that Castro had received \$100 million worth of Soviet-bloc armaments. Since then, the estimate has jumped to \$175 million at the minimum. The sheer bulk of arms is staggering: 400,000 tons. A study of Castro's arsenal, based on the best available intelligence:

Missiles

Castro's newest weapons are short-range guided missiles. On land, he has the Soviet's stubby SA-2 antiaircraft rocket, a solid-fuel ground-to-air missile similar to the U.S.'s Nike-Ajax. A nest of six SA-2s is already installed and operational under camouflage at Bahia Honda, 45 miles from Havana. Radar guided, the antiaircraft weapons can reach targets within a 30°-slant range of from 25 to 27 miles, or as far straight up as 60,000 feet. Another SA-2 site is reported under construction in Matanzas, 60 miles east of Havana, and more rocket batteries are expected eventually to guard all key Cuban military installations and cities. At sea, Castro's newly acquired Russian Type 100 torpedo boats boast the firepower of a small destroyer, with the addition of new ship-to-ship missiles whose 15-mile range makes them deadly against thin skinned transports.

Electronics

Many of the newly arrived 4,000 Red troops are electronics and radar technicians sent to install and man Castro's first missiles. The SA-2 rockets require extensive guidance radar. Other Russians will operate 250-mile-range surveillance radar and electromagnetic tracking posts to monitor Cape Canaveral shots and to aid orbiting Russian cosmonauts who have heretofore had no land-based station in the Western Hemisphere. Already in Cuban waters are five Russian 750-ton fishing trawlers, loaded to the gunwales with electronic gear.

Aircraft

Some 200 Czech-trained Cuban pilots are now equipped with 25 MIG-15s, 45 MIG-17s, and 20 supersonic MIG-19s. Converted transport pilots have taken over the controls of 24 recently-delivered M14 combat helicopters, 20 AN2 biplanes and eight twin-engined Ilyushin transports.

Seapower

Pride of Castro's fleet is the still-commissioned Granma, the 74-ft. yacht from which he launched his revolution in December 1956. But for the rest of the 5,500-man Cuban navy, six Russian destroyers are being acquired to add to a pre-Castro flotilla of a dozen U.S.-built corvettes. From seven to ten 40-knot, missile-armed torpedo boats are known to have already arrived as deck cargo from Russia.

Tanks

Cuban drivers have been trained to handle 75 Korea-vintage 35-ton T-34 tanks, 25 old 51-ton Joseph Stalin 11s and 100 new 40-ton T-54s, the last equipped with night-fighting infra-red sights and mounted with 100-mm. guns.

Artillery

Backing up its ground-to-air rockets, Red Cuba has more than 2,000 flak guns in position, mostly Skoda-made 30-mm. and 40-mm. Scattered through Havana and around the Russian camps, the antiaircraft weapons include four-barreled ZPU-4 Czech dual-purpose guns—the Castro-beloved "cuatro bocas" (four mouths) that helped repel the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invaders—as well as newer, heavier-caliber radar-guided skysweeper guns. Poking over Havana's sea wall are long 85-mm. cannons; poised at the ends of military roads leading to the U.S. base at Guantanamo is new 155-mm. motorized artillery capable of assault at 40 m.p.h. For combat support, there are 1,000 pieces of field artillery, including truck-mounted, multibarreled Russian rocket launchers.

Small Arms

Available to Castro's militiamen and regulars are 65,000 new Belgian FN rifles and 125,000 Czech automatic rifles, 200,000 Communist-bloc burp guns and assorted small arms, 3.5-in. antitank bazookas and more than 5,000 heavy mortars.

Troops

Castro's 300,000 militiamen are loosely trained, but carry impressive automatic-weapons firepower. For them and the 50,000-man regular army, durable Communist General Enrique Lister, 55, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War, is busy working up a new table of organization, and has instituted a highly efficient system of training and discipline. Some 80,000 militia had already received two months' field weapons training from Czech, Russian, East German and Red Chinese military advisers prior to the arrival of the latest 4,000 Russian military technicians. From the militia's jóvenes rebeldes (young rebels), a spit-and-polish elite corps of 3,500 has been recruited and put through rugged training that included scrambles up and down Cuba's highest mountain, Pico Turquino (6,560 ft.) with full battle pack. When they appeared in starched green fatigues outside the cactus fence around the U.S. Naval base at Guantánamo, even the U.S. Marines inside were impressed at their highly military bearing and polish.

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PREVIOUS WEEK'S COVER

FOLLOWING WEEK'S COVER



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Friday, Sep. 21, 1962

The Presidency: The Durable Doctrine*Sub. 11?*

THE PRESIDENCY (See Cover) The hour—6 p.m.—was unusual for a presidential press conference. So was the occasion. So was the tingling of high excitement that filled the room. The U.S., fretful and frustrated about the buildup of Russian arms and military personnel in Cuba, anxiously waited to hear what President Kennedy would say about his Cuba policy.

Politicians and private citizens had been barraging Kennedy with demands that he "do something." Moscow, having the time of its life, had issued a statement warning Kennedy that he had better do nothing if he wanted to stay out of trouble. The U.S., said the Russians, "cannot now attack Cuba and expect that the aggressor will be free from punishment for this attack. If such attack is made, this will be the beginning of unleashing war." Kennedy was calm. He came with a prepared statement, which he read with force. But its well-formed sentences did not shift the debate or alter any previous views; they did not change the policy of "containment" and watchful waiting which the President has espoused to date.

"Whatever Must Be Done." Castro, said the President, is "in trouble. Along with his pledges for political freedom, his industries are stagnating, his harvests are declining, his own followers are beginning to see that their revolution has been betrayed." As for those shipments of Communist weapons, they "do not constitute a serious threat to any other part of this hemisphere." Accordingly, "unilateral military intervention on the part of the U.S. cannot currently be either required or justified."

"But let me make this clear once again," Kennedy went on. "If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way ... or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies." But doing "whatever must be done" is not a policy; it is a taken-for-granted imperative for any Administration in any crisis. Kennedy's statement failed to still voices that had been raised against his inaction in the Cuba crisis. And in the absence of a more positive policy, there was increasing talk about a solid rock upon which current U.S. action against Cuba might be based.

That rock is the Monroe Doctrine.

Nikita Khrushchev considers the Monroe Doctrine a corpse. Said he in 1960: "Now the remains of this doctrine should best be buried, as every dead body is, so that it does not poison the air by its decay." Some Americans, even including some officials of the U.S. Government, look upon it as, if not quite dead, then at least moribund. It is "out of date," says Eleanor Roosevelt.

But others think differently. Last week New York's Republican Senator Kenneth Keating declared on the Senate floor that "the Monroe Doctrine, cornerstone of American foreign policy, has been violated." In a letter to the President, Texas' Democratic Congressman O. C. Fisher called for a naval blockade of Cuba and invocation of the Monroe Doctrine, "since the Soviets have now openly and brazenly violated the very essence of that policy." Connecticut's Democratic Senator Thomas J. Dodd said the U.S. "should invoke the Monroe Doctrine to proclaim a total embargo" on Communist military shipments to Cuba. Old Latin America Hand Spruille Braden, onetime Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, called for a U.S. military invasion of Cuba in the name of the Monroe Doctrine.

Prodding the President. Harry Truman, in his own way, was all for Monroe. "The reason we're in trouble in Cuba," he said, "is that Ike didn't have the guts to enforce the Monroe Doctrine." In less rough language, other politicians of both parties indicated that they felt the same way about Kennedy. South Carolina's Senator Strom Thurmond said the President's comments on Cuba "indicate strongly that the Monroe Doctrine has recently been reinterpreted with major omissions." In the Senate debate on the Administration request for stand-by authority to call up 150,000 reservists, Republicans urged amendments to prod the President into taking action against Castro. Connecticut's Prescott Bush offered an amendment declaring that the U.S. "has the right and obligation" to end Communist domination of Cuba.

His amendment, said Bush, would put Russia on notice "that the Monroe Doctrine is not dead, but remains an integral part of American foreign policy and will be enforced" Iowa's Jack Miller proposed an amendment that would have "authorized and directed" the President ";to take such action as is necessary to prevent any violation of the Monroe Doctrine." Most of these comments were emotional. Many were unknowing. But in a significant sense they reflected an intense American conviction that the Monroe Doctrine — almost like the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution — is an enduring cornerstone of national policy.

Avalanches of Change. And so it is. In the flux of history, the most earnest pronouncements of statesmen tend to be ephemeral. The archives of nations are stuffed with decrees, declarations, edicts, enunciations, protocols and pronounce ments that were meant to resound for decades but lasted only for weeks or months. Yet the Monroe Doctrine lives on in the hearts and minds of Americans—even though most of them have only the foggiest notion of what it says and means.

When James Monroe issued his doctrine on Dec. 2, 1823, most of the world's great nations were ruled by kings or emperors, and most of their subjects were farmers or peasants. Byron and Beethoven were still living, Darwin and Marx were still children. The years since then have witnessed avalanches of change that

have transformed the world beyond the imaginings of the men of Monroe's time. But the Monroe Doctrine survived all the transformations and remains today a living principle of national policy.

A Cautious Man. The doctrine's durability derived in part from the character of its author. John Calhoun, who as Monroe's Secretary of War sat in on the Cabinet discussions that shaped the Monroe Doctrine, recalled his former chief as "among the wisest and most cautious men I have ever known." Calhoun meant the word cautious in a complimentary sense.

Thomas Jefferson, Monroe's political mentor, wrote that he was "a man whose soul might be turned wrong side outwards without discovering a blemish to the world." In keeping with the patient, prudent makeup of its author, the Monroe Doctrine was no slapdash improvisation.

It was hammered out slowly, over many hours of thought and discussion. When it was finally presented to the world, it had the qualities of Monroe himself: plain and solid and durable as a slab of bronze.

~~Monroe - over~~
Born into the Virginia aristocracy that produced four of the U.S.'s first five Presidents, Monroe had an affinity for history in the making, and he lived his life in the thick of it. As a teen-age officer in the Revolutionary Army, he was severely wounded in a heroic charge at the Battle of Trenton. He became a captain at 19, a lieutenant colonel at 21, drew from Washington a commendation as a "brave, active and sensible officer." It was characteristic of Monroe, with his gift for being in the right place at the historic moment, that at 22 he was present at the grand victory ball in Fredericksburg, Va., after Cornwallis' surrender, mingling with George Washington, Mad Anthony Wayne, Light Horse Harry Lee, Baron von Steuben, Count de Grasse and other great captains of the Revolution.

When the Congress of the Confederation met in Annapolis, Md., two years later to consider ratification of the peace treaty with Britain, young Monroe was there as a member of the Virginia delegation, along with his former law teacher Thomas Jefferson. A member of Jefferson's Democratic-Republican Party, Monroe served three terms in the Congress of the Confederation, was elected to the Senate at 32.

As Minister to France in the 1790s, Monroe suffered his first and greatest setback: his pro-French views tangled with the Administration's policy of neutrality between France and Britain, and President Washington angrily ordered him recalled.

Washington wanted an envoy who would "promote, not thwart, the neutral policy of the Government." Monroe returned to the U.S. in disgrace, and it looked as if his public career might be finished, but he was liked and admired in his home state, and within a few years after his recall he bounced back as Governor of Virginia.* In 1803 Monroe's old friend Jefferson sent him to France as a special envoy to help negotiate the U.S. right to navigation on the Mississippi, a cause dear to Monroe's heart. Once again in the thick of history, he arrived in Paris just in time to take part in the negotiation of the Louisiana Purchase.

"Era of Good Feeling." In what came to be called the "Virginia Dynasty," Madison succeeded Jefferson and

Monroe succeeded Madison almost as a matter of course. Madison served as Jefferson's Secretary of State and Monroe as Madison's.

Amid the military disasters of 1814, when the British briefly occupied Washington and set fire to the executive mansion, Secretary of State Monroe took over the War Department from bumbling John Armstrong, achieved the rare distinction of holding two top Cabinet posts at once. In 1816 he was elected President with the inevitability of a crown prince succeeding to the throne in a stable monarchy.

Monroe was a fervent believer in national unity. Shortly after his inauguration he set off on a national tour — a strenuous undertaking in those days — using his enormous personal popularity to help bind the nation together. The trip was a splendid success, even in New England, the old stronghold of Federalism. Cheered the *New Haven Herald*, describing the city's reaction to Monroe's visit: "The demon of party for a time departed, and gave place for a general burst of National Feeling." The *Boston Centinel* reported that the President's visit served to "harmonize feelings, annihilate dissensions, and make us one people." The paper applied the label "Era of Good Feeling" to the new Administration, and the label has stuck down through the generations.

Monroe was re-elected President in 1820 by an electoral count of 231 to 1* And it was in his second term that he promulgated his durable doctrine.

What It Said. From his days as Secretary of State, Monroe had taken a keen and solicitous interest in the Latin American colonies that revolted against Spanish rule; in 1822 the U.S. became the first power to recognize any of Latin America's new nations. In that same year, two potential menaces to the New World loomed up in the Old.

Alexander I, Czar of Russia, issued a ukase claiming the entire Pacific Coast of North America and the surrounding seas down to the 51st parallel (the northern tip of Vancouver Island). Monroe directed his Secretary of State—a prickly genius named John Quincy Adams—to draft a protest. Foreshadowing a major segment of the Monroe Doctrine, Adams informed the Russian minister in Washington "that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments." To the U.S. Minister in Russia, Adams wrote: "There can, perhaps, be no better time for saying, frankly and explicitly, to the Russian government, that the future peace of the world, and the interest of Russia herself, cannot be promoted by Russian settlements upon any part of the American continent." The second threat loomed up at the congress of European powers at Verona, Italy, in the autumn of 1822. In Spain a revolution had forced the tyrannical Ferdinand VII (Ferdinand the Unbeloved) to accept a liberal constitution. Bent on preserving absolutism, France and the Holy Alliance powers —Russia, Austria and Prussia—decided at Verona to intervene in Spain to crush the revolution.

Early the following year, a French army marched across the Pyrenees and swiftly routed the revolutionary forces.

The French invasion of Spain stirred uneasiness in Washington. It seemed possible that the Verona powers, having restored Ferdinand the Unbeloved to full power, might now turn to the New World and Spain's former colonies.

"Perfectly Moonstruck." While President Monroe was pondering this prospect, Britain's Foreign Minister George Canning proposed a joint declaration by the U.S. and British governments warning the European powers against any attempt to reconquer Spanish America.

Canning was no friend of republican revolutions, but he valued the profitable trade between Britain and the new nations of Latin America. The U.S. Minister in London laid down a condition: Britain would first have to recognize the independence of the former Spanish colonies. Canning bluntly balked.

That autumn, with the U.S.-British negotiations stalled on the recognition issue, the news reached Washington that the French had taken Cadiz, the last stronghold of the Spanish revolutionists. In his diary, Secretary Adams recorded that Monroe was "alarmed," and that Secretary of War Calhoun was "perfectly moonstruck" with dismay.

Monroe decided that the time had come for the U.S., on its own, to warn the Old World to let the New World alone. Adams thoroughly approved of the idea of a unilateral declaration. "It would be more candid as well as more dignified," he said, "to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France than to come in as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war." For All the World to Heed. Adams wanted to communicate the U.S. declaration to France and Russia through the normal channels of diplomacy, but Monroe decided to incorporate it into his year-end message to Congress on the state of the Union. In doing so, he made his doctrine an openly announced national policy—for all the world to heed.

The text of the Monroe Doctrine consists of two distinct parts that were separated in Monroe's message by several paragraphs dealing with other matters.

The first part, basically the work of Secretary Adams, mentioned the Russian claims on the Pacific Coast, and then declared: "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." The second part, the heart of the doctrine and largely from Monroe's own mind and pen, dealt with the threat of European intervention in Latin America.

The "political system of the allied powers" is "essentially different" from that of America, said Monroe, and the U.S. is devoted to the defense of its own system. "We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety . . . It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern

*Monroe's
response?*

Cuba, Carr?

brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

The Best Bit of Paper. The old Marquis de Lafayette, friend of freedom and hero of the American Revolution, hailed the Monroe declaration as "the best little bit of paper that God had ever permitted any man to give to the world." But most European reaction was hostile. Prince Metternich, Chancellor of Austria and guiding spirit of the Holy Alliance, called the declaration "a new act of revolt, more unprovoked, fully as audacious, no less dangerous than the former" (meaning the Revolution of 1776). Czar Alexander I said that Monroe's message "enunciates views and pretensions so exaggerated, establishes principles so contrary to the rights of the European powers, that it merits only the most profound contempt." Even Canning, with a remote claim to being an instigator of the Monroe Doctrine, was bitterly displeased about the doctrine's barrier to British colonization in the Americas.

What especially galled the leaders of Europe's great powers was the audacity of the Monroe Doctrine, unbacked by any commensurate military power. In 1823, in its usual state of between-wars unpreparedness, the U.S. had virtually no standing Army and only a picayune Navy, consisting of five sloops of war.

The European powers, even those that became allies of the U.S., never accorded the Doctrine recognition. To this day it has no standing as a principle of international law. It remains a unilateral declaration, binding upon U.S. Presidents only as a traditional policy, and binding upon the rest of the world only to the extent that the world respects the U.S.'s power and determination to enforce it.

After Appomattox. Despite all the obvious obstacles—European hostility, U.S. unpreparedness, lack of legal force—the Monroe Doctrine, judged by the pragmatic verdict of history, has been an enormously successful policy. Since Monroe enunciated it, not a single Latin American state has lost its independence as a result of outright aggression from outside the hemisphere. In only two instances—aside from Castro's Cuba—did New World nations fall under European rule, even temporarily. Significantly, both exceptions occurred while the U.S. was preoccupied with its own Civil War. In 1861, at the invitation of the Dominican President, Spain declared that its former colony of Santo Domingo was once again under Spanish rule; and in 1863, with the help of Mexican royalists, France set up an Austrian prince as Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico. These adventures came to an end soon after Appomattox. The Spaniards got out of Santo Domingo in 1865. At the insistent prodding of U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward, France started withdrawing its troops from Mexico in 1866, and a year later Maximilian died before a Mexican firing squad. *Erwin Ogilvy*

The Monroe Doctrine guarded not only the independence of the Latin American states, but their territorial integrity too.

The violent march of European imperialism virtually bypassed Latin America. In the 1830s, Britain annexed the barren Falkland Islands, now claimed by Argentina, and added to its Central American colony of British Honduras some lands now claimed by Guatemala, but in both cases the territory taken was

virtually uninhabited, and no Latin American state was exercising effective sovereignty.

The Deterrent Effect. The success of the doctrine was largely in its deterrent effect: its very existence tended to stop trouble before it happened. Not until the Spanish-American War (in which the Monroe Doctrine played only a negligible part) did Europeans really look upon the U.S. as a great power; but the U.S. was nevertheless formidable enough that nations with appetites for New World territory—Britain, France, Spain and later Germany—were wary of getting involved in a fight. Time and again, during the latter part of the 19th century. German admirals urged their government to take over sites for naval bases in the Caribbean; every time, cooler heads insisted that the inevitable clash with the U.S. was too high a price to pay.

U.S.
really
informed

In short, the Monroe Doctrine, as European leaders liked to say, was presumptuous. But it worked.

Drastic Intervention. Monroe's successors not only upheld his doctrine—they extended it beyond the scope he originally gave to it. In 1845 James K. Polk declared, as the "settled policy" of the U.S., that "no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established upon any part of the North American continent." Far broader was the Theodore Roosevelt extension of the Monroe Doctrine. Down through the 19th century, it was official U.S. policy that the Monroe Doctrine did not bar outside nations from using armed force against Latin American states to punish wrongs or to collect debts, as long as the attackers refrained from annexing territory or changing the form of government. But when Germany undertook a blockade of Venezuelan ports in 1902 to force the current dictator to pay claims due to German citizens, U.S. public opinion got so aroused that the Germans called off the blockade.

In 1904 Roosevelt sent two warships to Santo Domingo to dramatize the U.S. interest in settling a tense debt dispute between the island and France. Then T.R. enunciated what came to be called the Roosevelt Corollary, declaring that if a Latin American country defaults on debts or otherwise misbehaves, the U.S. is justified in intervening, "however reluctantly," in order to forestall European intervention.

Under the Roosevelt Corollary, the U.S.

to others?!

intervened drastically in the internal affairs of several insolvent Caribbean republics. Three countries were actually occupied and ruled by the U.S. Marines for long stretches of time: the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924, Haiti from 1915 to 1934, and Nicaragua almost continually from 1912 to 1933.

Wilson

"Yankee Imperialism." The Roosevelt Corollary doubtless prevented European interventions in the Caribbean. But it also did grave damage in U.S. relations with Latin America. Denunciations of "Yankee imperialism" became oratorical routine for every aspiring Latin American politician.

Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy undertook to undo that damage.

F.D.R. recalled the Marines from Nicaragua and Haiti, toured Latin America, sipped toasts with Latin America's chiefs of state (many of them dictators who had seized office through military coups), preached

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 the new doctrine of Pan-American amity. At the Pan-American Conference in Montevideo in 1933, the U.S. agreed to a resolution prohibiting the nations of the hemisphere from interfering in each other's "internal or external concerns." In later years, the Latins drafted and the U.S. accepted even broader bans on intervention. The current version of the ban, adopted in 1948, declares: "No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of another state." Despite all these U.S. efforts to placate its southern neighbors, and despite all the economic aid the U.S. has given to Latin American nations, there is still a residue of anti-U.S. wile?

feeling. It shrinks year by year, but it remains strong enough that in many Latin American countries politicians have to be wary of openly taking pro-U.S. stands.

Policy of Nonaction. The Montevideo conference's ban on intervention in effect repealed the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. And in the eyes of many Latin Americans—and some U.S.

statesmen and scholars—the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed by the U.S.

U.S.
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 and the Latin American states at Rio in 1947, practically repealed the Monroe Doctrine. Under that treaty, "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States." The argument is that the basic purpose of the Doctrine—safeguarding the independence and territorial integrity of New World nations against aggression from outside the hemisphere—has been taken over by the multilateral Rio Pact, rendering the unilateral Doctrine obsolete. NATO

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 Not so. As a declaration of national policy, the Monroe Doctrine rested upon the U.S.'s right of self-defense. The U.S., as a sovereign nation, retains that right, and it is explicitly recognized in the Rio Pact. U.S. policymakers have made it unmistakably clear that the U.S. has not surrendered that right. The late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that "no member of the Rio Pact gives up what the Charter of the United Nations calls the inherent right of self-defense; that right is reserved." President Eisenhower made the same point in relation to the Organization of American States: "I think that the Monroe Doctrine has by no means been supplanted." The U.S.'s commitment to the OAS, he said, did not prevent the U.S. from looking after its own interests "when the chips are finally down." And last year, shortly after the tragic failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy declared: "Let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible. Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration—then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are to the security of our own nation." Multilateral Flypaper. So the Rio Pact did not erase the Monroe Doctrine. It only tangled the doctrine up in a lot of multilateral flypaper. Before the U.S. can invoke its own Monroe Doctrine, it must theoretically exhaust the possibilities of action under the Rio Pact. But the Rio Pact machinery would be an awkward means of coping even with overt armed attack; and it has proved to be hopeless as a way of grappling with Communist penetration by subversion, infiltration and revolution. SU aid?

election!
 The U.S. did deal with Communist infiltration in Guatemala under President Jacobo Arbenz in the 1950s.

JESUS!

But in so doing, the U.S. bypassed the inter-American machinery. At the Inter-American Conference in Caracas in 1954, Secretary Dulles persuaded the delegates to pass a resolution declaring that domination "of any American state by the international Communist movement" would call for an inter-American meeting "to consider the adoption of measures in accordance with existing treaties" (Arbenz' Guatemala voted against; Argentina and Mexico abstained). But no inter-American action followed these words; what toppled Arbenz from power was an invasion led by Guatemalan exiles and covertly sponsored by the U.S.

Communist Cuba is a far graver challenge to the U.S. and the hemisphere than Guatemala could ever have been. It is often argued that the Monroe Doctrine, the product of a simpler time, applies only to old-fashioned aggression. But in his wisdom, Monroe spoke for generations unborn and perils unenvisioned. What he declared to be dangerous to the U.S.'s peace and safety was "any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere . . . interposition in any form." That unmistakably applies to Cuba in 1962.

Just Get It Over With. What could the U.S. do if it decided to act on its own, invoking the Monroe Doctrine?

The choices are difficult and narrowing fast. Just 17 months ago, President Kennedy had a real chance to blast Castro out of power; but at the crucial moment of the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy called off the promised U.S. air cover. Today Castro's Cuba, propped up by Soviet economic and military support, is far more dangerous than it was then. The time is gone when it might be possible for Cuban exiles, no matter how much U.S. support they might get, to reclaim their homeland. And unless Castro launches an open, large-scale military attack against one of his neighbors, there is no prospect that the Organization of American States will undertake decisive action against Castro.

What remains? Some advocates of action call for a U.S. naval blockade to halt shipments of military supplies to Cuba.

But that would involve grave risks (it would mean trying to stop Russian ships on the high seas) without really solving the Castro problem. The only possibility that promises a quick end to Castro—if that is what is wanted—is a direct U.S.

invasion of Cuba, carried out with sufficient force to get the job done with surgical speed and efficiency.

Many Latin American leaders would welcome, either openly or secretly, just such U.S. action against Cuba. Most of Castro's closest Caribbean neighbors—Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic—have quietly informed the U.S. that they would back a U.S. invasion. Says Peru's Victor Andres Belaunde, former President of the U.N. General Assembly: "The presence of Russian troops in Cuba demands decisive action on the part of the U.S. I don't think Latin reaction to the U.S. action against Cuba will be unfavorable."

But the Cuba situation continues to haunt the Kennedy Administration. To Kennedy, personally, it is a bone

in the throat. He would like nothing better than to get the whole thing over with, by whatever means. For all his stylish public pronouncements, in private Kennedy is wont to hark back to the Bay of Pigs opportunity and to muse regretfully: "I wonder if . . ." ?

give
JFK is
offensive

One Administration argument against direct action to oust Castro is that Khrushchev might retaliate by stirring up trouble in other parts of the world, possibly setting off a thermonuclear war. But if Khrushchev wants such a war, he can start it or set it off any time he wants.

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And if—as can be presumed from the record of recent history—he does not want such a war, it is improbable that he would feel compelled to risk thermonuclear destruction to save Castro.

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When action is risky and painful, it is always tempting to men and to nations to delay in the hope that it will prove unnecessary. But history shows that postponement often increases the pain. As he ponders his problem, John Kennedy, a student of history, might well recall what James Monroe, that cautious President, wrote to Jefferson in 1822, the year before promulgating the doctrine that bears his name. Monroe was explaining his decision to risk European anger by recognizing the revolutionary governments of Latin America. "There was danger in standing still or moving forward," he wrote. "I thought it was the wisest policy to risk that which was incident to the latter course."

— In one version of history, Monroe's victory brought on George Washington's death. News of the election results, the story runs, reached Mount Vernon on a snowy December evening just as Washington, tired, cold and wet, returned home from a tour on horseback. Still bitter toward his former Minister to France, Washington talked long and angrily about the election without taking time to change into dry clothes.

Chilled, he fell sick with acute laryngitis, died 48 hours later. — Elector William Plumer of New Hampshire cast his ballot for John Quincy Adams, who said the vote caused him "surprise and mortification." Plumer later explained that he felt the honor of unanimity should be reserved for George Washington.

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Friday, Sep. 21, 1962

The Press: Press & President

"John F. Kennedy is floundering in a sea of troubles," wrote New York Times's Washington Columnist Arthur Krock. "He has reflected the uncertainty of what to do about it that Hamlet expressed in the famous mixed metaphor of the soliloquy. It is this shifting of tactics and moderation that has encouraged some of his opponents to believe they can retire him from the presidency after one term."

Absolutely Wrong. Strong criticism of the President has echoed through the daily press throughout the past month. His economy report evoked sneers: "Many words, little substance," said the Dallas Times Herald. His elevation of Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg to the U.S. Supreme Court, while greeted with approval in most quarters, outraged the Memphis Commercial Appeal ("a cynical payoff") and scared Columnist David Lawrence ("What a shiver of apprehension passes through the country").

As for his inability to ram his legislative program through a stubborn Congress, New York Herald Tribune Columnist Roscoe Drummond summed up: "There is no doubt in my mind that Senator Kennedy was absolutely sincere in telling the American people in the 1960 campaign that if they would elect a Democratic President and give leadership to a Democratic Congress, all would go well. And he was absolutely wrong."

What's Cooking? The principal attacks on the President came after his do-nothing-now statement on a Soviet-armed Cuba. "APPEASEMENT," cried the Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman. Wrote Columnist Henry J. Taylor: "If the steel companies could evoke wrath from Mr. Kennedy, why cannot Cuba? It is high time the American people forced a better policy than 'Let the dust settle/' "

"The American position is one of indecision, if not fearfulness," said the Omaha World-Herald. "It is one thing to proceed carefully," wrote Robert Spivack in the Herald Tribune. "It is something else to proceed 'cautiously' while the enemy is proceeding boldly." Denver's Rocky Mountain News insisted that "something has got to be done about Cuba and it had better be soon." Arthur Krock proposed naval patrols, David Lawrence called for 1) a total blockade and 2) severance of diplomatic relations with Russia. Such actions, he conceded, "could lead to some fighting." The New York Daily News railed at presidential ignorance: "President Kennedy says he has no knowledge that Soviet Russia has recently sent some troops into Castro

Cuba. Cuber, as the President sometimes calls it, is only 90 miles off Florider—oops. Florida. If the Kennedy Administration doesn't know what goes on in Cuba, one wonders how much, or how little, it knows about what's cooking in the rest of the world." Much of this criticism came from normally Republican and conservative papers, who had previously on occasion expressed admiration for the young President. But even Kennedy's close friend, Columnist Joseph Alsop, touring around Europe, was now disturbed by the symptoms of irresolution. Bristling at Khrushchev's ursine threats to visiting U.S. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall ("It is no laughing matter when Khrushchev flatly informs a member of the U.S. Cabinet that he is going to take Berlin . . . and that the U.S. will do nothing about it in the end"), Alsop called for action. "Perhaps the time has come to get angry," he wrote. "Perhaps it would have been better to throw back in Premier Khrushchev's face the recent outrageous note about Cuba and Berlin as 'unacceptable and non-received.'"

This, of course, has not been done. And at Kennedy's press conference last week, the punch and incisiveness lay, not in the presidential answers, but in reporters' questions (see box).

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Friday, Sep. 21, 1962

The Press: PRESS CONFERENCE SAMPLER

Whitney A. Shoemaker of the Associated Press: Mr. President, coupling this statement with the one of last week, at what point do you determine that the buildup in Cuba has lost its defensive guise to become offensive? Would it take an overt act? A.: I think if you read last week's statement and the statement today—I've made it quite clear, particularly in last week's statement when we talked about the presence of offensive military missile capacity or development of military bases, other indications, which I gave last week. All these would, of course, indicate a change in the nature of the threat.

William McGaffin of the Chicago Daily News: Mr. President, could you tell us why the Alliance for Progress has not made more progress in the past year on Latin American problems in your judgment? A.: . . . Latin America has been neglected for many, many years. I would hope that a good many Americans who are particularly concerned about Cuba today would also take a very careful look at the very low standard of living in much of Latin America ... I hope that in our concentration on the particular problem [Cuba] which I discussed at the opening we will extend our view and realize that what's at stake here is the freedom of a good many countries which are in very dire straits today . . . We are engaged in a tremendous operation with insufficient resources. And I think we are moving ahead since Punta del Este. But there's an awful lot of business left unfinished, and will be for some time. You cannot remake the face of Latin America overnight and provide better opportunity.

Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post: You said in your opening statement that you now have full authority to act in the Cuban affair. In view of this, do you think there's any virtue in the Senate or the Congress passing a resolution saying you have that authority? A.: No, I think it—no, I think it's—I think the members of Congress would, speaking as they do with a particular responsibility—I think would be useful, if they desire to do so, for them to express their view . . .

Jack Raymond of the New York Times: Mr. President, would you tell us some of your thinking of your request for special reserve mobilization power? Now, the international situation has led you twice to request such legislation. You could call a million reservists if you declared a national emergency. Why don't you do that? A.: Well, I think there are several stages of a possible crisis. The call of a national emergency is, I

would say, the near—the final step of a crisis, but there may be increased threats which would require us to call some reservists, particularly in the air, maybe at sea. possibly on the ground . . .

We have, as you know, of course, increased our Army strength from eleven to 16 divisions in the last year and a half. Now if we need, of course—if we're in a national emergency where the United States is threatened with very serious military action, of course, there'd be no hesitancy in declaring it. But we might be in a situation where the declaration of a national emergency might not be the most appropriate step, and in that case, we might—we would use the power granted to us by the Congress.

? Raymond: Mr. President, in that connection your request for only 150,000 reservists would seem to not support the opinion expressed because it seems no stage at all.

A.: Well, I think that . . .

Raymond: You said it strengthened the armed forces.

A.: That's correct. Then we have 150,000 more that we could call. They could be in very critical areas. As I've said, the air and the sea are two. And of course there could be Guard divisions called if the United States were obliged to reinforce its forces any place. The ability to call up needed men would make an appreciable difference. Now, as I say, we always have the final weapon, or nearly final weapon, of a national emergency and the power to call a million men. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense felt that this intermediate step could be very useful during the period when Congress is out of session.

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what did he call for? before Oct. 1?

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Friday, Sep. 28, 1962

**Foreign Relations: Speaking Out,
Softly**

Amid rising demands that the U.S. Government "do" something about Communist Cuba, the Senate last week at least said something. By a vote of 86 to 1, the Senate passed a resolution declaring that the U.S., in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, is determined to:

> Employ "whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms," to prevent the Castro regime from "extending by force or threat of force its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere."

> Prevent the buildup in Cuba of "an externally supported military capability" that would endanger the U.S.'s security.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously voted out an identical resolution. It will probably be passed by the House and signed by the President this week.

"War Hysteria." With the automatism of Pavlov's dogs, Communists salivated with denunciations. In Moscow, Red Star warned that Soviet armed forces "are in a position of highest military readiness to crush the aggressors." A Red Chinese broadcast accused the U.S. of "frantically preparing a new military aggression against Cuba." In his opening speech at the new session of the United Nations, Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko raged at the "war hysteria" and "campaign of hate" in the U.S. warned of war if the U.S. moves against Cuba.

But the Reds really had little to complain about. The Cuba resolution, as the Senate report on it said, was "firm but not threatening." In effect it went along with the President's contention that the Soviet weapons in Cuba are "defensive" in nature. How formidable the military buildup has become was evident from an official report on what U.S. intelligence has detected so far. It includes twelve anti-aircraft missile installations under construction, eight patrol boats carrying guided missiles with a range of n to 17 miles, and some 60 MIG fighter planes. At the coastal town of Banes, 60 miles from the U.S. base at Guantanamo (see THE HEMISPHERE), the Russians are building facilities for launching ground-to-ship missiles with a

range of 20 to 35 miles. Since mid-July, the report said, between 65 and 75 shiploads of Soviet military equipment and personnel have unloaded at Cuban ports—and more ships are on the way.

"Nose to Nose." Vermont Republican Winston L. Prouty, who cast the lone Senate vote against the resolution, charged that it "does not even face up to the Cuban problem. It reminds me of the resolve from King Lear that goes:

"I will do such things—

What they are yet I know not,

But they shall be

The terrors of the earth."

Other Republican Senators, including Nebraska's Carl Curtis and Iowa's Jack Miller, grumbled that the resolution was too soft. Florida's Democratic Senator George Smathers said it was only a "first step." In the House, New York's Republican Congressman John R. Pillion thundered that the resolution was "worse than no resolution at all. It scraps the Monroe Doctrine. It legitimizes a foreign regime in Cuba, telling it you can stay there unless you do this or that."

ak Far from embarrassing President Kennedy, the Cuba resolution carried the White House stamp of approval. Although it cited the Monroe Doctrine, the resolution endorsed the Administration view that the Russian buildup in Cuba, a flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine, does not demand any U.S. intervention. That view was affirmed once more in Secretary of State Dean Rusk's testimony before a joint closed-door session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees. Rusk argued against a U.S. blockade to halt the flow of Communist arms to Cuba, or any kind of unilateral U.S. action to deal with Castro. "It is not possible any longer for the U.S. to act strictly in unilateral terms," said Rusk. "We are engaged nose to nose with the Soviet Union right around the globe. It is almost inconceivable that that engagement could become hot at one point and not at others, and at each of these points we are necessarily involved with our allies."

NOT U-2! Rusk did not rule out all possibility of U.S. military action against Castro. The U.S. is "conducting a close surveillance of the Caribbean area," he said, and that "could lead to certain incidents which would involve the use of the armed forces." In other words, the U.S. could blunder into military action by accident. Furthermore, "if any elements of armed forces embarked from Cuba for any neighboring countries," U.S. military force would be used to "intercept" the invaders. But as long as Castro refrains from intervening outside Cuba, Rusk seemed to say, the U.S. will refrain from intervening inside Cuba. And so, the Soviet buildup will continue apace.

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Friday, Sep. 28, 1962

Cuba: Containment Shuffleboard

The nearest encampment of Russian forces is only 36 miles from the U.S. naval base at Guantdnamo, Cuba. Motorized Communist-bloc artillery waits at the end of specially cleared roads pointing toward the perimeter. Inside the 45-sq.-mi. base (see map), the 4,000-plus U.S. sailors and marines hold their tempers, their fire and their ground. Last week TIME Correspondent William Rademaekers flew out of Guantdnamo with a report on the base's situation and readiness: *la*


After weeks of ominous silence, the only hole in Castro's Cactus Curtain, Guantanamo's northeast gate, has now become the scene of a tense drama. Over the weekend, Cuban militiamen threw up a type of cattle chute—parallel lines of wire fencing some 300 yards long—through which the 2,300 Cuban civilians who work on the base were forced to pass. At 7 a.m. on Monday, as the first workers arrived, the shakedown began. Some men were stripped naked, each item of clothing carefully inspected for "documents." Others had their shirts or pants removed. Some were forced to kneel as tough Cuban guards emptied their pockets, spat at them, and shouted such things as "Why do you work for the Yankee bastards?" The inspection took 2½ hours before all the Cubans got through, and in the evening, as cows grazed peacefully outside the chute, Guantanamo's Cubans waited and sweated for an hour or more as the process was repeated before they were allowed to go home.

The new harassment has braced officials at the base for a harder time. The tactics are obviously designed to choke off the base's local work force—and also halt the embarrassing trickle of post exchange food that Cuban workers have been able to carry home with them. People living in Oriente province, which surrounds the base, have been especially hard hit by the breakdown of Cuba's distribution system. Beef and chickens, frozen when they leave Havana 600 miles away, arrive in Oriente in an advanced state of decay; so do dairy products. Said one Cuban on the base: "Our meat sometimes has worms, and when it doesn't it smells to the heavens. I do not know how long we can live like this." Added another: "Now they tell us, 'You won't stick it out until January—we promise you.' It is very difficult to be a hero when you have a family. It is now very difficult to work for the Americans."

Rear Admiral Edward J. O'Donnell, Guantanamo's base commander, says that he can remain operational

without the Cuban workers, just as he can stay in business without Castro's water, still being piped in from the Yateras River four miles away. In case Castro tries forcible eviction, the base's perimeter is guarded by combat-ready U.S. marines equipped with tanks and artillery. However, the bulk of the firepower comes from the ships using Guantanamo's training facilities. Destroyers, cruisers, battleships and carriers come and go without apparent plan. Yet a substantial part of the fleet is always near, and there is more than a touch of seriousness in the way the crews go through their paces.

Guantanamo's personnel know that they can be burned for publicly talking "politics," but privately they exercise their rights as U.S. citizens. Many are angry, frustrated and disillusioned, worried about "instant appeasement" and "going under painlessly." At one of the clubs on the base, they play a game bitterly called "containment shuffleboard—a game you don't try to win, but simply try to keep your opponent from scoring too high." As one sailor put it: "I'd like to think that one day we would have the guts to do something—but I doubt it." "It's hard to hold your head up these days when you see these Cubans being mauled at the gate by Communists," said another. "I never thought I'd see the day when in a place 90 miles from the States. Commie guards would keep me from taking liberty."

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The nearest encampment of Russian forces is only 36 miles from the U.S. naval base at Guantdnamo, Cuba. Motorized Communist-bloc artillery waits at the end of specially cleared roads pointing toward the perimeter. Inside the 45-sq.-mi. base (see map), the 4,000-plus U.S. sailors and marines hold their tempers, their fire and their ground. Last week TIME Correspondent William Rademaekers flew out of Guantdnamo with a report on the base's situation and readiness:

After weeks of ominous silence, the only hole in Castro's Cactus Curtain, Guantanamo's northeast gate, has now become the scene of a tense drama. Over the weekend, Cuban militiamen threw up a type of cattle chute—parallel lines of wire fencing some 300 yards long—through which the 2,300 Cuban civilians who work on the base were forced to pass. At 7 a.m. on Monday, as the first workers arrived, the shakedown began. Some men were stripped naked, each item of clothing carefully inspected for "documents." Others had their shirts or pants removed. Some were forced to kneel as tough Cuban guards emptied their pockets, spat at them, and shouted such things as "Why do you work for the Yankee bastards?" The inspection took 2% hours before all the Cubans got through, and in the evening, as cows grazed peacefully outside the chute, Guantanamo's Cubans waited and sweated for an hour or more as the process was repeated before they were allowed to go home.

The new harassment has braced officials at the base for a harder time. The tactics are obviously designed to choke off the base's local work force—and also halt the embarrassing trickle of post exchange food that Cuban workers have been able to carry home with them. People living in Oriente province, which surrounds the base, have been especially hard hit by the breakdown of Cuba's distribution system. Beef and chickens, frozen when they leave Havana 600 miles away, arrive in Oriente in an advanced state of decay; so do dairy products. Said one Cuban on the base: "Our meat sometimes has worms, and when it doesn't it smells to the heavens. I do not know how long we can live like this." Added another: "Now they tell us, 'You won't stick it out until January—we promise you.' It is very difficult to be a hero when you have a family. It is now very difficult to work for the Americans."

Rear Admiral Edward J. O'Donnell, Guantanamo's base commander, says that he can remain operational

without the Cuban workers, just as he can stay in business without Castro's water, still being piped in from the Yateras River four miles away. In case Castro tries forcible eviction, the base's perimeter is guarded by combat-ready U.S. marines equipped with tanks and artillery. However, the bulk of the firepower comes from the ships using Guantanamo's training facilities. Destroyers, cruisers, battleships and carriers come and go without apparent plan. Yet a substantial part of the fleet is always near, and there is more than a touch of seriousness in the way the crews go through their paces.

Guantanamo's personnel know that they can be burned for publicly talking "politics," but privately they exercise their rights as U.S. citizens. Many are angry, frustrated and disillusioned, worried about "instant appeasement" and "going under painlessly." At one of the clubs on the base, they play a game bitterly called "containment shuffleboard—a game you don't try to win, but simply try to keep your opponent from scoring too high." As one sailor put it: "I'd like to think that one day we would have the guts to do something—but I doubt it." "It's hard to hold your head up these days when you see these Cubans being mauled at the gate by Communists," said another. "I never thought I'd see the day when in a place 90 miles from the States. Commie guards would keep me from taking liberty."

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Friday, Oct. 05, 1962

TIME

Foreign Relations: A Fishing Tale

McK
Oct
2 wms

Sept. 28 [il. 28s photographical?!]

Fear of Berlin? Wf not focus now?

McAul - wf not focus - "don't write
for mirrors"!

would there internal USC
pressure to mirror? RFK? Wf act?

(Wf didn't JFK want to use planes,
unleash US?!) Tell advantage of
"no opinions"!

If U.S. words could scare Nikita Khrushchev out of Cuba, his technicians would be homebound from Havana right now. After four hours of debate, in which U.S. Representatives unleashed all their anger at the Soviet buildup in the Caribbean, the House passed the Senate-approved resolution reaffirming the right of the U.S. to use force—if needed—in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. Secretary of State Dean Rusk talked, mainly about Cuba, to some 40 foreign ministers from all over the world as they gathered at the United Nations in New York. Rusk also laid the groundwork for an informal meeting this week in which he could zero in on just the Latin American foreign ministers. There was vague talk of stepped-up surveillance of Communist military activity in the Caribbean and tougher economic sanctions against Cuba, in each case through collective hemisphere action.

STILL NO
0-2c!

Not Bothered. If any of this bothered either Khrushchev or Fidel Castro, they rather handsomely managed to conceal their dismay. Castro announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to help build "a fishing port" in Cuba to "facilitate the operations of the Soviet fishing fleet in the area of the Atlantic." With a bland air, Castro explained that he was "surprised to learn the extraordinary number of fishing boats that the Soviet Union has on all the seas." The Soviet newspaper Izvestia echoed the line of innocence: "The implementing of this agreement will not only allow Soviet fishermen to increase their catch of herring in the Atlantic, but first of all will also help Cuba to create her own fishing fleet and cadres of trained fishermen."

It was all one whale of a fish tale. The North American Air Defense Command had long tracked the Soviet trawler fleet operating near U.S. coastal waters. There are some 3,000 of these ships afloat, and many do much more than fish. Heavily laden with electronic snooping gear, their real function is military surveillance. They patrol off missile-launching Vandenberg Air Force Base in the West, off Cape Canaveral in the East, along strategic points in the Atlantic and Pacific missile ranges. They have even cut underseas communications cables.

Snoop Ships & Subs. The new "fishing port" will be, in fact, a Soviet naval base. It will supply and repair the Soviet snoop ships, eliminate the need for their long trips home. The equipment required to maintain this

fleet can be used just as well to service submarines and torpedo boats. Said New York's Republican Senator Kenneth Keating: "If we fall for this new bait, we will be the biggest suckers of them all."

For the U.S., the week brought only one encouraging note—and that was pretty far out. Both West Germany and Turkey—NATO partners of the U.S.—announced that they would comply with U.S. requests to stop shipping Communist cargoes to Cuba. Late tabulations showed that ships flying the flags of nations supposedly friendly to the U.S. have been twice as active in such traffic as Soviet-bloc vessels. In the past three months, ships owned by firms headquartered in Great Britain have made 61 trips to Cuba. West German vessels 20, Norwegian 18, Greek 17, Swedish 8. Last week there were 55 ships en route to Cuban ports, only seven of them flying Soviet flags. The British, the Norwegians, the Greeks and the Swedes remained deaf to U.S. pleas.

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TIME

Friday, Oct. 12, 1962

Oct 5

Foreign Relations: The Cuba Debate

If the Soviet military buildup in Cuba has done nothing else, it has given rise to a significant and intensifying U.S. debate — one that might even lead to effective action some day.

For the Administration, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was last week's chief spokesman. At an "informal" Washington meeting, he earnestly urged 19 Latin American foreign ministers and representatives to recommend that their countries cut off all remaining trade with Cuba, take self-defense measures to combat Communist aggression or subversion from Cuba, restrict travel of their own citizens to Cuba for possible Communist indoctrination, and encourage "Cuban national liberation" groups in their nations.

At a White House luncheon, President Kennedy added to the argument. Said he to the Latin American ministers: "The American republics must act now to contain the expansion of Communism from Cuba, and also take those steps which will lead to the liberation of Cuba. The Communist Party seeks to establish a springboard for an attack on the entire hemisphere by subversion, by infiltration, by all the other rather obvious apparatus that the Communist system uses so effectively. Communism can be the death of this hemisphere."

an JFK - Dec. to G-I into!

After the luncheon, the ministers promptly plunged into their own debate—not over what they really should or could do about Cuba, but mainly over whether or not they should try to issue a communique. Although one was finally produced, it was hardly calculated to cause even one grey hair in Castro's beard. It recognized the obvious—that "the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba is an attempt to convert the island into an armed base for Communist penetration of the Americas and subversion of the democratic institutions of the hemisphere."

Defense?!

A Piece of Paper. What to do about it? The most the ministers could agree on was to intensify surveillance of arms shipments to Cuba "to prevent the secret accumulation in the island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the hemisphere." There were vague phrases about combating subversion. And there was outright rejection of direct action: "A military intervention of Communist powers in Cuba cannot be justified as a situation analogous to the defensive measures adopted in other parts of the free world in

still as U-2 mission (Oct 9)

order to face Soviet imperialism." One U.S. aide summed it all up: "They unanimously agreed upon a piece of paper."

lc
complex
Rusk turned briefly, and perhaps more profitably, from a debate to a monologue. He told the ministers that the U.S. will close its ports to any ships—including those of its NATO allies—which carry cargoes of any type to Cuba, then seek return payloads from the U.S. Neither will the U.S. open its harbors to any government cargo, such as surplus food, to be carried on any ship owned by a firm engaged in Soviet-Cuba traffic. This, too, would make it difficult for ships to pick up transatlantic loads in both directions—and one-way loads are not profitable. At week's end, unofficial negotiations for the release of Bay of Pigs invaders from Castro prisons approached a climax. However welcome, it would do nothing to loosen the Soviet grip on the island.

Not Castro's, but Khrushchev's. At non-Administration levels, the debate was far hotter. Connecticut's Democratic Senator Thomas Dodd, appearing on David Susskind's all-talk Open End, called bluntly for a blockade. "I don't call it Castro's Cuba," he said. "I call it Khrushchev's Cuba. I suggest we start with a partial blockade. If it isn't adequate, we move to a total one. How much of a threat does it have to become? How many lives will we have to pay to stop it? It would have taken very few in the beginning, some more later, many more now. I think it will be a catastrophe if it goes any further." *for*

c.I.?
On the same program, Florida's Democratic Senator George Smathers argued that a blockade may not be enough, urged the recognition of a Cuban government-in-exile and the creation of a hemispheric military force, like NATO. "We have to have some program that is calculated to get rid of Communism in Cuba and we cannot do it by some sort of defensive blockade," said Smathers. "I think what we ought to do is just what we did in Europe, where we organized an admittedly military group of nations that felt about Communism just the way we did—that are prepared to fight and will fight." *JFK found* *miss? Pull. back?!*

?
New York's Republican Senator Jacob Javits, speaking to the U.S. Inter-American Council in Manhattan, said that a blockade or invasion of Cuba by the U.S. might eventually be needed, but urged first that President Kennedy call an emergency meeting of the Organization of American States to find out if it will act on Cuba. If it refuses (which it will), Javits said that an attempt should be made to establish a Caribbean defense organization.

Toward a Consensus. Whatever the final action, Javits emphasized that the alternatives are a legitimate subject of nationwide debate. "This does not mean that the President should improvidently be pushed or rushed in exercising his great constitutional responsibility for the nation's foreign policy," he said. "But it does mean that officials like myself must express their views so that the national consensus, which will influence the President's policy, may be truly representative of the nation."

?!
As a first step in a meaningful debate, Javits asked President Kennedy to "describe the seriousness of the Cuban crisis to the American people directly on national television and radio. I call upon him to be blunt not only with us but with his Administration. I call upon him to recognize the urgency plainly required by the situation. The American people are disturbed about the Cuban situation, disturbed as they have not

UNAS?

been since the Korean war." *oa*

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[← Back to Article](#)[Click to Print](#)**TIME**

Friday, Oct. 19, 1962

Politics: J.F.K. on the Stump*Oct 12:**Oct 12 - just before Oct 14-15-16!*

There has never been anything quite like it. In a mid-term election campaign, the President of the U.S. is barnstorming the nation, looking, acting and sounding as though he himself were a candidate for county clerk.

Kennedy's basic decision to go all out was made months ago, when he realized that he would be blamed if Democrats suffered major losses this fall. Polls indicated that a major problem is Democratic apathy—less than 30% of Democrats, as against 43% of Republicans, figured they had any real reason to vote. That, at least, was something the President might do something about.

Once Again, with Feeling. Kennedy campaigns with all the trappings—brass bands, searchlights crisscrossing in the night, scores of motorcycle cops. It seems like 1960 all over again. His theme is certainly the same: the need "to get this country moving again." The Republican Party/ he repeats, says no to "progress," the Democratic Party says yes. Kennedy seldom gets specific about such issues as medicare and tax reform, but he quotes staccato statistics to show how G.O.P. minorities have blocked his programs: "Last year 81% of the Republicans in the House voted against the area redevelopment bill; 95% of the Republicans in the House voted against the Housing Act."

Last week a Baltimore crowd began to cheer at the sight of the first Secret Service helicopter over the trees. When Kennedy eventually landed, he needed only to smile to draw a swelling roar. The motorcade drove six miles through streets lined with what Baltimore police called the biggest political crowd in the city's history—the estimate was 175,000. In the Fifth Regiment Armory, on the site of the hall in which Woodrow Wilson was nominated in 1912. Kennedy was greeted by an honor guard of Negro R.O.T.C. cadets, a band from St. Mary's School, and the Ladies Swiss Embroidery Workers.

While local politicians beamed on the platform, Kennedy gave the Republicans hell. "I am proud to come back to this city and state and ask your support in electing Democrats—those members of the House and Senate who support the minimum wage and medical care for the aged, and urban renewal, and cleaning our rivers, and giving security to our older people, and educating our children, and giving jobs to our workers.

That is the issue of this campaign."

Meet the Press. In New York, one of the most dynamic campaigners in the U.S. did his best to bolster one of the most forlorn. Waiting for Kennedy, Democratic Gubernatorial Candidate Robert M. Morgenthau stood alone on the apron at La Guardia Airport. No one seemed to know the pleasant, introverted lawyer who has suddenly found himself thrust into a contest with Republican Nelson Rockefeller. An aide finally ushered Morgenthau over to meet the press, but the conversation soon suffered into silence, and the candidate went back to standing by himself and staring into space.

Kennedy tried hard. He greeted Morgenthau warmly, steered him toward the cameras, invited him into the presidential car. The next morning Kennedy popped over to Newark to attend a Columbus Day celebration, revealed to a heavily Italian crowd of 10,000 a campaign trick of his grandfather's, Boston's John F. ("Honey Fitz") Fitzgerald. "My grandfather always used to claim that the Fitzgeralds were descended from the Geraldinis, who came from Venice. I have never had the courage to make that claim, but I will make it on Columbus Day in this state of New Jersey."

Artful Elbows. Then Kennedy hustled back to Manhattan to watch a Columbus Day parade and to make another try at perking up Morgenthau. On the reviewing stand, Morgenthau shyly took his place next to Kennedy, only to be elbowed aside by the likes of Mayor Robert Wagner and Edward Dudley, Democratic candidate for state attorney general, until he ended up four places away from the President. With Morgenthau forced out into leftfield, Kennedy leaned to his right and had an animated exchange with Republican Rockefeller.

Flying into Pennsylvania, Kennedy renewed his familiar pitch for an even more overwhelmingly Democratic Congress. There was, he said, a grave danger that "the 88th Congress will be in control of a dominant Republican [and] conservative Democratic coalition that will defeat progress. And that is why I come here tonight and ask your help in electing a progressive Congress."

Looking Ahead. Then the President took off for Indianapolis and, although he did not identify him by name, a sharp attack on Indiana's Republican Senator Homer Capehart, who has been urging a blockade or even an invasion of Cuba.

Said Kennedy: "This is no time for rash and irresponsible talk. This is the time for men who talk softly and carry a big stick." The President praised Democrat Birch E. Bayh Jr., Capehart's opponent in November, as a man who would never join "those self-appointed generals and admirals who want to send someone else's son to war."

Bayh? against Capehart!

And so, on to Louisville and an attempt to help Kentucky's Lieutenant Governor Wilson Wyatt in his fight against Republican Senator Thruston Morton. He planned to keep up this same headlong pace right up to Election Day. There remained some doubt about how much he was actually helping his party's assorted

candidates—but he was certainly giving it that old Kennedy college try.

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TIME

Friday, Oct. 26, 1962

The Campaign: Two Big Issues

In Dallas, more than 1,000 people jammed a League of Women Voters luncheon, sent 250 questions to the head table to be answered by Texas' gubernatorial candidates. In Waukegan, Ill., 400 Democrats gathered around a roaring bon fire at a party rally. In Amherst, Mass., on a miserable, stormy night, nearly 1,000 packed the high school auditorium to hear political speeches. In Atlanta, a group of wealthy citizens met at a candlelight buffet dinner with a Republican candidate for Congress. When he was through speaking, a woman put the question that seems most on America's mind in Election Year 1962. "What," she asked, "about Cuba?"

These meetings, as much as the throngs that turn out for President Kennedy, and the women who clutch at him across the nation's airport fences, are meaningful to this campaign. Political observers can hardly recall when there was such interest in an off-year election. The citizens who turn out are not in a frolicsome mood. They listen intently, take notes, ask questions. As they do, two major issues take shape: 1) foreign policy, especially Cuba, and 2) money.

Setting the Course. "I never cared too much for old Harry Truman," growled a California farmer. "But he damn sure wouldn't have let Khrushchev move into Cuba." "We had a chance to correct the Cuba situation," said Thomas O'Grady, an Illinois railroad switchman. "But we lost it. I'm not blaming Kennedy, but hell, we've got to do something before things get out of hand down there." Following the example of Senior Republican Dwight Eisenhower, G.O.P. candidates have taken to the attack, charging the Administration with irresolution in its foreign policy and weakness in dealing with Castro.

The tactic can be dangerous. In Indiana, for example, Republican Senator Homer Capehart advocated a direct U.S. invasion of Cuba, hastily backed away when it seemed to be losing him votes. Yet the Democrats are clearly embarrassed by the foreign policy issue, prefer to discuss domestic matters whenever possible. If Cuba must be talked about, they argue, it should be talked about in the vaguest of terms. Urges the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee in a memo to party candidates: "Be for a course of action on Cuba, but a course of action short of invasion."

why? public not happy? But what?

Ignoring the Fact. As the U.S. is frustrated by Cuba, so is it uneasy about the economy. That feeling was reflected in the stock market, which last week fell to 573.29 in the Dow-Jones industrial averages—lower than Blue Monday. It was reflected in the Federal Reserve Board's move to perk things up by cutting commercial bank reserve requirements. It was reflected in the things-are-going-to-get-better statements of such Administration officials as Walter Heller, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges (see U.S. BUSINESS).

But most of all it was reflected in the political battles at state and local levels. U.S. voters tend to feel helpless about the national economy and national tax policies; it's all too big to be understandable. They can, however, do something about state taxes—and a candidate can ignore that fact only at his peril.

The average per capita state tax has leaped from \$65 in 1952 to \$113 this year. In Ohio, Democratic Governor Mike Di Salle is in deep trouble because of the tax increase he pushed through the legislature to pay for his expanded welfare programs. In Michigan, Democratic Governor John Swainson is hard put to explain his state's swelling deficit. In Colorado, Democratic Governor Steve McNichols balanced the budget and freed the state of bonded indebtedness. But he had to raise the income tax to do it, and it may cost him his job.

As always, many elections will be decided on the question of which candidate has the toothiest smile, or which is most likely to get Government aid for a new sewer district. But as rarely before in off-year elections, the bigger, more substantial issues are being discussed and debated in almost every state. A few months ago, President Kennedy asked for a national dialogue on the great national problems of the day. Now he is getting it, and the U.S. can only benefit.

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Friday, Oct. 26, 1962

Oct 19

Nation: Still Waiting to Hear

To hear President Kennedy on the campaign trail, about the only thing that really counts is whether the next U.S. Congress will be even more lopsidedly Democratic than the last. In some ways, what Kennedy does not say is more significant than what he does.

Kennedy argues that he needs even more Democrats in Congress in order to put through his domestic welfare programs. Last week in Connecticut, he passed the word again. On the green in Waterbury, he cried: "Too many times I have seen fights won and lost by one, two or three votes, on housing, and medical care for the aged, and education, and farming, and all the rest. I don't want to see the next two years spent with a Congress in the control of the Republicans* and an Executive in control of the Democrats, and nothing being done which must be done if this country is going to move ahead."

In the Midwest, the President resounded his theme. In Springfield, Ill., he spoke of agriculture: "In the last 21 months we have not, by any means, solved the farm problem. But we have achieved the best two-year advance in farm income of any two years since the Depression. At the same time we reduced our wheat and feed grain surpluses by 700 million bushels."

In Chicago, countering a charge made by Eisenhower a fortnight ago, he held forth to \$100-a-plate diners in the vast new McCormick Place exhibition hall. "I am not asking for one-party government," he insisted. "I am asking that you vote for the one party which is willing to work for progress. I am asking for enough help to get the job done. In the 87th Congress the health-care bill was defeated in the Senate by one vote, the full powers of the trade bill were saved by one vote, the original emergency public works bill was defeated by one vote, and in the House the farm bill was defeated by five votes and the tax bill saved by twelve."

NA!
Through it all, the President avoided anything more than passing reference to the international problems of the U.S. Cuba might as well have been on another planet. A White House aide explained—at least in part—the strategic thinking: "Medicare, depressed areas, aid to education—these are still the issues that are going to get votes or lose them." Maybe so—and maybe not. In any event, at week's end Kennedy canceled

trips into several states, flew back to Washington suffering from a cold accompanied by a slight fever. His illness, plus the fact that he is bypassing foreign policy while on the stump and has not held a press conference in six weeks, makes it unlikely that the voters will hear before Election Day from their President about the issues that seem to concern them most. *Na*

* There is not the faintest chance that Republicans will control the next Senate, only an outside possibility that they will take control of the House.

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Friday, Oct. 26, 1962

Cuba: Double Traveler

It used to be that a neutralist wishing to show how even-handed his politics were had to journey half a world, to Washington and Moscow. Now he can achieve the same effect on the cheap, by a trip to the U.N. with layovers in Washington and Havana. Last week Algeria's Premier Ahmed ben Bella, 45, leading his new nation into "constructive neutrality," said goodbye to President Kennedy one day and hello to Fidel Castro the next day. *hm*


Gestures All Around. Determined to outdo the traditional 21-gun salute that Ben Bella got on the White House lawn, Castro had an old Communist satellite gimmick to impress his guest—a 21-tank salute. As the long rifles of the Russian-built tanks barked their welcome, the bearded Cuban gave the slim Algerian rebel a mighty abrazo and then led him to the microphones. Said Castro: "To make this visit at a time when the powerful Yankee empire has redoubled its hostility against our country ... is, on your part, Señor Premier, an act of courage and a gesture we shall never forget."

From then on, it was one gesture after another. Ben Bella gushed praise for the "extraordinary advances and progress of this revolution despite the maneuvers of enemy forces." Every Algerian, he said, "knows, follows and admires" the Cuban revolution; Algerians celebrate "as a national event, the victory of Playa Girón."* As a new nation, he said, Algeria has struck only one medal of honor, and this will be given to Castro.

"You Too." Ben Bella saw little of Castro's hungry, rundown island during his day in Cuba. Most of the time was spent huddled with Castro officialdom. Castro and Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós were particularly insistent that Ben Bella agree to a specific denunciation of the U.S. Guantánamo Naval Base. So was Che Guevara, the Argentine Communist in charge of Cuba's economy. "Sooner or later," he told Ben Bella, "you, too, will have to face the issue of the French naval base of Mers-el-Kebir." According to a later Algerian account of the session, Ben Bella urged Castro to ease tension with the U.S. "And just how?" asked Castro. A *he* little less rattling of Russian rockets would help, Ben Bella reportedly said. The final joint communiqué reflected no such exchange. Ben Bella approved a statement demanding an end to "imperialist oppression," and "foreign military bases in other countries, including the naval base at Guantánamo."

Washington, which hopes to get along with Ben Bella, reacted with a pained official silence, and a private explanation that Ben Bella has a large body of leftist support to keep happy. Flying back to New York the Algerian Premier would say no more about Cuba. But Algerians at the U.N. reported some interesting observations by Ben Bella and his aides about their Cuban hosts. They got the feeling that Che Guevara and Armed Forces Commander Raúl Castro were the real "strongmen" of the regime. President Osvaldo Dorticós, long considered a mere Castro puppet, was a surprisingly "strong personality." What about Castro himself? "Still immature, and too nervous."

* Cuba's name for the Bay of Pigs invasion.

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TIME

Friday, Oct. 26, 1962

Berlin: Where Is the Crisis?

The word at Bonn's Palais Schaumburg one morning last week was that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer seemed to be in a terrible mood. Washington kept shouting from the housetops that a Berlin crisis was imminent; Adenauer did not agree, and did not see what Washington wanted him to do about it. At noon a cable signed Schröder was placed on his desk, and within minutes the temper in Adenauer's office improved. The German Foreign Minister, visiting Washington, reported his considered judgment that the American uproar about Berlin had been started largely for domestic political reasons. No one he had talked to, reported Schroder, had any solid evidence that the Soviets were about to make any unusual new trouble for Berlin.

Palaver at State. Both London and Paris essentially agreed with Schroder's estimate. In Moscow, Nikita Khrushchev had a three-hour talk with Ambassador Foy Kohler in which he delivered no warnings, and pushed no harder than before. In Washington, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, at his own request, saw Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk. As usual, Gromyko was adamant; at a State Department dinner the dialogue droned on roughly like this:

Gromyko: Now, Mr. Secretary, the situation is that there are two Germanys and there are two Berlins. Those are facts, and they will not change.

Rusk: Ah, Mr. Minister, all this may be true. But it is also true that there is a Western presence in Berlin. That is a fact, and it will not change.

Gromyko's attitude was not new, and suggested stalemate rather than crisis. Barring the existence of some unknown intelligence reports or private revelation, all the Washington warnings—by the President, Bobby Kennedy, Rusk, Defense Secretary McNamara et al.—were not based on anything concrete. The closest thing to specific evidence was a month-old Tass statement, which suggested that Moscow was willing to be patient about signing a peace treaty with East Germany until after the U.S. elections. The danger in Berlin remains real enough at all times, but it also happens to fit in neatly with the Kennedy election strategy; one way of diverting attention from the Cuba issue is to argue that Berlin is really more dangerous and

important. At week's end, the Administration itself revised its timetable, now suggested that the big crisis would come early next year rather than next month.

Greetings at the Wall. The unpleasantest noises about Berlin from the Red side last week were provided by Polish Communist Boss Wladyslaw Gomulka, who, with Premier Josef Cyrankiewicz, journeyed to East Berlin. Gomulka has long been considered a relatively independent and "respectable" Communist, and there had been much speculation that he loathed Walter Ulbricht's nasty East German regime. But in public, at least, he could scarcely have been more obliging: he denounced West Germany, demanded Western withdrawal from Berlin and an early peace treaty. He visited the Wall, the world's most obscene tourist attraction, and signed a visitors' book, inscribing, "Hearty greetings to the soldiers standing watch on the borders of the German Democratic Republic."

Meanwhile, Nikita Khrushchev kept toying with the idea of going to the U.S. for conversations with President Kennedy. Khrushchev, Americans in Moscow guessed, might not want to stay put in Russia too long at a time of harvest and production failures, rising costs, and other domestic problems. For him, too, talking about Berlin might be a useful diversion at the moment.

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Friday, Oct. 26, 1962

Nation: Still Waiting to Hear

To hear President Kennedy on the campaign trail, about the only thing that really counts is whether the next U.S. Congress will be even more lopsidedly Democratic than the last. In some ways, what Kennedy does not say is more significant than what he does.

Kennedy argues that he needs even more Democrats in Congress in order to put through his domestic welfare programs. Last week in Connecticut, he passed the word again. On the green in Waterbury, he cried: "Too many times I have seen fights won and lost by one, two or three votes, on housing, and medical care for the aged, and education, and farming, and all the rest. I don't want to see the next two years spent with a Congress in the control of the Republicans* and an Executive in control of the Democrats, and nothing being done which must be done if this country is going to move ahead."

In the Midwest, the President resounded his theme. In Springfield, Ill., he spoke of agriculture: "In the last 21 months we have not, by any means, solved the farm problem. But we have achieved the best two-year advance in farm income of any two years since the Depression. At the same time we reduced our wheat and feed grain surpluses by 700 million bushels."

In Chicago, countering a charge made by Eisenhower a fortnight ago, he held forth to \$100-a-plate diners in the vast new McCormick Place exhibition hall. "I am not asking for one-party government," he insisted. "I am asking that you vote for the one party which is willing to work for progress. I am asking for enough help to get the job done. In the 87th Congress the health-care bill was defeated in the Senate by one vote, the full powers of the trade bill were saved by one vote, the original emergency public works bill was defeated by one vote, and in the House the farm bill was defeated by five votes and the tax bill saved by twelve."

Through it all, the President avoided anything more than passing reference to the international problems of the U.S. Cuba might as well have been on another planet. A White House aide explained—at least in part—the strategic thinking: "Medicare, depressed areas, aid to education—these are still the issues that are going to get votes or lose them." Maybe so—and maybe not. In any event, at week's end Kennedy canceled

trips into several states, flew back to Washington suffering from a cold accompanied by a slight fever. His illness, plus the fact that he is bypassing foreign policy while on the stump and has not held a press conference in six weeks, makes it unlikely that the voters will hear before Election Day from their President about the issues that seem to concern them most.

* There is not the faintest chance that Republicans will control the next Senate, only an outside possibility that they will take control of the House.

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Friday, Oct. 26, 1962

California: The Taste of Triumph

The candidates for Governor of California—perhaps the biggest single prize at stake in the 1962 elections—have been denouncing and cajoling for months. Now, in time-tried style, both can begin to taste triumph. Says Democratic Incumbent Pat Brown: "I have never been more confident of victory. This will be a Democratic year in California." Says Republican Richard Nixon: "His campaign is dying and ours is surging with optimism. Yes, there is victory in the air." All of which adds up to the fact that it is anyone's race.

Nixon has zigzagged 18,000 miles across the state, most recently whistle-stopping from Santa Cruz to San Diego in a "Victory Special" train. He has squeezed some 163,000 hands, withstood 15 solid hours of more-or-less random questions from telethon viewers. He has livened his rallies with glamorous girls, organized everything from "Giant Fans for Nixon" to "Veterinarians for Nixon"—headed by the vet who cares for his dog Checkers.

Pat Brown has perspired through Mexican square dances and 90-minute television ordeals of his own. He rushes from factory gates to coffee shops, addresses everyone outside of a telephone booth. Whereas Dick sort of hugs babies, Pat really smooches them.

Spies & Smears. Anguished cries of "smear" have come from both candidates—with considerable cause.

Democrats, for example, have launched a whispering campaign that reads the most sinister implications into a 1956 loan of \$205,000 to Nixon's brother, Donald, by a firm owned by Defense Contractor Howard Hughes. On the other side, many G.O.P. county headquarters have been selling a 50¢ booklet by an alleged onetime FBI counterspy, which, among many other things, charges that "Governor Pat Brown, over the years, has established an unchallengeable record of collaborating with and appeasing Communists from top to bottom." Both candidates of course deny that they have anything to do with airing the other's dirty linen.

At the same time, both Nixon and Brown have tried to generate some genuine issues. Nixon has hammered hard at Brown with charges that his law enforcement is lax, that he is fiscally irresponsible, that the

Democrats have failed to achieve industrial expansion sufficient to keep pace with the state's population growth, that Brown has refused to seek new laws to fight Communist subversion.

"Why," asks Nixon, "has crime skyrocketed in California? Because our local crime fighters have not had strong support from the present state administration. Remember, a police badge is only as good as the Governor who backs it up." On taxes, he promises to cut \$50 million in government spending next year "so that we can get the surplus that will allow us to reduce taxes." As to growth: "California must have one million new jobs in the next four years. The state is now only doing half as well as it must do."

Calculated Risk. But it is Nixon's use of the Communism issue that has stirred the most excitement. It involves a calculated risk; it seems to try to placate the state's far-right Republicans, even while offending the Democratic and independent voters that Nixon needs to win (final state registration figures: Democrats—4,289,997; Republicans—2,926,408). Yet California, among all the states, is perhaps the most jittery about the threat of internal Communism. A recent poll showed that 66% of California voters favor a proposed constitutional amendment (opposed by both Nixon and Brown) that would empower any grand jury in any of the state's 58 counties to meet secretly, declare an organization subversive, and inflict penalties without appeal.

Brown, trying to turn the Communism issue against Nixon, claims that the former Vice President "is dealing in panic," that Nixon is simply rereading the same script that got him elected to Congress in 1946 and to the Senate in 1950. "Clichés like this went out with 'whizbang' and the Stutz Bearcat," cries Brown. But Pat is careful to advocate an expansion of anti-Communism teaching in the schools "in a nonhysterical atmosphere."

The Uptrend. Brown promised that he would not raise taxes if reelected; rather, he would exempt 840,000 low-income residents from the state tax rolls. He says that he will increase state aid to local schools, but he will not permit any deficit spending. His basic theme is that California is prosperous and that he and the Democrats have made it so. "We have money in the bank and our credit rating has never been higher," he says. "Today employment in California is breaking all records. In just the past year, our economy has produced 238,000 new jobs. Wherever you look in California—wages, profits, new construction—the trend is up."

Both Jack Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower have visited the state to plead their party's cause. Kennedy plans to return for more campaigning. But despite all the issues, along with all the gimmickry, Californians will probably make their choice almost as if there had been no campaign at all: upon their personal preference for party or personality.

Nixon has tried to present an image of confidence and casualness. Yet his old self-consciousness still shows. Scowling angrily in front of television cameras, he recently complained to newsmen: "I think it's time that you fellows began to have a single standard, not a double standard in this campaign. You do not put the

same questions to Mr. Brown with regard to his smears that you do to me." Brown, on the other hand, is loose as a goose—and sometimes sounds like one. Honked he in a recent nationwide television appearance: "The greatest issues in California are the issues of the greatest growth of any state in this union, and every issue that we have should be directed toward the problems of the future of this state, including taking care of them at the present."

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TIME

Friday, Nov. 02, 1962

Nation: The Showdown

Eni Oct 26? (pre-SAM) But it has

Oct 28 letter!

Did it come out

late? on Oct. 29

or late 28th?

(See Cover)

W/ Anderson? Vs. (Demunion?) of JFK? To avoid JFK?

For days and weeks, refugees and intelligence sources within Cuba had insisted that the Soviet Union was equipping its Caribbean satellite with missiles, manned by Russians, that could carry nuclear destruction to the U.S. But the reports were fragmentary and sometimes contradictory. And U.S. reconnaissance planes, photographing Cuba from the Yucatan Channel to the Windward Passage, could detect no such buildup. President Kennedy was not yet persuaded to take decisive action.

*NO
U-2*

not U-2 - derived Oct 9

On Oct. 10 came aerial films with truly worrisome signs. They showed roads being slashed through tall timber, Russian-made tents mushrooming in remote places. The order went out to photograph Cuba mountain by mountain, field by field and, if possible, yard by yard.

Magic Pictures. For four long days, Hurricane Ella kept the planes on the ground. Finally, on Sunday, Oct. 14, Navy fighter pilots collected the clinching evidence. Flying as low as 200 ft., they made a series of passes over Cuba with their cameras whirring furiously. They returned with thousands of pictures—and the photographs showed that Cuba, almost overnight, had been transformed into a bristling missile base.

*NO
U-2!*

As if by magic, thick woods had been torn down, empty fields were clustered with concrete mixing plants, fuel tanks and mess halls. Chillingly clear to the expert eye were some 40 slim, 52-ft., medium-range missiles, many of them already angled up on their mobile launchers and pointed at the U.S. mainland. With an estimated range of 1,200 miles, these missiles, armed with one-megaton warheads, could reach Houston. St. Louis—or Washington. The bases were located at about ten spots, including Sagua la Grande and Remedios on the northern coast, and San Cristobal and Guanajay on the western end of the island (see map above, and pictures on following eight pages). Under construction were a half-dozen bases for 2,500-mile missiles, which could smash U.S. cities from coast to coast. In addition, the films showed that the Russians had moved in at least 25 twin-jet Ilyushin-28 bombers that could carry nuclear bombs.

*NO
or NY*

Oct 26

At Once. Throughout Monday, Oct. 15, the experts pored over the pictures. There could be no doubt. Early on Oct. 16 a telephone call went to CIA Director John McCone, who was in Seattle mourning the death there of his stepson. It was 4 a.m. on the Coast; but McCone came awake in shocked realization of the grave impact of the news. When he had heard the last detail, he ordered the pictures taken to the President at once. NO ~~night~~ ¹⁵ _(AM)

evening before While the pictures were being prepared for the President, CIA officials outlined the information by phone to McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's adviser on national security. Bundy hurried out of his office in the west wing of the White House, rode the tiny elevator up to the President's living quarters on the second floor, and walked into Kennedy's bedroom. The President, who was dressed and had just finished breakfast, put down the morning papers and listened. His expression did not change as Bundy spun out the startling story.

? At 10:30 a.m.. Kennedy first saw the pictures of the missiles. At 11:45 he sat down in his rocking chair for a conference with the top members of his Administration that began the most crucial week of his term in office. It was a week of intensive analysis and planning, a week of round-robin meetings at State and the Pentagon—and above all, a week of decisions of surpassing importance to the U.S. and the world today.

Why? Throughout that week. U.S. planes kept Cuba under their photographic magnifying glass. Air Force RB-475 and U25 prowled high over the island. Navy jets swooped low along the coastlines.

NO With the passing of each day, each hour, the missile buildup burgeoned. In speed and scope it went far beyond anything the U.S. had believed possible. By conservative estimate, the Soviet Union must have been planning it in detail for at least a year, poured at least \$1 billion into its determined effort.

But why? That was the question that kept pounding at President Kennedy. He

well... knew all too well that the Soviet Union had long had the U.S.. under the ⁴ Damoclean sword of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the Russian homeland. There thus seemed little real need for such a massive effort in Cuba. Yet, as Kennedy pondered and as he talked long and earnestly with his top Kremlinologists—among them former U.S. Ambassadors to Moscow Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen—some of the answers began to emerge. More and more in Kennedy's mind, the Cuban crisis became linked with impending crisis in Berlin—and with an all-out Khrushchev effort to upset the entire power balance of the cold war.

? "Chip" Bohlen, about to leave for Paris as U.S. ambassador there, supplied a significant clue. Talking to Kennedy, he recalled a Lenin adage that Khrushchev is fond of quoting: If a man sticks out a bayonet and strikes mush, he keeps on pushing. But when he hits cold steel, he pulls back. ?

The Theory. Khrushchev's Cuban adventure seemed just such a probe. He hoped to present the U.S. with a fait accompli, carried out while the U.S. was totally preoccupied—or so, at least, Khrushchev supposed—with its upcoming elections. If he got away with it, he could presume that the Kennedy

WWR

NO } Administration was so weak and fearful that he could take over Berlin with impunity.

The theory gained credence when, on the very day that Kennedy learned about the missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev did his best to cover up the operation by assuring U.S. Ambassador Foy D. Kohler during a relaxed, three-hour talk that the arms going to Cuba were purely defensive. Two days later, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko showed up in the White House with the same soothing message. But all was not bland during Gromyko's $\frac{1}{2}$ -hour visit. Noting that he knew Kennedy appreciated frank talk, Gromyko declared that U.S. stubbornness had "compelled" Russia to plan to settle the Berlin crisis unilaterally after the Nov. 6 elections.

Khrushchev already had requested a November meeting with Kennedy. As Kennedy came to see it, Khrushchev planned to say something like this: We are going to go right ahead and take Berlin, and just in case you are rash enough to resist, I can now inform you that we have several scores of megatons zeroed in on you from Cuba.

If such a scene would hardly be dared by novelists, it was well within Khrushchev's flair for macabre melodrama. In this baleful light, it became completely clear to Kennedy that the U.S. had no course but to squash the Soviet missile buildup. But how? In his long, soul-trying talks with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, State Secretary Dean Rusk, the CIA's McCone and other top civilian and military officials, the plan was arduously worked out. Direct invasion of Cuba was discarded—for the time being. So was a surprise bombing attack on the missile sites. Both methods might cause Khrushchev to strike back instinctively and plunge the world into thermonuclear war. More than anything else, Kennedy wanted to give Khrushchev time to understand that he was at last being faced up to—and time to think about it.

^N
The Answer. The best answer seemed to be "quarantine"—a Navy blockade against ships carrying offensive weapons to Cuba. That would give the Premier time and food for thought. It would offer the U.S. flexibility for future, harsher action. It seemed the solution most likely to win support from the U.S.'s NATO allies and the Organization of American States. And it confronted the Soviet Union with a showdown where it is weakest and the U.S. is mighty: on the high seas. For the U.S. Navy, under Chief of Naval Operations George Anderson, 55, has no rival. OK

^{WHAT?} To Anderson went the job of setting up the blockade with ships and planes and making it work. While the Bay of Pigs fiasco had involved heltery-skeltery White House amateurs, now the pros were taking over. Anderson worked closely with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Maxwell Taylor and with McNamara, who had been eating and sleeping, in the Pentagon.

Speed was vital. Already plowing through the Atlantic were at least 25 Soviet or satellite cargo ships, many of them bringing more missiles and bombers for Cuba. They were shadowed by Navy planes from bases along the East Coast.

effect of time cover?

Now, under Anderson's direction, U.S. warships prepared to intercept them.

All this took place in an eerie atmosphere of total secrecy in a notably voluble Administration. As part of the security cover, Kennedy took off on a scheduled campaign tour. But by Saturday, Oct. 20, he knew he could stay away from Washington no longer. Press Secretary Pierre Salinger announced that the President had a cold. Kennedy, a dutiful deceiver muffled in hat and coat, climbed aboard his jet and sped back to Washington.

Roundup. On the morning of Monday, Oct. 22, Kennedy worked over the TV speech that would break the news to the nation that night. The order went out to round up congressional leaders—wherever they were—and fly them back to Washington. The Air Force brought House Speaker John McCormack from his home in Boston, House Republican Leader Charles Halleck from a pheasant-hunting trip in South Dakota, Senate Minority

Whip Thomas Kuchel from a handshaking visit to a San Diego factory.

House Democratic Whip Hale Boggs was fishing in the Gulf of Mexico when an Air Force plane flew over his boat and dropped into the water a plastic bottle attached to a red flag. The message in the bottle told Boggs to phone the White House. His boat pulled over to a nearby offshore oil rig. The Congressman donned a life jacket, swung by rope to a spindly ladder, and climbed 150 feet to the rig's platform, where a helicopter was awaiting him. At an airbase on the mainland, they crammed Boggs into a flight suit, strapped him into a two-seat jet trainer, clapped an oxygen mask on his face, took away the sandwich he had been clutching, and rocketed him back to Washington.

who?
Dissent. While the Senators and Congressmen were converging on Washington, Kennedy called in his Cabinet members. Some of the members still did not know what was going on. Silently they filed in. Silently they listened to the briefing, and silently they departed. Next came the congressional leaders. They studied the enlargements of the missile pictures and, in the words of one, their blood ran cold. The President then said simply: "We have decided to take action."
how?

When he was done outlining the quarantine plan, Kennedy asked for comments—and found himself opposed by two of his fellow Democrats. Sitting directly across from the President, Georgia's Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told the President that blockade was not enough and came too late. Russell was for immediate invasion. He argued that the U.S. was still paying for the Bay of Pigs debacle, so why fiddle around any longer? Russell was supported, surprisingly, by Arkansas' William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, who had led the fight in April 1961 against the Bay of Pigs invasion. *Had known by a week**

Kennedy turned away the criticism without anger, stuck by his decisions, and even managed to send the legislators away laughing. Said the President to Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey as the meeting broke up: "If I'd known the job was this tough, I wouldn't have trounced you in West Virginia." Said the Senator to the

** (how) did Cuban dissidents change minds?
(RFK on Paul Newman/Dillon)*

President: "If I hadn't known it was this tough, I never would have let you beat me."

"Judge for Yourself." Throughout that afternoon, Cadillacs swept through the magnificent October sunshine bearing foreign diplomats on urgent summons to the State Department. Russia's Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin smiled affably at newsmen as he strolled into the building. After the usual pleasantries, Rusk handed Dobrynin a copy of Kennedy's speech and a letter to Khrushchev. Dobrynin emerged 25 minutes later, his shoulders sagging and his face the color of fresh putty. When reporters asked him what had happened, he snapped: "You can judge for yourself soon enough."

The afternoon papers had carried the announcement that the President would address the nation that night on a matter of the "highest national urgency"—and all America seemed to be watching as Kennedy went on television. It was a grim speech, delivered by a grim President.

The U.S., he said, had two goals: "To prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere."

Kennedy explained that the quarantine would cut off offensive weapons from Cuba without stopping "the necessities of life." He warned that "any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere" would be regarded by the U.S. as an attack by the Soviet Union and would bring full-scale nuclear reprisal against Russia.

Shotguns & Beans. There were some Nervous Nelly reactions in the U.S. The stock market, hardly a symbol of U.S. backbone, dropped sharply next day. In Tampa, sporting-goods stores reported a run on shotguns and rifles. In Dallas, a store reported brisk sales "Of an emergency ration pack of biscuits, malted-milk tablets, chocolate, pemmican and canned water. In Los Angeles, a Civil Defense warning that retail stores would be closed for five days in the event of war or a national emergency sent housewives stampeding into the supermarkets. In one, hand-to-hand combat broke out over the last can of pork and beans. Said North Hollywood Grocer Sam Goldstad: "They're nuts. One lady's working four shopping carts at once. Another lady bought twelve packages of detergents. What's she going to do, wash up after the bomb?" Yet for all such transient evidences of panic, the U.S. was solidly behind Kennedy. As he himself had discovered on his election-year forays around the nation, it was the overriding wish of almost all Americans to "do something" about Cuba.

poll?

Around the world, U.S. forces braced for combat. Under Admiral Anderson's orders, the Navy's Polaris submarines prowled the seas on courses known only to a handful of ranking officials. The Air Force went on a full-scale alert, put a fleet of B-52 bombers into the air, dispersed hundreds of B-47 bombers from their normal bases to dozens of scattered airfields. In West Berlin, the Army's contingent of 5,000 went on maneuvers.

Salty Pride. As for the blockade itself, it was precisely directed by Anderson working in his blue-carpeted Pentagon office bedecked with pictures of historic Navy battles. Several times a day he briefed McNamara.

how!

red-eyed from lack of sleep, in front of huge wall maps. He signed countless cables—pink paper for secret, green for top secret.

As a professional—and articulate—Navyman, Anderson took particular pride in the fact that the confrontation with Russia was taking place on salt water. Said he: "The sea still does provide a measure of space, if two thermonuclear powers would stand off against each other. In general, we're seeing the great importance of sea power." Another way of putting it was that the Navy's show provided a maximum amount of power with a minimum amount of friction. At all times, Anderson delegated heavy responsibility to his subordinates—most of all to an old friend he called Denny. This was Admiral Robert Lee Dennison, 61, who is both Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

Did CNO actually direct blockade? a chief? (Trin)

Ships, Planes & Subs. As the Russian ships headed toward Cuba on their collision course with the blockading force. Dennison walked to a wall map in his Norfolk headquarters and outlined the Navy's problem. "The approaches to Cuba are pretty well funneled down. Most ships headed for Cuba come out of the North Atlantic and have to come through the Bahamas or the Lesser Antilles, and both the Bahamas and the Lesser Antilles have relatively few channels. We don't really have any headaches. We have plenty of force. There are a lot of ships out there."

So there were. They belonged to Task Force 136, commanded by Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward, 53, a gunnery specialist who has developed into one of the Navy's most respected strategists. Under Ward were approximately 80 ships. In reserve was the nuclear-powered carrier Enterprise. Navy P2V, P5M and P3V patrol planes, flying out of bases all along the East Coast and Florida, and from carriers encircling Cuba (see map), put the Soviet ships under constant surveillance within 800 miles of Cuba.

Anderson's orders were clear. All Cuba-bound ships entering the blockade area would be commanded to heave to. If one failed to halt, a shot would be fired across its bow. If it kept on, the Navy would shoot to sink. If it stopped, a boarding party would search it for offensive war materials. If it had none, it would be allowed to go on to Cuba. But if it carried proscribed cargo, the ship would be required to turn away to a non-Cuban port of its captain's own choosing. Similarly, Cuba-bound cargo aircraft would be intercepted and forced to land at a U.S. airport for inspection, or be shot down. As for Soviet submarines, they would be sought out by radar and sonar. U.S. forces would signal an unidentified sub by dropping some "harmless" depth charges while radioing the code letters IDKCA, the international signal meaning "rise to the surface." Any submarine that ignored the order would be depth-charged for keeps.

Although there was a strong national sense of relief when Kennedy finally announced that he was "doing something" about Cuba, tension mounted almost unbearably in the hours that followed. What would happen? Would Khrushchev press the thermonuclear button? On Tuesday night, Kennedy signed a proclamation outlining the quarantine. The first indication of Russia's reaction came when a few Soviet freighters changed course away from Cuba. But others steamed on, and the moment of showdown came closer.

A day and a half after proclamation of the blockade, the Navy intercepted the Soviet tanker Bucharest. Oil

had been left off the proscribed list because the Administration did not want to draw the line on an item that might be a necessity of life for Cuba. The talker was allowed to pass without inspection.

"No Incidents." Sixteen hours later, about 180 miles northeast of the Bahamas, the destroyers John R. Pierce and Joseph P. Kennedy Jr.* took up stations behind a Russian-chartered Lebanese freighter named the Marucla (built in Baltimore during World War II). At daybreak on Friday, in a scene reminiscent of the 19th century, the Kennedy lowered away its whaleboat and sent a boarding party aboard the Marucla, which cooperatively provided a ladder. Wearing dress whites, Lieut. Commander Dwight G. Osborne, executive officer of the Pierce, and Lieut. Commander Kenneth C. Reynolds, the exec of the Kennedy, led the party aboard the ship. After politely serving his visitors coffee, the Greek captain allowed them the run of his ship. The cargo turned out to be sulphur, paper rolls, twelve trucks, and truck parts.

"No incidents," radioed the boarding party. "No prohibited material in evidence. All papers in order. Marucla cleared to proceed course 260. speed 9 knots to Havana via Providence Channel. Maintaining surveillance."

While the Marucla was being searched, a far more important event of the blockade was happening elsewhere in the Atlantic. After days of steaming toward Cuba and closer and closer to the Navy's line of ships, the remaining Soviet arms-carrying merchantmen were heading for home. Khrushchev had decided not to collide with the U.S. Navy on the high seas. The blockade was a success.

Still, there could be no sense of relaxation. A way had to be found to get those already installed missiles out of Cuba. The U.S. effort was two-pronged: one was diplomatic, the other military.

Talk. On the diplomatic front, Adlai Stevenson urged Acting U.N. Secretary-General U Thant to impress upon the Russians the fact that the missiles must go. Making prompt action even more necessary was the fact that the Navy's twice-daily, low-level reconnaissance flights showed that the Russians were speeding up the erection of missile sites.

NO While the talks with U Thant were going on, Khrushchev ^{got.} suddenly proposed his cynical swap: he would pull his missiles out of Cuba if Kennedy pulled his out of Turkey. His long, rambling memorandum was remarkable for its wheedling tone—that of a cornered bully. Wrote Khrushchev: "The development of culture, art and the raising of living standards, this is the most noble and necessary field of competition . . . Our aim was and is to help Cuba, and nobody can argue about the humanity of our impulse."

NO Force. Kennedy bluntly rejected the missile swap and increased the speed of the U.S. military buildup. The President considered choking Cuba's economy with a complete blockade. To knock the missiles out in a hurry, the White House discussed sabotage, commando raids, naval bombardment or a pinpoint bombing attack. And there was the strong possibility that invasion might finally be required.

Squadrons of supersonic F-100s and F-106s zoomed into Florida's Patrick and MacDill Air Force Bases. In

the Caribbean were 10,000 Marines who had been ^{be} about to go on maneuvers. McNamara ordered to active duty 24 troop carrier squadrons of the Air Force Reserve—more than 14,000 men.

Demand. Kennedy's course carried with it the obvious risk of casualties and finally, after a week of talk and maneuver, an Air Force reconnaissance plane was lost. But the flights went on as the U.S. prepared to move against Cuba if Khrushchev did not destroy his missiles.

To underline the need for urgent action, Kennedy sent Khrushchev a letter at week's end stating that no settlement could be reached on Cuba until the missiles came down under U.N. supervision.

Surrender. Next day—just two weeks after the clinching recon photos were taken—Khrushchev said he was giving in. In his message, Khrushchev mildly told Kennedy: "I express my satisfaction and gratitude for the sense of proportion and understanding of the responsibility borne by you for the preservation of peace throughout the world, which you have shown. I understand very well your anxiety and the anxiety of the people of the U.S. in connection with the fact that the weapons which you describe as offensive are in fact grim weapons. Both you and I understand what kind of weapons they are."

To try to save some face, Khrushchev took full credit for preserving the peace of the world by dismantling the missiles. He also asked for a continued "exchange of opinions on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and on general disarmament and other questions connected with the lessening of international tension." And he said that Russia would continue to give aid to Cuba, which might mean that he had a lingering hope of still using the island as a base for Communist penetration of Latin America.

Within three hours, President Kennedy made his reply: "I welcome Chairman Khrushchev's statesmanlike decision to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union under United Nations verification. This is an important and constructive contribution to peace ... It is my earnest hope that the governments of the world can, with a solution to the Cuban crisis, turn their earnest attention to the compelling necessities for ending the arms race and reducing world tensions."

Thus, President John Kennedy appeared to have won in his courageous confrontation with Soviet Russia. There would, of course, be other crises to come. Looking ahead, Kennedy said several times last week: "I am sure we face even bigger, more difficult decisions." Such decisions —if met as boldly and carried out as shrewdly as those so far—present him with an opportunity for a major breakthrough in the cold war.

* Asked how the destroyer named for the President's older brother, who was killed in World War II, happened to be at the right place at the right time, a Defense official said: "Pure coincidence." The Pierce is named for a lieutenant commander who won the Navy Cross and lost his life in 1944 while commanding the U.S.S. Argonaut against the Japanese. In the battle, the Argonaut went down with all guns firing.

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Friday, Sep. 28, 1962

Nation: The Pugilists

The normally cherubic face of Indiana's Republican Senator Homer Capehart, 65, turned an angry red. His big fists grasped the lapels of his Democratic Senate opponent, sturdy Birch Bayh Jr., 34. Growled Capehart: "Don't try to get away." Snapped Bayh: "Take your hands off me." The performance was a bit too competitive, even for the Indianapolis Athletic Club, and an onlooker rushed in to prevent a fist fight.

The cause of the quarrel was Democrat Bayh's belligerent drive to prevent Capehart from becoming the first Hoosier ever to serve four terms in the Senate. The specific incitement was an issue which seems likely to stir emotions of candidates—and voters—from now until November. The issue: Communist Cuba, and what to do about it.

"Send the Marines." In Washington, Capehart has been as pugnacious about Cuba as any member of the Senate. As a member of the Latin American subcommittee of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, he has advocated direct U.S. intervention in Cuba. On the stump back home, he urges a naval blockade against Communist arms in the Caribbean, then adds: "If a blockade doesn't work, send in the Marines."

Democrat Bayh (pronounced by), former Speaker of the Indiana House, angrily denounces Capehart as a "warmonger." Capehart, he charges, is "playing politics with the blood of American boys and the safety of American homes." Bayh supports the Kennedy Administration argument that Castro may collapse from economic chaos, cites the Kennedy pledge that action will be taken against any aggressive attempt to export Communism from the island. Bayh's argument is sometimes effective. Acidly commented one farmer: "Sure, let Homer call for an invasion; we'll all follow him when he yells 'charge' and hits the beach."

Just a few weeks ago, almost everyone conceded that Capehart, a farm-born Hoosier who became a millionaire phonograph manufacturer before his election to the Senate in 1944, was a cinch to be reelected. Everyone, that is, but Bayh, who has been campaigning furiously in a white station wagon equipped with fancy gear for making newspaper photo mats and television tapes. Also born on a farm, Bayh was president of his 1951 class at Purdue University, earned a law degree from Indiana U., was elected to the state legislature in 1954, owns a 340-acre farm near Terre Haute. Admits Capehart: "If we don't work we could

get beat."

Who's a Liar? Capehart is working. Last week he abandoned Washington to campaign in his bull-like voice, beat a fist into a palm, and roar: "There's a hundred ships loaded with Russian equipment on the high seas heading for Cuba. This nation had better act." At a Sigma Delta Chi luncheon at the Indianapolis Athletic Club, the candidates clashed headon. Bayh claimed that Capehart had drawn \$250,000 in federal benefits on his own farming operation while "trying to reduce the income of farmers," and that he had "deliberately violated" the rules of a Senate briefing on Cuba by disclosing that Kennedy planned to ask power to mobilize 150,000 reservists. "I was not present," interrupted Capehart. "I didn't know what was said." "You certainly did know; you breached the security of the briefings," barked Bayh. "You're deliberately calling me a liar!" shouted Capehart.

Except for the difference in age, it might have been interesting if they had come to blows. Capehart, although pretty pudgy now, was an Army boxing champion in World War I. Bayh was light heavyweight champ at Purdue.

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[← Back to Article](#)[Click to Print](#)**TIME**

Friday, Nov. 09, 1962

Russia: The Adventurer

(See Cover)

In the wake of Russia's retreat from Cuba, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan rose in the House of Commons to deliver his reasoned judgment on the outcome. It was, he declared, "one of the great turning points of history."

This judgment may have been somewhat inflated, but the event does have momentous significance. Years ago, the West had forced a Russian withdrawal in Iran, stopped Communism in Korea, pushed it back in Europe with the Marshall Plan, frustrated its 1948 siege of Berlin with the airlift. All these occasions were milestones in the persistence of free men to remain free. But these tests came before both sides had large nuclear arsenals, and for the most part did not involve a direct, point-blank confrontation between Washington and Moscow. Now, in an ultimate showdown, Russia had given way.

Nikita Khrushchev is a resourceful, imaginative and tough opponent who obviously has a great many tricks left in the back of his shrewd peasant mind. But, except for those who seem constitutionally unable to believe that the Russians can ever make mistakes, there is an almost worldwide consensus that in Cuba Khrushchev had overextended himself, and that he has been forced back in a test of will with the U.S.

Satellite Procession. Khrushchev was busy all week trying to prove precisely the opposite. To the Russian people, who were kept almost totally in the dark about their government's attempt to plant rockets 6,000 miles from Soviet soil, Khrushchev was playing the role of the stern defender of peace on the side of plucky little Cuba. But it was not so easy to fob off Communism's professionals.

One by one, the Red satellite leaders began trooping into Moscow. First came Czechoslovakia's President Antonin Novotny, who had heavily invested in Cuba. Next came Bulgaria's Todor Zhevkov, and East Germany's Walter Ulbricht, who has been waiting since 1958 for Khrushchev to live up to his promise to throw the U.S., Britain and France out of Berlin. At week's end Poland's Wladyslaw Gomulka joined the procession. Each in his own way, the satellite leaders were bound to ask the same question that preoccupied

the rest of the world: Why had Khrushchev got himself involved in the Caribbean adventure?

Moscow often had tried rocket diplomacy of sorts in the past. Khrushchev once told Greece that he would rain nuclear destruction on the Acropolis, and he as good as promised Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that West Germany would become a "funeral pyre." But these were only what diplomats have come to call "missile letters." Never before had the Kremlin risked using missiles themselves to push its policies. It had not permitted Warsaw Pact allies to have offensive missiles, and had never, in fact, dared allow them off the soil of the Soviet Union. Why had Khrushchev done so now in the Caribbean, virtually an American lake thousands of miles from the nearest point of direct Soviet interest?

Explanation for Export. Since many in the West cling fondly to the view of Khrushchev as a moderate, one theory is that he was pushed into taking the Caribbean gamble, either by the military or by the so-called "hard line" or "Stalinist" group, which some experts suspect of strong and continuing influence. This, presumably, is just what Nikita would like the world to think. Some Western observers even go so far as to argue that if Khrushchev was forced into the Cuban move by "extremists," he is now in a better position than before, having proved the extremists wrong and presumably put them in their place.

Most longtime students of Soviet politics doubt this. They believe that there is still something like collective leadership in Russia, hence that Khrushchev may have been egged on by militarists—or for that matter, urged to be careful by the cautious. Certainly the man who has exploded a 50-megaton bomb in a test over the Arctic, might, by ordinary standards, be considered a hard-liner himself. On balance, there is reason to assume that Khrushchev was behind the Cuban project from start to finish.

The version being fed to the satellites and neutrals is that Khrushchev really believed on the basis of Soviet intelligence reports that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent. He felt that the Russian people could not bear to witness the overthrow of what they now considered as a reincarnation of their own great 1917 socialist revolution. So, according to the ingenious but preposterous Moscow tale, a careful Russian plan was drawn up to ship the missiles to Cuba without secrecy, install them without camouflage. When Kennedy got word, he would make a fuss, presumably demand negotiations, in which the Russians would be able to extract a no-invasion guarantee for their pal Fidel.

The stakes, of course, were far too high for so far-fetched a motive. Many Communists apparently do not believe the story themselves. "The Soviets here are depressed and quite sensitive," reports a U.S. newsman from Bonn. "When they tell you that Khrushchev withdrew because the U.S. guaranteed the continued existence of Castro, they look quickly at your eyes to see if you buy that one. They really prefer not to talk about it."

An Unhappy Birthday. Khrushchev's real reasons were undoubtedly rooted in the severe problems Russia faces. With customary fanfare this week, Moscow celebrates the 45th anniversary of the Communist revolution. It is not a happy anniversary. In nearly half a century the country has made tremendous strides, to become one of the world's great industrial powers, but the life of the ordinary Russian is still drab and

cramped. He dreams of material progress that is an everyday fact in the West, and it sometimes seems to him that it is easier for his country to orbit a cosmonaut than to turn out a decent pair of shoes. Despite killing, coaxing and collectivization, Russia has been unable to solve her agricultural problems, and still does not produce enough food to meet the needs of a rising population. The bitter ideological split with Red China has cracked open the façade of world Communist unity.

The cold war is not going the Kremlin's way either. Moscow seems no closer to grabbing Berlin; the U.S. is making a firm stand in Southeast Asia; Africa and other neutral areas are resisting Communist blandishments. Moreover, the Soviet effort to match the U.S. in advanced missile and nuclear hardware is painfully expensive, and still has not put Russia out in front. More and more of the American missile-carrying Polaris submarines are taking up underwater stations around the world, an effective seaborne answer to Russia's huge, costly intercontinental ballistic missiles.

How to redress the balance quickly, on the cheap? Although long-range ICBMs are too big and costly to mass produce, Russia's factories are geared to churn out the smaller medium-range and intermediate-range missiles. They must have seemed just right for Cuba, which is within easy range of the U.S., and hence potentially far more accurate than Russian-based missiles.

Dr. No Aspect. The haste with which Khrushchev grasped the opportunity and mounted his Cuban missile program tends to confirm the Washington theory that he hoped to have the weapons ready for some fancy nuclear blackmail with the U.S. this fall. At an estimated cost of \$1 billion, the missiles were relatively inexpensive, but once they were in place, Moscow might at last sign the long-threatened peace treaty with East Germany and order the West out of Berlin. Considered now, in the light of its failure, the plan suggests a certain Dr. No aspect of the mad scientist threatening to blow up the U.S., but it also had a sort of classic simplicity.

^{NO}
No Khrushchev must have considered the possibility of getting caught while the missiles were being installed, but apparently thought it worth the gamble. He evidently banked on U.S. acquiescence or, at least, confusion and hesitation. This was the major miscalculation. Only seven weeks ago he had boasted to Austria's Vice Chancellor, then visiting Moscow, that Russia would ignore any possible U.S. blockade of Cuba. But once he realized the possible cost of doing so, he acted with breathtaking speed.

Tug of War. Khrushchev was obviously afraid that if he hesitated the U.S. would invade Cuba or destroy the bases; a backdown after such action would be far more humiliating than a retreat before. For years to come, political scientists will be studying and restudying the rapid exchange of messages between the Kremlin and the White House, as Khrushchev tried to forestall U.S. action and salvage what he could.

Of the three main proposals that came from the Kremlin, the first will doubtless make the most fascinating reading for future scholars. In essence, it flatly offered ^{NO} to get Moscow's missiles out of Cuba if the U.S. agreed to drop any plans to invade. To date no one except top Kremlin and Washington officials knows what else it contained, because after its arrival on the night of Oct. 26, President Kennedy classified it top secret.

LIE

From the accounts of those who have seen it, it was an unusual document, written in short sentences, obviously at top speed, and with great emotion. It was filled with expressions of fear that events were outracing the statesmen, threatening to tumble out of control. Khrushchev literally begged Kennedy to keep things under control, promised he would do the same. He compared his struggle with Kennedy to two men pulling on a rope with a knot in the middle. The harder we pull, wrote Nikita. the tighter the knot gets.*

Upping the Ante. The note was all the more curious in the light of the second message, which was broadcast by Moscow Radio next morning, before Kennedy had even answered the first one. This new proposal abruptly upped the ante by proposing U.S. evacuation of its bases in Turkey for a Soviet dismantling in Cuba.

WIKI
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NO
This helped explain the series of events that had taken place in Turkey itself earlier in the week, after Kennedy's first television announcement of the Cuba missiles threat. Out of the blue, Soviet Ambassador Nikita Ryzhov sought an audience with Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin, confronted him with a blunt demand for immediate withdrawal of U.S. missiles and NATO installations in Turkey. Premier Ismet Inonu himself drafted the note of rejection. Next Ryzhov arrived with a second, blunter ultimatum: Withdraw the U.S. bases or the Soviet Union will put Turkey's cities first on the list for annihilation if war comes. "If you don't think we are ready to make war over Cuba, you are mistaken," added Ryzhov. Reportedly, Premier Inonu's response to the nuclear threat was: "Don't make me laugh." The Turks stood firm, just as President Kennedy did when the Turkish swap offer arrived at his desk. In Khrushchev's third and final note, he reverted to his first offer, agreed to withdraw the missiles for a no-invasion offer.

Lie After Lie. Inevitably, Moscow's erratic behavior all that week again raised the question of internal strife in Moscow. Some Kremlinologists theorize that Khrushchev had dashed off the first excited note in a panic after convincing himself that the U.S. was on the verge of a Cuba invasion, then was forced by a more militant Kremlin faction to make his Turkey demand. But a majority of Western experts and diplomats see the zigzagging messages as evidence of Nikita Khrushchev's bargaining methods, or simply of confusion. In any case, argue several experts. Khrushchev could not have fired his messages off so swiftly had each one been the subject of a great debate in the Presidium. In Russia, fights take time. NO (BLIND)

No sooner had he signaled his retreat than the Soviet propaganda machine began to project the image of Nikita Khrushchev as the savior of peace. "All progressive mankind is hailing the peaceful actions of the Soviet Union," proclaimed Pravda. Many a neutralist country bought that line, at least in public. Nevertheless, some facts were inescapable:

> While crying peace. Khrushchev, by his own admission, had built aggressive missile bases on the U.S.'s doorstep. His Foreign Minister and ambassadors in capitals throughout the world had told lie after lie for weeks to conceal the purpose of the Cuban project.

> By accepting Soviet arms aid, Havana's own revolutionary government had made itself a virtual puppet of Moscow, for throughout the crisis Khrushchev was publicly negotiating Cuban policy without even a nod to

Fidel Castro.

Soviet Munich? One result of the Cuban affair has been to give new spirit to the Western alliance. NATO members were heartened by Kennedy's strong stand against Russia, though there were some minor complaints about lack of advance consultation. "It used to be said," grumbled Britain's Liberal Party Leader Jo Grimond, "that without the nuclear deterrent we would have to go naked into the conference chamber. With it, we never even got into the chamber at all." The Guardian added huffily that the U.S. might have involved Britain in "annihilation without representation." The lesson of Cuba was clear: as leader of the alliance, the U.S. is prepared to act without its Allies when necessary. Many saw in this a powerful reason for European political unity. Commented France's Le Monde: "Only a united Europe, of which England should be a part, will be in a position effectively to influence events."

In contrast, the Cuban affair was quite a blow to a lot of Nikita's old friends, and to many who were not quite friends, but almost. One of Brazil's leading leftists, Leonel Brizola, President João Goulart's Yankee-baiting brother-in-law, called U.S. officials liars when the first missile base charges were made. Later, stunned by Khrushchev's own admission, Brizola said bitterly: "From now on, we must view with the greatest skepticism all Soviet offers to help nations trying to achieve independence." In Africa, Guinea's President Sékou Touré, a onetime pal of the Russians, refused to grant transit landing rights to Russian planes en route to Cuba.

Russia's embarrassment among the non-aligned nations was compounded by Red China's invasion of India, the oldest neutralist country of them all. Despite the Moscow-Peking rift, Russia obviously had to side with China rather than with India. Nevertheless, Red China's militant leaders were clearly appalled by Moscow's missile backdown in Cuba. Western reporters in Peking sent out astonishingly frank stories, quoting high Red Chinese officials as calling Cuba "a Soviet Munich." Day after day, Peking urged Castro to stand fast.

Planted Cronies. If the Chinese in Peking think that Khrushchev blundered, are there any "Chinese" in Moscow who think so too? Publication in Pravda of a year-old anti-Stalin poem by Evgeny Evtushenko (TIME, Nov. 2) was noted with fascination by some students of Soviet policy; to them it suggested that Khrushchev's crowd was issuing a warning to its Stalinist enemies. In addition, Izvestia stated emphatically that the Soviet decision to withdraw the Cuba missiles was "the only correct one in the prevailing circumstances," which sounded as if a defense of the move had become necessary. Finally, Moscow dragged from disgrace Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, 81, only last year berated by Khrushchev as an "antiParty" type. Now Pravda carried a long article over his signature praising the achievements of the Soviet Union as well as the "Leninist" leadership of Comrade Khrushchev, and pointedly recalling Stalin's errors. By thus using the broken old soldier, Khrushchev caused speculation that he might want a military man's prestige to bolster his own position against army critics, possibly rallied around tough Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky.

While such evidence is paper-thin, the fact remains that if the Kremlin resembles other human institutions, Khrushchev must have rivals who would like to get his hide. The Cuban affair might provide a ready

opportunity, possibly at the Communist Party Central Committee meeting scheduled for this month. But any move against Khrushchev would be exceedingly difficult. Since 1957 he has made sure that no potential rival can rise too high. On all the major platforms of power—the Central Committee's Presidium, the Party Secretariat, the Bureau of the Federal Russian Republic, the Presidium of the Soviet Council of Ministers—only one name appears more than once: Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. He has planted his cronies in key positions everywhere. Even before the full-scale battle with the "antiparty group" in 1957, more than 70 of the members of the Central Committee owed their careers to Khrushchev or were his close friends. In fact, one Kremlinologist suggests that "Khrushchev's institutional strength probably exceeds anything that Stalin ever achieved."

As far as can be seen, Khrushchev at 68 is in good health, although there are always those rumors of a kidney ailment. His legendary political skill and common touch are unflagging; at the height of the Cuban crisis he managed to get off messages of congratulation to a dozen farmers (for their prize corn crops) and to a successful swineherd. To quiet any doubts about solidarity at the top, Khrushchev and the Party Presidium attended the theater one evening, a traditional display by Soviet party officials in time of crisis.†

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JFK-RFK

What Next? Since Moscow usually produces new pressures to camouflage defeat, many Westerners braced themselves for a crisis at some other trouble spot. Moscow might start making diversionary noises about Turkey and its U.S. bases, or beat the drums again along the Azerbaijan border of Iran. But it seems doubtful that the Soviet Union will get really tough anywhere for quite a while. Berlin, for once, was dropped almost entirely by the Soviet press and radio during the Cuba crisis, and last week East German papers abruptly stopped referring to the peace treaty that Khrushchev has promised them so long.

For one thing, Nikita would scarcely want to mar so quickly the image that he is building as "peacemaker" in Cuba. Moreover, Cuba must have convinced him, if he still needed convincing, that the U.S. will stand firm in Berlin. Since Khrushchev presumably is no more eager to start a nuclear war over Berlin than over Cuba, provoking a Berlin crisis now might be risking another and even more disastrous Russian backdown. The guess is that Khrushchev will simply not revive the East German question for several months.

Instead, it seems likely that Moscow will accelerate its "peace" offensive; this could mean a protracted period of pleading for negotiations, perhaps coupled with sweeping proposals for European disengagement, in the hope that time and soft words might erode the capitalist enemy's determination to the point where Moscow feels it is safe to resume tougher tactics. This would certainly fit in with the views of those in the West who continue to argue that if Russia was reasonable enough to give up its Cuban bases, the U.S. ought to give up some of its own bases. A first sign of the line came at a Bonn reception last week when Soviet Ambassador Andrei Smirnov planted his tall, bearlike figure solidly before one of West Germany's top diplomats, Franz Krapf, head of the Foreign Office's Eastern section.

Smirnov: Now, Herr Krapf, as objective diplomats we must admit that American rocket bases in Britain, Italy and Turkey are legally and morally the same as the ones we are dismantling in Cuba, mustn't we?

Krapf: I admit no such thing. It seems to me they are entirely different. ?

Smirnov: Well, you must admit that Chairman Khrushchev acted in a very statesmanlike manner.

Krapf: One hopes he will continue to do so. One hopes further that after Cuba he will not make the mistake committed by two German governments and hold the illusion that Americans won't fight.

Note to Moscow. In order to get some kind of deal on bases, the Russians might well dangle concessions on disarmament. Western negotiators are already intrigued by Khrushchev's offer to allow inspectors to verify the dismantling and removal of the Soviet missiles, even though in the end, the U.S. may not be able to rely on outside inspection in Cuba. The West's insistence on inspection has always been a stumbling block in the tedious talks on a nuclear test ban as well as on general disarmament. There is no real reason to believe that this adamant position has changed; it is one thing to agree to let inspectors—and from the Red Cross, at that—on Cuban soil, another to let them into Russia. Still, Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan rushed off a note to Moscow suggesting that the way might soon be opened for the first stage of disarmament.

Even as the U.S. and Russia were exploding small rocket-borne nuclear weapons at high altitudes, the Russians dropped hints that they might accept a system of unmanned seismographic inspection posts inside Russia. In them, a world body would install tamper-proof boxes containing recording apparatus that would be regularly studied for signs of underground nuclear blasts.*

History's Guide. By offering their sealed boxes, the Russians were of course conceding nothing of value. Indeed, they gave scant support to the hopeful new thesis now abroad, that Khrushchev after Cuba might take a genuinely new, flexible approach to negotiation of the major East-West issues. Some Westerners excitedly spoke of grasping new opportunities while Moscow was off balance: an access deal for Berlin, perhaps even some kind of German reunification.

If history is any guide, the dreamers are in for sharp disappointment. Nikita Khrushchev is as flexible a maneuverer as any Communist who has studied Lenin's line: "If you are not able to adapt yourself, if you are not ready to crawl in the mud on your belly, you are not a revolutionist but a chatterbox." Occasional appearances to the contrary, Khrushchev is no chatterbox. Over Cuba he had to do some crawling, but it will not be easy to keep him down.

*In the absence of the letter's actual text, the U.S. public can find a fictional substitute in the current bestseller, Fail-Safe, in which Khrushchev and Kennedy talk on the phone during a nuclear crisis.

Khrushchev: Some of our experts urged that we retaliate instantly with all our ICBMs and our bombers.

Kennedy: Why didn't you do that?

Khrushchev: I knew that retaliation would be the end for both of our countries. My generals are not happy, but there is a time for common sense.

† A famed previous occasion was the night in 1953 when the entire Presidium except one trooped into the Bolshoi. The absence of Secret Police Chief Lavrenty Beria led experts to suspect that he had been purged by his pals. This proved to be correct; they had shot him two days before.

*Another version of this scheme was publicized last week in the New York Times's letters column. The proposal, jointly forwarded by Harvard University's chief seismologist and by a Harvard government student, had some weird aspects. It would require the U.S. and Russia to deposit \$5 billion apiece with the World Bank, as a sort of good faith deposit against discovery of an illegal underground blast within their boundaries. The evidence would come from many unmanned seismic recorders in sealed boxes scattered throughout the two countries. On every Wednesday (why this must be the day is not explained), each nation would fly the recorders to a neutral team on its frontier. Eventually, the records would be inspected by a panel of 15 scientists from neutral countries. If nine of the 15 decide that there has been an explosion, the guilty nation would be declared a violator, and steps would be taken to hand over its \$5 billion to the other country. Thus testing would become expensive, if not impossible.

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Friday, Dec. 14, 1962

The Administration: The Stranger on the Squad

(See Cover)

His speech—elaborately phrased, rich with allusions—sounds like another language amid the staccato din of the New Frontier's verbal shorthand. With his ironic, self-deprecating wit, he often appears to be some misplaced elfin uncle among the intense young men who laugh at their well-worn house jokes only rarely—and hardly ever at themselves.

A lonely man, he seems even lonelier in the forced togetherness of New Frontier society. In a group that sees conversation as a necessary delay between acts, he relishes talk for its own sake. In a group that venerates the quick decision, he is a ponderer. He remains an introspective man among the professionally outgoing, a paunchy tennis player in the midst of a touch-football squad, an elder statesman in a society whose main concession to age is to switch the oldtimer from pass-catching end to blocking back.

Adlai Ewing Stevenson, 62, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, is the very antithesis of the New Frontiersman. Two years a member of a team, he was never a member of the club. And it was the difference between Stevenson and most of his colleagues, the conflict between his ways and theirs, the obvious fact that Jack Kennedy would not be exactly brokenhearted to see Adlai go home to Illinois, that last week placed Stevenson in the biggest, noisiest family fight so far during the Kennedy Administration.

A. Munich? Like so many family fights, it was over a silly issue—a three-page article in the Saturday Evening Post. Time was when the Post was known for homey cover pictures and short stories in which boy and girl always managed to meet, spat, resolve their differences and legally wed within 2,500 words. Now the Post goes in for hurry-up, behind-the-scenes exposés—such as last week's "In Time of Crisis," a panting account of the Cuban confrontation by Charles Bartlett, Washington correspondent for the Chattanooga Times, and Stewart Alsop, the Post's Washington editor.

The Bartlett-Alsop piece was notable for only one thing: it charged that Stevenson, alone among the President's advisers, dissented from the firm-action consensus on Cuba, that only Adlai was willing to trade

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American bases abroad for the removal of the Soviet missiles. It quoted, an anonymous source as saying that Stevenson "wanted a Munich."

In ordinary times, such an article would not have caused much of a ripple. But in Washington last week, pundits stacked theory upon theory—and the cartoonists had not had such juicy fun in months. It was promptly and widely assumed that Kennedy himself had instigated the accusation, that the President was trying to sandbag Stevenson out of the U.N. That so much importance would be attached to a magazine article was in part an outgrowth of the somewhat bizarre and distorted atmosphere that prevails in Washington. No other Administration has so single-mindedly followed the proposition that "news is a weapon" (see PRESS). No other President has maintained such close personal contacts with newsmen. Aware of the Kennedy method of the indirect nudge, the planted hint, the push by newspaper column, students of the Administration follow the work of Kennedy's favorite columnists as faithfully as Kremlinologists plod through Pravda's prose. And of all Washington newsmen, Charlie Bartlett is closest to Kennedy.

Bartlett is the old pal who introduced Jack to Jackie, who ushered at their wedding, who regularly spends weekends with the Kennedys at Glen Ora. "The President is not a source of mine," insists Bartlett. But other Washington newsmen—doubting that those weekends are spent entirely talking about old times—look at Bartlett's work as a conscious or subconscious mirror of Kennedy thinking. "If anybody else had written that piece but Bartlett," says a White House aide, "nothing would have been said."

But Bartlett did write it. Other magazines and newspapers were preparing "inside" pieces, but it was the President who urged Bartlett to compose one on his own. He also issued instructions, as he had done for several but not all other newsmen, giving Bartlett access to the White House, CIA and State Department sources.

Small wonder, then, that the Post story stirred a storm. It arose only in part about the argument whether the Bartlett-Alsoop charges were accurate—or whether, as Stevenson said angrily, they were "wrong in literally every detail." Far more important was the question of whether Kennedy was trying to use his pen pals to make it impossible for Stevenson to remain at the United Nations.

The pattern has appeared before. Hardly had Chester Bowles taken office as Under Secretary of State when the observation was printed—in Charlie Bartlett's column—that he was hardly the star of the New Frontier. A few months later, with claims of coincidence on all sides, Bowles was moved to a high-sounding job of lesser importance. Similarly, Foreign Aid Director Fowler Hamilton read repeatedly in the papers of his imminent departure from the Government. Partly to find out if the rumors were true, and hoping they weren't. Hamilton went to the White House, where his resignation was swiftly accepted.

It therefore seemed more than possible that Kennedy was using leakmanship in an effort to rid his Administration of Adlai Stevenson, twice the Democratic candidate for President, leader of his own large political following—and a man whose relationship with John Kennedy has long been uneasy.

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Only in the light of that relationship does last week's flap take on major political meaning. The antagonisms between Kennedy and Stevenson date back to the 1956 Democratic Convention, when Massachusetts' Senator John Kennedy placed in nomination the name of Adlai Stevenson of Illinois. Kennedy then thought he had Stevenson's backing for the vice-presidential nomination. But Stevenson threw the nomination open to all aspirants; Kennedy was forced to fight for it—and just barely lost to Estes Kefauver.

11
At the 1960 convention, the Kennedy forces wanted Stevenson to make the speech nominating Kennedy. Stevenson, still halfheartedly running himself, agonized over the decision. Finally, Bobby Kennedy called him with an ultimatum: make the speech—or else. Stevenson hemmed, hawed, and eventually refused. To the Kennedys, the crime was as much in the agonizing as in the refusal.

The Bone. But political protocol still demanded that the New Frontier find some kind of Administration job for the two-time Democratic presidential candidate. Stevenson was widely mentioned for Secretary of State. He was understandably disappointed when the United Nations offer came instead; and again he hesitated about accepting. Many Stevenson supporters considered the U.N. post just a bone thrown to Adlai. But to some of Kennedy's Irish Mafia outriders, it was one bone more than Adlai deserved.

From the beginning, Stevenson was refused the policymaking role he had expected; sometimes he was not even informed of major Administration plans. The great humiliation came during the Bay of Pigs disaster. At the U.N., two days before the invasion, Stevenson, unaware of what was going on, waved photos of planes that he insisted were flown by Cuban Air Force defectors who had bombed their own airfields before fleeing to Florida. On the day of the invasion, he denied any U.S. responsibility. A few days later, Kennedy took complete responsibility for the Bay of Pigs—and the planes were revealed to be U.S. bombers that had been disguised, with little flair for the art, by the CIA. Deeply hurt, Stevenson was finally soothed with promises of better future liaison.

After that, things seemed to go a bit better. Indeed, some of Stevenson's U.N. performances have won even Kennedy's admiration. On one occasion, when Adlai called the White House to urge a tough speech warning Russia to stay out of the Congo, Kennedy remarked: "In this job, he's got the nerve of a burglar."

In diplomatic business that takes patience, Stevenson has drawn on U.N. experience that goes back to the founding conference in San Francisco, steering through U.S. policy on the Congo operation, U.N. financing, and the election of U Thant—and doing it mostly in quiet, off-camera discussions. In U.N. speeches, Stevenson's eloquence has been an effective weapon. A year ago, he gave perhaps the most cogent speech to date, explaining why the U.S. opposes the seating of a Red China regime that behaves "in a fashion recalling the early authoritarian emperors of China." During the Angola and Goa debates, Stevenson made clear U.S. opposition to colonialism and aggression, reminded delegates that the Communist world is "the largest colonial empire which has ever existed in all history, the only imperial system which is not liquidating itself but is still trying energetically to expand in all directions."

Still Restive. Yet, only a year ago, Stevenson remained restive at the U.N., seriously considered returning to

Illinois to run against Republican Senator Everett Dirksen. Viewed from the U.N.'s glass jungle in Manhattan, the Senate appeared to be a far more reasonable club—one that might allow some time for reflection instead of the grinding cycle of negotiations, speeches, parties, dinners and the problems of running a 115-man staff. Stevenson was still unhappy with his role in foreign policy—the role of advocating policies he had no part in making. Typically, Kennedy spent one session with Stevenson in which he did not discourage Adlai from running for the Senate. Then, in a second meeting, Kennedy told Stevenson he could exert more influence as U.N. ambassador than as junior Senator from Illinois. The President promised Stevenson "an expanding role in the making and execution of foreign policy."

To a certain degree, that pledge has been kept. Stevenson works mainly through regular State Department channels, reporting to Secretary of State Rusk through his old friend Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. But he is often on the direct line to Kennedy from his U.N. mission headquarters or from his Waldorf Tower suite. He consults constantly with Arthur Schlesinger Jr., a White House liaison man and an old Stevenson speechwriter who, however, switched allegiance to Kennedy in early 1960. At least once a week Stevenson flies to Washington to attend State Department meetings or meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

It was ironic that Stevenson's performance during the October Cuban crisis should have occasioned last week's controversy. For, to all outward appearances, this was Adlai's finest hour as U.N. Ambassador. Acting on talk-tough instructions telephoned to him by President Kennedy, Stevenson flayed Russia's Valerian Zorin. "Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium-and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?" he demanded. "Yes or no—don't wait for translation—yes or no?" When Zorin protested that he was not a defendant in an American court, Stevenson cut in: "You are in the court of world opinion right now."

"You will have your answer in due course," Zorin said. "I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over," snapped Stevenson. For millions of Americans watching the performance on television, it was Stevenson at his best—a reasonable man who had finally lost patience with an outrageous opponent.

Fact-Fiction. But Bartlett and Alsop cast a far different, much harsher light on Stevenson's Cuban crisis behavior. Their Post piece has much in common with the Washington fact-fiction novels that are now clogging the bestseller lists. It purports to narrate the secret deliberations of "ExComm"—an abbreviation for the National Security Council Executive Committee that was unknown even to members of the group until it was repeated paragraph after paragraph by Bartlett and Alsop. The Post story is filled with Druryisms and some language that seems to be left over from the magazine's serialization of Fail-Safe. Leaders negotiate "in the shadow of nuclear war" and make "the live-or-die decisions when the chips are down." As clichés mount, the reader half expects the next phone call to be answered by old Scab Cooley. But instead it is McGeorge Bundy who hears a CIAman's cryptic, spy-befuddling report of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. "Those things we've been worrying about"; says the CIAman cleverly, "it looks as though we've really got something." There is even room to mention a minor Russian official in Washington named Georgi Bolshakov, who is duped by his own bosses so that he can pass along to Kennedy the incorrect information

that "those things" are strictly defensive.

Bartlett and Alsop say that in the days between the discovery of the missile bases and the Kennedy announcement of a blockade, Ex-Comm was split between "hawks" and "doves"—those who wanted to invade Cuba or bomb out the missile bases, and those who urged caution. The "most hawklike of the hawks," they write, was Dean Acheson. One of the doves was normally belligerent Bobby Kennedy, who, said the Post, thought that "an air attack against Cuba would be a Pearl Harbor in reverse, and contrary to all American traditions."

Although the hawks were originally in the majority, according to the Post, opinions finally merged, and everybody joined Dean Rusk as a "dawk or a hove."* The group formed a "rolling consensus" built around McNamara's plan of "maintaining options" by blockading Cuba, leaving the door open for invasion or bombing if the blockade failed to get rid of the missiles. Who was the only person who did not roll with the consensus? Why, Adlai Stevenson, of course. OK!

"There is disagreement in retrospect about what Stevenson really wanted," admitted Bartlett and Alsop. But they were sure it was something bad. And they quote that "non-admiring official" as saying: "He wanted to trade the Turkish, Italian and British missile bases for the Cuban bases." In the post-mortem speculation about who that official might have been, many fingers were pointed at Acheson, whose dislike for Stevenson is notorious. But Acheson coolly and flatly denied it. Said he: "I do not know to this day what Adlai Stevenson's position was, and I don't care. I never bothered to find out where he stood." =VFR

In fact-fiction books about Washington, everything, as the readers know, turns out well for the good guys. Now Dean Rusk, in a line Allen Drury could never have invented, sums up the victory: "We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked." It was a statement, wrote Bartlett and Alsop, that will go down with "such immortal phrases as 'Don't fire till you see the whites of their eyes.'" But the Post compensates for the lack of a surprise ending by hammering away at the villain. The Munich quote is bannered across the top of one page. Opposite is a full-page portrait of Adlai, chin in hand, looking like a man who is incapable of making up his Christmas list. "Stevenson was strong during the U.N. debate," reads the caption, "but inside the White House the hard-liners thought he was soft." X

The response from Stevenson was immediate and angry. On NBC-TV's early-morning Today show—which has the advantage of catching half-dressed and partly shaved Washington officials before they leave for the office—and in later conversations, Stevenson made some telling points to support his claim that "this must be some kind of record for irresponsible journalism." Stevenson said that he:

— "Emphatically approved the blockade on further arms shipments to Cuba" ^{Lat.} three days before the Kennedy announcement, and "opposed, equally emphatically, an invasion of Cuba at the risk of nuclear war until the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations had been used." ~

? — Never advocated a swap of bases, but merely predicted correctly that Khrushchev might bring up the

check

NO } matter. Stevenson's suggested response: to tell Khrushchev that the matter of foreign bases was already on the agenda of disarmament talks, but that those talks could not even begin until the weapons were out of Cuba. Says a White House aide and former hawk: "Anyone who did not think about the bases as possible points that would be raised in any negotiations after the blockade would have been nutty."

NO } Aside from some demonstrable inaccuracies in the story, the whole hawk-dove theme was a vast oversimplification. In an effort to examine all possibilities, everybody at the Executive Committee meetings offered ideas that they were not willing to live or die by. That was the advisers' function—and the final decisions were the President's. There was no doubt whatever about where he stood: during the hottest moments of the Cuba crisis he was planning in the most positive terms to invade Cuba if the Soviet Union did not forthwith promise to remove its missiles.

the B+A

LIE } After the Post article was published, the White House limped to Stevenson's defense. Pierre Salinger issued a brief, flabby statement attesting that Stevenson "strongly supported the decision taken by the President on the quarantine and brilliantly developed the U.S. position at the United Nations." But it did not deny the Bartlett-Alsop charges. On the same day, Stevenson was in Washington to attend an NSC Executive Committee meeting (where, like other top Cuba advisers, he received from Kennedy a silver calendar with the 13 crucial October days deeply etched). After the session, Stevenson was ushered into Kennedy's office, assured that the President had had nothing to do with the Post article.

"Dear Adlai." White House staffers reported that Stevenson left completely satisfied. This was far from the case. Kennedy had been almost cavalier, ignoring Stevenson's arguments that presidential advisers should be protected from leaks ("Advice is of little value if it is chilled by fear of disclosure or misrepresentation"), indignant only at the notion that anyone could think he would use Charles Bartlett as a mouthpiece.

Later, Kennedy wrote Stevenson a "Dear Adlai" letter that, without undercutting Bartlett and Alsop, expressed "regret at the unfortunate stir" and "fullest confidence" in Stevenson. Toward week's end, while introducing the President at a Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. Foundation dinner, Master of Ceremonies Stevenson joked about the whole flap. Introducing Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver as an "instant peace" salesman so successful that "he makes the United Nations cry for it," Stevenson quipped: "As for me. I've been crying for it for the past week." Adlai quoted Joseph Pulitzer's observation, "Accuracy is to a newspaper what virtue is to a lady"—but added: "A newspaper can always print a retraction." Kennedy chuckled, but made no attempt to match the Stevenson wit—and no attempt to show warmth toward Adlai.

Heroes & Bums. It remained far from clear whether the President had actually tried to hurt Stevenson through Bartlett and Alsop. Most of the evidence was to the contrary. What had probably happened was that some other New Frontiersmen, knowing of the President's lack of deep affection for Adlai, had felt free to knock him. What the whole controversy really did was to highlight the huge personal and philosophical differences between Kennedy and Stevenson. "We seem to be living in an era," said Stevenson last week, "when anyone who is for war is a hero and anyone who is for peace is a bum." This was the sort of slapdash accusation from which Stevenson himself has sometimes suffered, and it was a strange formulation of the

choices before U.S. policymakers. The great point Kennedy had recognized during the Cuba crisis was that there are times when the only way to achieve peace is to risk war. Again, Stevenson insisted that "it's time to stop this childish talk about hard and soft lines among the advisers of the President." The words are labels allowing of little subtlety, but they are roughly functional and are used all over Washington and by the President himself.

The President denies, both in public and in private, that he wants to pressure Stevenson out of the Administration. "It makes no sense for me to get rid of Stevenson," he says. "Where could I get anyone who could do half as good a job?" As for Stevenson, he believes that he is performing an important function at the United Nations. Says he: "The battle line is here, right here. But I would go in a minute if I thought the President wanted me to."

Although Stevenson's role on the battle line cannot have been helped by being undercut again by his own Administration, he remains an effective operator. The neutrals who greeted his appointment as a salvation have been somewhat disappointed; the Stevenson aloofness that prevents him from leaping into New Frontier society also prevents the kind of delegates' lounge chumminess that many expected of him. He has still been considered the pipeline from the smaller nations to the White House—and the line appears somewhat damaged.

The outlook is for Stevenson to stay at his post—at least for a while. But politics is not only a matter of principles, or of promises. More than anything else, politics is people—and there are few people on the political scene who seem less likely to form a smooth doubles team than Adlai Stevenson and John Kennedy. It was probably with that in mind that Adlai, when asked if he really believed that some New Frontiersmen were trying to force him out of office, replied: "No, this is the first time I've ever heard this mentioned. I'm not sure it will be the last time."

* Hove presumably rhymes with love. In a burlesque entitled "Last Drippings from the Great Certified Leak," the New York Times's senior columnist Arthur Krock, never wittier or more sardonic, suggests the word might first have been pronounced when McNamara predicted that a Soviet destroyer would "heave in sight." But ExComm's presiding officer, called "Himself," corrects him with "The word is hove." Otherwise, Krock turns ExComm into MadAv. "Let's melt this ball of wax and move the hardware from the shelf," suggests Krock's McNamara. "Suppose I start batting out the fungoes." Sorenson—or somebody identified as "T. S—"—says, "You mean toss it in the well and see the kind of splash it makes; follow it into the high grass and see if it eats; get down to where the rubber meets the road." The only possible mistake in the transcript that was leaked to him, admits Krock, is the section which reports Himself saying to the one dissenter, "I'll get back to you." Concludes Krock: "This last remark could have been 'I'll get back at you.' "

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Nation: HOW THEY'RE RUNNING FOR THE HOUSE

Friday, Nov. 02, 1962



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THE Republican Party's fondest hope has been to take control of the U.S. House of Representatives in the 1962 elections. To turn the trick, the G.O.P. needs to take 44 seats away from incumbent Democrats. This calls for a landslide which almost no observer sees in the offing. Most pre-Cuba guesses gave the G.O.P. a gain of about a dozen seats. What Cuba did to this estimate, few are willing to say.

THE NEW LINES. By far the greatest change will result from the redistricting required in 25 states after the 1960 census. A characteristic case is in Illinois, where seven-term Democrat Peter F. Mack Jr. and Freshman Republican Representative Paul Findley were squeezed into a new downstate district by a G.O.P. legislature that clearly hoped to sack Mack. An unpredictable liberal (he voted against foreign aid this year), Mack was given twelve rural Republican counties. Findley, a weekly newspaper publisher and a Goldwater conservative, seems ahead. But Mack is durable: when another G.O.P. legislature gerrymandered his district a decade ago he won anyway. In West Virginia, eight-term Democrat Cleveland M. Bailey, 76, has a new district that gives him a 50,000 registration advantage. But middle-roading G.O.P. Congressman Arch A. Moore Jr., 39, has won the endorsement of some labor groups, even a few Democratic leaders. A Democratic legislature in North Carolina threw the state's 4 only Republican Congressman, Charles R. Jonas, into a new district with Democratic Representative A. Paul Kitchin. The race is as close as the conservatism of the two men. Says Jonas: "There are spenders and savers. I'm a saver." Says Kitchin: "I'm a conservative, but not a mossback."

New York's Democratic Representative Samuel S. Stratton picked up some publicity in a vain try for his party's gubernatorial nomination. But Republicans outregister Democrats in his new district, and he is up against a pert state senator Mrs. Janet Hill Gordon.

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TWO WAYS ON CUBA. The Cuban issue cuts both ways. It may help some Democrats, on the theory that the voters will be rallying round the President. But many Republicans especially those who took a strong stand for action, see it as a help to them and their party.

Michigan Democrat Neil Staebler, a longtime backstage strategist, for weeks scoffed at the demands of Republican Alvin Bentley, a millionaire former Congressman, for a Cuba blockade. Cried he: "Anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of history should know that a blockade is an instrument of war. Is Bentley proposing that we sink Soviet freighters?" Bentley was indeed, and now he is making the most of his I-told-you-so chances. Florida Republican Edward J. Gurney, a war hero and former mayor of Winter Park claims that Kennedy's decision to blockade "was forced upon him by the leaders of my party—and the people are saying "Thank

God, he's got off his rocking chair.' " His opponent, conservative Democrat John Sutton, seems to have no answer, complains: "If I get beat, it'll be because he's the best TV personality I've ever seen." In California, Republican Congressmen John Rousselot and Edgar Hiestand have been demanding action on Cuba, still may lose because of redistricting and their membership in the John Birch Society.

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"This is the first time that George Clooney has actually been Photoshopped out of a picture."

BARACK OBAMA, paying tribute to the actor at a fundraiser held in Clooney's Hollywood home, explaining that his iconic "Hope" campaign poster of 2008 was actually from a photograph of the President sitting next to him

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Friday, Nov. 16, 1962

The Year the Middle of the Road Was Crowded

Democratic enthusiasts claimed victory —they called it "commanding," "massive," "smashing" and "a landslide." Some landslide. In arithmetical terms, the off-year elections of 1962 were almost a standoff. And in their portent to U.S. politics for the next two years, they meant difficult legislative going for the Democratic Kennedy Administration and the possibility of real trouble in 1964. The overall results:

· **GOVERNORS.** Numerically, it was a draw. With some races so close that the official results might not be known for weeks, it appeared that Democrats had taken over six chairs previously held by Republicans; it also seemed that Republicans had won six Democratic seats. But Republicans tallied their great triumphs in the big industrial states—New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Ohio. The G.O.P. winners in three of these states automatically became presidential factors. By handsomely winning re-election in New York, Nelson Rockefeller stood as the front runner for his party's 1964 nomination. If Rocky slips, Michigan's George Romney and Pennsylvania's William Scranton could move to the forefront. *not Rocky.*

· **THE SENATE.** Democrats dropped two seats they had held in the 87th Congress —but they picked up six that Republicans had held. This certainly was a victory, but it didn't make much difference to the legislative future. The results merely increased the already lopsided Democratic Senate majority to 68-32; and the performance of the 87th Congress showed that a big Democratic majority does not necessarily mean clear sailing for New Frontier legislation.

· **THE HOUSE.** Republicans had hoped to pick up from 15 to 20 seats—not nearly enough to take control of the House. On the other hand, President Kennedy had campaigned as no President before him for Democratic Congressional candidates. He argued that a Democratic gain would ensure passage of his programs. He failed to get that gain. Instead, the Democrats will have four fewer seats than they had before the election. The House line-up in the 88th Congress will be 259 Democrats and 176 Republicans. The same conservative Democratic committee chairmen who resisted the New Frontier before will still be there. On the record of the 87th Congress, that spells legislative problems for the New Frontier.

Across the U.S., extremists of both the right and the left suffered. The middle of the road—or perhaps its

slightly conservative lane—was crowded. The message of that conservative consensus, the mandate that it seemed to have picked up from the voters, was: the Federal Government should do less at home, in the way of welfare projects, and more abroad, in the act of fighting Communism. ✓

Ticket splitting was the rule: California, for example, elected a ^{Gov. N} Democratic Governor and a Republican Senator; Pennsylvania, Ohio and Oklahoma did just the opposite, choosing Republican Governors and Democratic Senators.

Democrats broke into traditional Republican strongholds in New England; Republicans made their best showing since Reconstruction in the South. In a dozen states, the voters split almost down the center of the party dividing line; rarely before in U.S. political history had there been elections in which so many Republican and Democratic candidates were separated by so few votes.

The only issue that seemed to make much difference was Cuba—and that issue certainly redounded to the Democrats. Of all Republican candidates, Indiana's Republican Senator Homer Capehart, California's Gubernatorial Hopeful Richard Nixon, Pennsylvania's Senate Candidate James Van Zandt and Minnesota's Veteran Representative Walter Judd had been arguing hardest and longest for a tough U.S. policy toward Cuba. President Kennedy took the issue away from them —and all four lost.

Many Democrats took great comfort in the fact that they had held down the losses ordinarily expected of the party in White House power during off-year elections. But that political cliché was not relevant to 1962; among other things. Democrats had lost 21 congressional seats even while Kennedy was winning in 1960; they therefore had fewer to lose this year. And downright disturbing to the Democratic future were the Republican gubernatorial wins in the big industrial states. That fact was acutely recognized by John Kennedy and the pragmatic politicians who surround him in the White House. Perhaps the best summary of the 1962 elections was uttered by a Kennedy aide. "The big states!" he groaned as he studied the returns. "The big states! The big states!"

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Friday, Dec. 07, 1962

Nation: The Buildup for Cuba: Just Like World War II

They were gone the instant they came—a brace of Air Force RF-101 jets screeching 200 ft. above Florida's Homestead Air Force Base. On the reviewing stand, President Kennedy turned to General Walter Sweeney, commander of the Tactical Air Command, and asked: "They wouldn't have been able to shoot down those ships at that speed and altitude, would they?" The general said no. Said Kennedy: "I'd like to see them again." And so the reconnaissance jets once more simulated the flights that had helped document the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba (see box).

Kennedy also paid his personal respects to the men of the Army's 1st Armored ("Old Ironsides") Division at Fort Stewart, Ga. During the U.S. buildup toward a possible invasion of Cuba, the division had been secretly moved 1,300 miles from Fort Hood, Texas. The operation took two weeks, with 40 trains carrying equipment and some men, while 13,000 other soldiers were airlifted.

The movement of the 1st Armored and other military activities during the Cuban crisis were disclosed last week as the Pentagon relaxed the security clampdown that had prevailed for a month and a half.

Early Warning. When Soviet missiles were first discovered in Cuba, the U.S. hastily improvised an early-warning system. Three Air Force long-range radar units, designed to track satellites, were focused on Cuba to pick up any sign of a firing. The network would have provided about five minutes' warning for the mid-Atlantic coastal region and about 15 minutes for most of the Strategic Air

Command bases—time enough to launch a retaliatory attack on Russia.

At the same time, SAC greatly increased the number of B-52 bombers—usually about 50%—on 15-minute ground alert. Dozens of SAC's B-52s fully armed with nuclear bombs flew 24-hour alerts; none was allowed to land until its replacement was in the air. And a special alert went out to most of the crews of the U.S.'s 156 operational intercontinental ballistic missiles (102 Atlases and 54 Titan I missiles).

When President Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine of Cuba, a U.S. fleet was on its way within hours. The U.S.S. Blandy, a destroyer, shoved off so quickly from Newport that it left behind its paymaster and his moneybags. On payday Lieut. James Eilberg, the supply officer, doled out the ship's petty-cash hoard of \$9,500, then collected money as it was spent in the ship's store, post office and "gedunk" (soda shop), and parceled it back out until everyone was paid.

At peak strength, the main quarantine force consisted of 16 destroyers, three cruisers, an antisubmarine aircraft carrier and six utility ships. Deployed in reserve were nearly 150 other ships, including the nuclear-powered carrier Enterprise. In all, the Navy came alongside 55 Cuba-bound ships, let them pass through after establishing that they carried no proscribed material. Navy planes and ships also detected and tracked half a dozen Soviet submarines. When the subs surfaced to recharge their batteries, they were politely hailed by Russian-speaking U.S. interpreters, then permitted to continue their voyage. One destroyer gathered a Dixieland combo on its deck, blared a jazz greeting across the water to a surfaced sub intruder. The Russians grinned like kids.

The U.S. Air Force lost 15 men during the alert: four in the crash of an RB-47 reconnaissance plane at Florida's

MacDill Air Force Base; four in an RB-47 crash at Kindley Air Force Base in Bermuda; six in the crack-up of a C-135 transport at Guantanamo, and U-2 Pilot Major Rudolf Anderson, who was shot down by antiaircraft fire while on a photo-reconnaissance flight—one of more than 2,000 sorties over Cuba by U.S.

planes.

"We Were Prepared." All the while, the buildup continued for a possible invasion. The Tactical Air Command airlifted more than 18,000 tons of equipment to staging areas in the southeastern U.S. Besides the 1st Armored, the U.S.

was prepared to throw in the 1st and 2nd infantry divisions, the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions, some 12,000 marines and more than 1,000 aircraft. Says a top-ranking admiral of the invasion plans: "We were prepared to execute an operation that would have compared in scope with the largest of World War II." It was that, plus the poised threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation against Russia, that undoubtedly caused Khrushchev to back away from his Cuban adventure.

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Friday, Dec. 07, 1962

Foreign Relations: The Happy Hot-Dog Eater

Russia's Armenian-born diplomatic rug peddler was the image of public affability.

No sooner did Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan arrive in New York last week, after 24 days of confabs with Castro, than he began posing for photographers while chomping hot dogs in the fashion of an old Brooklyn Dodgers fan. He spent a friendly evening with U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, much of it occupied by discussion of such matters as Pushkin's short stories. Bantering with newsmen, Mikoyan cracked that Stevenson was "more difficult" than Castro.

Even so, he loved them both—"Stevenson da, Castro da," But it was nyet, nyet, nyet when Mikoyan settled down to serious discussion of Cuba. During Mikoyan's small-talk sessions with Stevenson, some U.S. officials spoke of the possibility that the Russian was waiting to see President Kennedy before really doing business.

The fact could hardly have been further from the hope. Mikoyan flew from New York to Washington, spent more than three hours with Kennedy, who was flanked by State Secretary Dean Rusk and former Ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn ("Tommy") Thompson. Kennedy found himself enjoying the matching of wits with Mikoyan, and the dueling went straight on without the coffee break that has become customary during such afternoon sessions in the President's office. But when the two were done, they were still where they had started.

Kennedy stuck steadfastly to the key U.S. position: there must be inspection of Cuba by an international group to make sure that all the missiles and bombers were gone. The President read to Mikoyan the parts of Khrushchev's letters, both public and private, in which the Premier spelled out his promise to allow on-site inspection.

Mikoyan argued back that the Soviet Union had already done so much to meet Kennedy's demands for withdrawing offensive weapons that there really was no need for any inspection. Mikoyan even had the

effrontery to endorse Castro's preposterous position that he would permit U.N. inspection of Cuba only if the U.S.

would allow U.N. inspection of U.S. areas where—by Castro's claims—Cuban exiles and U.S. troops were still preparing to invade the island.

Next day, Mikoyan and Rusk lunched and talked for nearly three hours without making any progress. At week's end, Anastas Mikoyan headed home, presumably to report to Khrushchev. Communist ways being what they are, there was no telling what he would say—but he certainly could not claim that he had sold the U.S. any rugs.

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Friday, Dec. 07, 1962

The Atom: After 20 Years: More Hopes Than Fears

The new age began on a chill, grey afternoon 20 years ago. The site was a laboratory in a squash court beneath the stands of the University of Chicago's old Stagg Field Stadium. Gathered there was a team of scientists and engineers headed by Enrico Fermi, a refugee from Mussolini's Italy. They had finished building history's first nuclear reactor. Now they were using it to produce the first controlled nuclear reaction.

The reactor was beautifully simple. It was called a "pile," and it was literally that—a 500-ton pile of carefully machined bricks made of pure graphite. Imbedded in some of the bricks, in a precisely calculated pattern, were little cubes of uranium or uranium oxide. Long control rods, plated with the metallic element cadmium, were so set up that they could be withdrawn from, or inserted into, deep holes in the graphite.

That is all there was to it. The operation of the pile depended on natural properties of 1) uranium, which normally emits neutrons at a steady rate, 2) graphite, which slows neutrons down but does not absorb them, and 3) cadmium, which absorbs neutrons very effectively. As the control rods were withdrawn—so the experimenters figured—fewer of the neutrons from the uranium would be absorbed, and therefore more fission would occur. At some point of withdrawal, fission would be producing new batches of neutrons faster than the cadmium would be absorbing them. Result: a chain reaction.

At 10:37 on that morning of Dec. 2, 1942, Physicist George Weil stood ready to start withdrawing the final control rod.

which was marked to show how many feet and inches of the rod remained within the pile. "Pull it to 13 feet, George," Fermi said calmly, watching the meters set up to measure the neutron emission inside the pile. As Weil withdrew the rod, the meters clicked faster and faster. Fermi did some calculating with the little slide rule he always carried with him. "This is not it," he said. The rate of radiation leveled off as neutron emission from uranium and neutron absorption by cadmium came into equilibrium.

A Bottle of Chianti. Several times that morning, Fermi told Weil to pull the control rod out a little farther,

six inches or a foot. Each time the radiation increased, only to level off again—still too much control rod. After lunch, Fermi ordered the rod withdrawn another foot. Again the radiation leveled off. Then another six inches. Still not enough. "Pull it out another foot," Fermi called. It was precisely 3:25 p.m.

The meters clicked dizzily. "This is going to do it," said Fermi, working his slide rule. Recalls Weil: "I had to watch Fermi every second, waiting for orders. His face was motionless. His eyes darted from one dial to another. His expression was so calm it was hard. But suddenly his whole face broke into a broad smile." "The reaction is self-sustaining." Fermi announced. "The curve is exponential." Instead of leveling off, the rate of radiation was continuing to accelerate—a chain reaction was under way inside the pile.

Fermi let the reaction run on for 28 minutes, then ordered it stopped. Hungarian-born Physicist Eugene Wigner brought out a bottle of Chianti. Fermi sent out for paper cups. Nobody offered a toast—the moment was too solemn for that. Wrote Physicist Samuel K. Allison, a top Fermi assistant, in a recent article: "All of us in the laboratory knew that with the advent of the chain reaction the world would never be the same again."

A Threat of War. A total of 42 people (including one woman, Physicist Laura Woods) were present at the squash-court experiment. Last week 27 of the survivors —Fermi and several others are dead—gathered in Washington to observe the 20th birthday of the Atomic Age. At a floodlit ceremony outside the White House, President Kennedy spoke to the group. "This development which has played a significant role in our history and in our lives," he said, "can be either good or bad depending on the use to which it is put. It is the obligation of those who bear positions of responsibility in various governments of the world to make sure it is put to good use." Around the world, the 20th anniversary was an occasion for contemplating the uses to which atomic energy has been put—and may be put in the future.

Less than three years after the chain reaction in Chicago, the U.S. had built atomic bombs and dropped one on Hiroshima and one on Nagasaki. The years since then have witnessed, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, a vast buildup of nuclear weapons—more than enough, it is often pointed out, to be theoretically capable of destroying every human being on earth. And the continuing deadlock of U.S. and Russian negotiators in the test-ban talks at Geneva indicates that men cannot expect in the foreseeable future a trustworthy nuclear disarmament agreement between East and West.

Peaceful Explosions. If the darkest fears of 20 years ago have not been realized, neither have the highest hopes. Sunday-supplement visions of impending universal plenty, with nuclear reactors supplying unlimited cheap power, were grossly premature. Nuclear reactors still cannot produce electric power as cheaply as thermoelectric plants fueled with coal or oil. But mankind has received a huge, unforeseen bonus from the radioisotopes created in nuclear reactors. They are used in countless applications in industry and science, from detecting tiny, hidden flaws in machinery parts to tracing physiological processes in the human body.

Last week Physicist Edward Teller, the dour genius who led the U.S. in its race to develop the H-bomb

ahead of the Russians, reported on the progress of the Atomic Energy Commission's Project Plowshare, exploring peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. He told of a Plowshare test in Nevada last summer in which a thermonuclear device with a power of 100 kilotons (equivalent to 100,000 tons of TNT) was exploded underground, creating in a few seconds a crater 1,200 ft. wide and 320 ft. deep. Such explosions, he said, could be used to make harbors and canals, remove earth and rock covering mineral deposits. Nuclear explosions, said Teller, have "the potentiality of becoming the first really important and thoroughly economic use of atomic energy." The reasons why nuclear explosions have not already been used in practical, peaceful projects, he said, are "a lack of imagination, a lack of enterprise, and some political timidity."

Atomic batteries to power radio transmitters have already been used in U.S. space satellites, and an AEC project is developing a special reactor for use inside space vehicles (see SCIENCE). Before many years, AEC predicts, nuclear engines will be propelling vehicles through space, as they already propel submarines, surface warships, and the nuclear merchant ship Savannah. AEC's Project Rover is actively working toward that end.

Dispelling a Cloud. After slow beginnings, the development of power reactors has reached the point where, according to a recent AEC report to the President, atomic power is "on the threshold of competitiveness with conventional power" in parts of the U.S. where coal and oil are relatively expensive. During the 1970s, AEC predicted, nuclear power will become economically competitive "throughout most of the country."

In its report, AEC urged heavier stress on development of "breeder" reactors, which will create more nuclear fuel than they consume. Present-model nuclear reactors operate through fission of scarce and costly uranium 235. Natural uranium is mostly U-238; less than 1% of it is U-235. Breeder reactors would convert nonfissionable U-238 into fissionable plutonium, or convert the fairly common element thorium into fissionable U-233 (neither plutonium nor U-233 is found in nature). A few days before the 20th anniversary of the first chain reaction, AEC announced that its experimental plutonium reactor had achieved a self-sustaining reaction, verifying that plutonium can be used as fuel in a power reactor.

Breeder reactors, opening up a virtually limitless supply of power, will dispel a cloud that hangs over the future of mankind—the prospect that within a few centuries the earth's supply of coal and petroleum will be exhausted. Since modern civilization could not survive without economical sources of power, historians of the future may record that the train of atomic development beginning on Dec. 2, 1942 preserved the civilization that it sometimes seemed to threaten.

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Friday, Dec. 07, 1962

Nation: OVER CUBA: Flak at 11 o'clock

At MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, Lieut. Colonel Joseph O'Grady, 41, commander of the 29th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, arose at 2:30 a.m., by 3:30 was being briefed in the base operations building. The date was Oct. 29, 1962. O'Grady's mission: to lead a flight of RF-101 "Voodoo" supersonic jets on a low-level aerial reconnaissance flight over Cuba. His specific targets: an airfield and a missile site. Last week O'Grady, who was one of 25 Air Force, Navy and Marine reconnaissance pilots who received the Distinguished Flying Cross for their work, wrote the most detailed account so far of how it feels to fly—and be shot at—over Castro's Cuba. O'Grady's laconic report:

I WAS issued the maps that would be I required for my flight, then plotted the positions of my targets from the longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates also given me by Intelligence. At this time the Intelligence specialist briefed me in detail on the targets; for example, on the airfield he gave me the runway alignment compass direction, approximate site of the building areas, and he gave me the list of Essential Elements of Information, referred to as EEIs, that would be required of the airfield.

This process was then repeated for the missile site. After the briefing was concluded, I was given target study folders that contained various items such as detailed maps, photographs, and drawings of the target proper, and associated items of equipment that I could reasonably expect to find. After these items were covered, the Intelligence officer briefed me on the Cuban early warning radar net and surface-to-air missile coverage.

"Dotson Seven One." In a short span of time we had prepared our maps and flight logs. We knew exactly where we would be every second of our flight. We also knew the exact amount of fuel that would be required for the mission, and the frequencies to be used to contact the various radio stations en route. I knew my target complex as well as I know my own home town.

The duty officer gave me the frequency and the code name of a powerful control station to whom I was to make an in-flight report, giving the specific EEIs as briefed by the Intelligence officer. I was given the number of my aircraft and my call sign; from wheels-up to touchdown I was known as "Dotson Seven One."

The departure and climb out to altitude were exactly as briefed. We were maintaining radio silence and utilized our normal command hand signals for any communication that was required. Our flight down the Florida peninsula was uneventful.

Nearing the Cuban mainland, I reached my descent point. The Voodoo nosed over and I went "down on the deck." At this low altitude I was undetected by the long-range radar. The weather in the lower altitudes was broken cumulus, or scattered fluffy clouds, with scattered rain showers. Sea haze interfered to a small degree with my visibility. But it was good enough that I easily spotted my preplanned landfall point. It was a green, marshy outcropping of land.

Keeping low, I flew inland until I reached a river inlet to a big bay. This was my initial point, or the place where I turned the plane on its target course. I trimmed the aircraft to allow the cameras to pass over the airfield and missile site at the best possible direction and altitude for the photography that was desired.

As the target came into view, I knew the study I had done was correct and the materials furnished for me for this study were accurate to nth of a degree.

Toward Home Plate. On my initial flight on the target area, I secured photographs of both targets. Airplanes with mechanics at work were directly below. After about ten seconds of controlled flight with four of six of the cameras in the airplane working, we turned "down and around" and came in for another target run from a different direction.

On the second run, when the cameras were running, our aircraft were stable, trying for the most distortion-free photographs. Bursts of enemy antiaircraft fire appeared at the 11 o'clock position, or just to the left of the course of my plane. Almost simultaneously, the bursts were blossoming back on my left all the way to the 6 o'clock position.

*Monday
Oct 29*

I immediately called the ground fire to the attention of my wingman. Almost at the same instant he also was informing me. This was the first break of radio silence since we departed MacDill.

Our briefing instructions prior to mission departure were to immediately break off any target run if fired upon.

We immediately headed for "home plate." En route I was able to visually locate an enemy missile site. Using our preplanned tactics, we evaded Cuban radar coverage and brushed treetops and sea spray away from the island.

Weather conditions were the same on our return flight as they were inbound.

We hadn't been gone long. The Voodoo is a fast airplane. Once out of the range of the detection radar, we climbed up to cruising altitude and streaked for home.

We got what we were sent for—target coverage.

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